The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The imminent threat of quantum computing necessitates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure critical infrastructure, particularly within mobile Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. This study validates the feasibility of such an integration through a detailed performance analysis of a PQC-secured communication architecture. A virtualized testbed was developed to simulate a network of Mobile Manufacturing Trucks (MMTs), acting as IIoT clients using Node-RED, transmitting real-time sensor data to a central Security Operations Center (SOC) running a Mosquitto MQTT broker. The security of the data channel is enhanced via an applicationlayer hybrid scheme that augments a standard TLS connection with the NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation mechanism, orchestrated by distributed C-based cryptographic services. Performance evaluations of this end-to-end system yielded highly positive results. The mean end-to-end responsiveness was measured at 108.80 ms, successfully meeting the sub- 300 ms requirement for real-time industrial applications. Analysis of the latency distribution revealed a realistic network jitter profile, with a small number of outliers, while the majority of transmissions remained well below 150 ms. Furthermore, CPU utilization on all virtual machines remained minimal, confirming the computational efficiency of ML-KEM for resource-constrained edge devices. These findings provide strong quantitative evidence that a hybrid PQC approach is a viable and performant solution for securing mobile IIoT systems, aligning with the principles of the IEC 62443 standard. This work establishes a practical blueprint for deploying quantum-resistant protocols, with future research directed toward hardware-based validation, the integration of PQC digital signatures, and AI-driven anomaly detection.
The recent introduction of Google’s Willow quantum chip has demonstrated remarkable computational capabilities, solving problems in microseconds that would take classical computers millions of years. As quantum computers advance toward cryptographic relevance, existing encryption algorithms become vulnerable to attacks that could break them within seconds or minutes, rendering current cryptographic protections ineffective. This necessitates the establishment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards to secure systems in the quantum era. This study evaluates the performance of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms ML-KEM (512, 768, 1024) and ML-DSA (2, 3, 5) on a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B, representing baseline IoT device capabilities. Using the Liboqs library, each algorithm was executed across 1000 iterations in a real-world wireless network environment connected to a router, accounting for practical network conditions such as packet loss, latency, and jitter to assess computational feasibility under resource-constrained conditions. Experimental results demonstrate the practical viability of PQC algorithms in IoT environments. ML-KEM-512 achieves encapsulation in 55.76 μs and decapsulation in 56.15 μs, with key generation in 123.78 μs (median), while ML-DSA-44 completes signature generation in 379.83 μs and verification in 159.38 μs. These findings confirm that both ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms offer efficient and rapid performance, making them suitable candidates for securing IoT devices against quantum threats.
The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has introduced millions of resource-constrained devices into critical infrastructures, consumer environments, and industrial systems. These devices rely on lightweight communication protocols such as MQTT to support low-power, intermittent, and bandwidth-limited operation. However, common TLS algorithms used to secure MQTT communications are vulnerable to quantum attacks made feasible by Shor's algorithm. As a result, IoT infrastructures must evaluate and adopt post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) methods capable of providing long-term resilience. This report investigates the implementation of PQC algorithms within an MQTT-based IoT networks using three Raspberry Pis. Specifically, it integrates the FALCON digital signature scheme, one of NIST's selected post-quantum signature algorithms, to maintain message authenticity and integrity across resource-constrained MQTT clients and brokers. By measuring system performance, the research characterizes the practical trade-offs of deploying lattice-based PQC on lightweight hardware.
The threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer contributes to an increasing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Compared to existing research efforts regarding the integration of PQC into the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, industrial communication protocols have so far been neglected. Since industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) are typically deployed for decades, protection against such long-term threats is needed. In this work, we propose two novel solutions for the integration of post-quantum (PQ) primitives (digital signatures and key establishment) into the industrial protocol Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA): a hybrid solution combining conventional cryptography with PQC and a solution solely based on PQC. Both approaches provide mutual authentication between client and server and are realized with certificates fully compliant to the X.509 standard. We implement the two solutions and measure and evaluate their performance across three different security levels. All selected algorithms (Kyber, Dilithium, and Falcon) are candidates for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We show that Falcon is a suitable option – especially – when using floating-point hardware provided by our ARM-based evaluation platform. Our proposed hybrid solution provides PQ security for early adopters but comes with additional performance and communication requirements. Our solution solely based on PQC shows superior performance across all evaluated security levels in terms of handshake duration compared to conventional OPC UA but comes at the cost of increased handshake sizes. In addition to our performance evaluation, we provide a proof of security in the symbolic model for our two PQC-based variants of OPC UA. For this proof, we use the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif and formally verify confidentiality and authentication properties of our quantum-resistant variants.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens the security ofclassical public-key cryptography, necessitating the transition toward post-quantum cryptographic (PQC)algorithms standardized by NIST. At the same time, modern Internet protocols such as HTTP/3—runningover the QUIC transport protocol—are becoming widely deployed, offering reduced latency and improvedreliability compared to traditional TCP+TLS stacks. Ensuring that HTTP/3 infrastructure remains secure inthe post-quantum era requires practical implementations that integrate PQC algorithms without causingprohibitive performance overheads. In this study, we present the development of a PQC–enabled Apacheweb server that supports HTTP/3 through a custom OpenSSL 3.5.4 provider embedding the NISTstandardized ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms. Our implementation integrates PQC primitives into theQUIC handshake via modified OpenSSL EVP interfaces and enables PQC-based certificates and keyencapsulation mechanisms within a Caddy reverse proxy + Apache server architecture. Performanceevaluations were conducted on heterogeneous hardware, including a Raspberry Pi 4 and an Intel-baseddesktop system, under realistic network conditions. Experimental results show that ML-KEM and MLDSA introduce moderate handshake latency (≈18%) and minimal throughput reduction (4–8%). Across allconfigurations, HTTP/3's multiplexed, UDP-based design mitigated PQC-related delays, maintaining morethan 90% of classical throughput. The results demonstrate that integrating standardized PQC algorithmsinto modern web servers is both feasible and efficient, validating HTTP/3 as a strong foundation forquantum-resilient Internet communication. This work provides an operational reference for deploying PQCwithin web infrastructures and highlights pathways for future enhancements such as hybrid key exchange,certificate compression, and hardware acceleration.
Recent progress in quantum computers severely endangers the security of widely used public-key cryptosystems and of all communication that relies on it. Thus, the US NIST is currently exploring new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that are robust against quantum computers. Security is seen as one of the most critical issues of low-power IoT devices-even with pre-quantum public-key cryptography-since IoT devices have tight energy constraints, limited computational power and strict memory limitations. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first in-depth investigation of the application of potential post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature algorithms (DSAs) proposed in the related US NIST process to a state-of-the-art, TLS-based, low-power IoT infrastructure. We implemented these new KEMs and DSAs in such a representative infrastructure and measured their impact on energy consumption, latency and memory requirements during TLS handshakes on an IoT edge device. Based on our investigations, we gained the following new insights. First, we show that the main contributor to high TLS handshake latency is the higher bandwidth requirement of post-quantum primitives rather than the cryptographic computation itself. Second, we demonstrate that a smart combination of multiple DSAs yields the most energy-, latency- and memory-efficient public key infrastructures, in contrast to NIST's goal to standardize only one algorithm. Third, we show that code-based, isogeny-based and lattice-based algorithms can be implemented on a low-power IoT edge device based on an off-the-shelf Cortex M4 microcontroller while maintaining viable battery runtimes. This is contrary to much research that claims dedicated hardware accelerators are mandatory.