This article provides an expanded computational evaluation of three standardized lattice-based post-quantum signature schemes—ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and Falcon-512—using reference implementations from the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) project. Unlike prior benchmarking efforts that rely on optimized implementations or hardware-specific tuning, this work focuses on reproducible baseline performance on a conventional CPU platform. We measure key generation, signing and verification times across 5,000 iterations and analyze the effect of message length on signing cost. Results confirm that ML-DSA variants achieve significantly faster signing and key generation, whereas Falcon-512 produces substantially smaller keys and signatures. The study further highlights the computational dominance of lattice operations over hashing, explaining the weak dependence of signing cost on message size. These findings aim to support system architects evaluating the practical feasibility of standardized post-quantum signature algorithms.
This article provides an expanded computational evaluation of three standardized lattice-based post-quantum signature schemes—ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and Falcon-512—using reference implementations from the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) project. Unlike prior benchmarking efforts that rely on optimized implementations or hardware-specific tuning, this work focuses on reproducible baseline performance on a conventional CPU platform. We measure key generation, signing and verification times across 5,000 iterations and analyze the effect of message length on signing cost. Results confirm that ML-DSA variants achieve significantly faster signing and key generation, whereas Falcon-512 produces substantially smaller keys and signatures. The study further highlights the computational dominance of lattice operations over hashing, explaining the weak dependence of signing cost on message size. These findings aim to support system architects evaluating the practical feasibility of standardized post-quantum signature algorithms.
This study reviews post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for secure communication, focusing on standardized lattice-based schemes and their practical deployment implications. Classical public-key systems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography remain central to secure communication, but their long-term security is threatened by quantum algorithms capable of solving factorization and discrete logarithm problems. The study adopts a hybrid approach combining literature-based review with dataset-driven performance analysis. The empirical evaluation compares ML-KEM and ML-DSA with RSA-4096 and ECDSA-P256 using CPU benchmarking and network simulation metrics. Results indicate that ML-KEM provides substantial computational advantages over RSA-4096, making it suitable for latency-sensitive key establishment. ML-DSA also demonstrates competitive performance, especially in verification, but introduces larger signature sizes than ECDSA-P256. The analysis shows that the main deployment challenge is not computational feasibility but increased communication overhead caused by larger keys, ciphertexts, and signatures. These findings suggest that post-quantum migration requires more than direct algorithm replacement. Effective deployment should involve protocol optimization, crypto-agility, hybrid transition strategies, and context-specific parameter selection. Although the dataset focuses mainly on lattice-based algorithms, the study confirms the practical relevance of standardized post-quantum schemes for future secure communication infrastructure and identifies directions for broader evaluation across additional PQC families, including code-based, hash-based, multivariate approaches, real-world networks, and implementation-level security testing in practice contexts.
Large-scale quantum computers would invalidate the hardness assumptions behind many deployed public key cryptosystems and reduce the effective strength of symmetric primitives. As a result, governments and industry have begun a multi-year transition toward post quantum cryptography and quantum safe protocols. This survey provides a structured overview of that transition. It classifies the main families of post quantum schemes, with emphasis on the standardized lattice based and hash-based algorithms ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON and Classic McEliece, and it summarizes their parameter sets, key sizes, ciphertext or signature lengths and performance profiles across the NIST security categories. The survey then reviews stateful hash-based signatures, multivariate and isogeny-based proposals and emerging MPC in the head constructions and discusses their security assumptions and level of maturity. At the protocol level it analyzes hybrid designs for TLS 1.3, QUIC, IPsec, SSH and public key infrastructures and draws lessons from early deployments in web, IoT, and cloud environments. By collating detailed parameter data from recent NIST standards and reference implementations and mapping them to concrete deployment scenarios, the survey links high-level policy guidance to engineering choices. The paper also synthesizes cross cutting implementation and migration challenges, including side channel resistance, cryptographic agility, asset inventory and migration planning, and algorithm diversity across deployments. Finally, it identifies open problems such as leakage resilient implementations, domain specific post quantum profiles for constrained devices and combinations of post quantum cryptography with quantum key distribution. The goal is to give researchers and practitioners a coherent reference that connects algorithms, standards, protocol mechanisms and deployment guidance for building quantum safe systems.
The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
Conventional public-key cryptographic systems are increasingly threatened by advances in quantum computing, accelerating the need for robust post-quantum cryptographic solutions. Among these, Falcon, a compact lattice-based digital signature scheme, has emerged as a leading candidate in the NIST post-quantum standardization process due to its efficiency and theoretical security grounded in hard lattice problems. This work introduces Falcon-M, a modified version of the Falcon algorithm that significantly reduces implementation complexity. It does so by replacing Falcon’s intricate trapdoor-based key-generation mechanism with a simplified approach that utilizes randomized polynomial Gaussian sampling and fast Fourier transform (FFT) operations. Falcon-M incorporates SHA-512 hashing and discrete Gaussian sampling to preserve cryptographic soundness and statistical randomness while maintaining the core structure of Falcon’s signing and verification processes. We formally specify the Falcon-M algorithm, provide an updated pseudocode, and offer a comparative analysis with the original Falcon in terms of algorithmic complexity, security assumptions, and implementation overhead. Additionally, we present formal lemmas and theorems to ensure correctness and define theoretical bounds on forgery resistance. Although Falcon-M does not rely on a formal cryptographic trapdoor, we demonstrate that it achieves strong practical security based on assumptions related to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. Falcon-M is thus well-suited for lightweight post-quantum applications, particularly in resource-constrained environments, such as embedded systems and Internet-of-Things (IoT) platforms.
Falcon is an efficient and secure postquantum signature scheme for services based on quantum computing. It employs the hash-and-sign approach in conjunction with the Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) framework on Number Theory Research Unit (NTRU) lattices. This study evaluated the operation procedure and the capacity to run the Falcon scheme using a key length of 1024 bits on different hardware and software platforms, such as personal computers and Raspberry Pi 4 and Windows, Ubuntu, and Android operating systems. The following results were obtained: file sizes ranged from 30 to 5449268 KB, digital signature times ranged from 50 to 19500ms, and signature verification times ranged from 14 to 19000ms. The results show that the Falcon post-quantum signature scheme works stably and ensures execution speed on different platforms, similar to current digital signature schemes.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of two lattice-based post-quantum digital signature schemes: FALCON and SOLMAE. FALCON which was finallty selected by NIST for PQC standardization, represents an efficient realization of the GPV framework over NTRU lattices. SOLMAE, inspired by FALCON, Mitaka, and Antrag, aims to improve implementation simplicity and performance while preserving strong security guarantees. Adopting a pedagogical approach, we provide algorithmic insights into both schemes and conduct practical evaluations using their Python implementations, focusing on key generation, signing, and verification procedures. Performance comparisons at two NIST security levels (512 and 1024 bits) highlight SOLMAE’s potential advantages in simplicity and execution time, suggesting its suitability for deployment in resource-constrained environments.