The arrival of practical quantum computing threatens the classical public-key cryptography satellite communication relies on, a threat most acute for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites whose missions span many years. While post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has been studied extensively for terrestrial networks, work bringing it into LEO systems has stayed close to the algorithms and rarely connected to the system-level architecture that must run them under tight resource limits. This study addresses that gap through a bibliometric analysis of 56 Scopus-indexed publications from 2020 to 2026, using keyword co-occurrence and clustering to describe how quantum-secure satellite communication is organized. The analysis identifies four dominant thematic clusters and exposes a structural separation between PQC research and satellite architecture research, sharpest under the constrained conditions of LEO. The study proposes a Resource-Security Co-Design framework uniting lightweight cryptographic control, adaptive authentication, physical-layer entropy reinforcement, and resource-aware orchestration within one architecture, coordinating security and resource management as a single design rather than swapping PQC in as a component. An accompanying feasibility model relates computational complexity, transmission overhead, and onboard resources, setting operational boundaries within which a LEO-class satellite can sustain quantum-safe security. The central contribution is the traceable link between identified gaps and synthesized architecture.
The arrival of practical quantum computing threatens the classical public-key cryptography satellite communication relies on, a threat most acute for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites whose missions span many years. While post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has been studied extensively for terrestrial networks, work bringing it into LEO systems has stayed close to the algorithms and rarely connected to the system-level architecture that must run them under tight resource limits. This study addresses that gap through a bibliometric analysis of 56 Scopus-indexed publications from 2020 to 2026, using keyword co-occurrence and clustering to describe how quantum-secure satellite communication is organized. The analysis identifies four dominant thematic clusters and exposes a structural separation between PQC research and satellite architecture research, sharpest under the constrained conditions of LEO. The study proposes a Resource-Security Co-Design framework uniting lightweight cryptographic control, adaptive authentication, physical-layer entropy reinforcement, and resource-aware orchestration within one architecture, coordinating security and resource management as a single design rather than swapping PQC in as a component. An accompanying feasibility model relates computational complexity, transmission overhead, and onboard resources, setting operational boundaries within which a LEO-class satellite can sustain quantum-safe security. The central contribution is the traceable link between identified gaps and synthesized architecture.
To solve the issue of new security threats to the satellite-based IoT (Sat-IoT) networks introduced by quantum computing, this research intends to create a quantum-resistant communication protocol of the satellite category of networks (Sat-IoT).As novel low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations emerge to enable the reach of global IoT networks, secure and flexible communication in the presence of quantum-capable adversaries constitutes the most important consideration.In the given study, the post-quantum cryptographic package (lattice-based encryption: Kyber-1024) is combined with the reconfigurable antenna system in order to perform enhanced two-level security.A new protocol suite is proposed combining a quantum-safe key exchange, physical-layer beam reconfiguration and integrity-aware adaptive link management.The model is an analytical model which is verified with satellite channel requirements utilizing LEO dynamics.The most important measures of performance are key compromise probability, signal-in-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), and encryption latency of simulated quantum attacks.The findings show that the suggested protocol can better the key compromise resistance levels by up to 82 percent than the conventional ECC-based or RSA-based protocols.The adaptive antenna subsystem will also increase the resilience of the links in a high interference environment by 45 per cent.These findings help find out that the cryptographic hardening, combined with antenna level adaptability, can improve the Sat-IoT network survivability in the quantum age tremendously.To sum up, this work looks promising as a similar work can eventually be employed to allow scalable and forward-compatible secure satellite-IoT communication and acts as a scalable anchor of future quantum-safe Sat-IoT implementations.
Satellite systems rely on a robust yet light weight cryptographic solution for the security of ground systems, communications links, Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C), payloads, onboard systems and associated subsystems. Cryptography ensures data integrity and overall security especially for satellites whose missions and data transmitted are in general and by global practices included in Critical National Infrastructures (CNIs). But emerging cybersecurity threats might render cryptographic solutions such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie–Hellman (DH) and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) ineffective in securing space assets. Quantum cryptography offers a better solution to the emerging threats of relentless and sophisticated systems and adversaries. This paper evaluates the performance of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) when deployed. The research explored the various standards mapped out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for PQC deployment. Current security architecture of satellite systems was compared to what the PQC solution will offer to these highly classified assets. The paper further explored algorithms in place and how effective they could be in the space industry. In the space sector, deploying PQC requires a beta analysis of its performance; which was explored in the third chapter of this work. Challenges and Deployment Considerations and Computational and Resource Constraints of PQC deployment was evaluated in the fifth and sixth sections of this work. The paper concluded by acknowledging the potential complexities in the eventual wholistic adoption and deployment of Quantum Cryptography.
With the rapid advancement of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, ensuring the security of satellite-to-ground communication has become a critical concern. Traditional cryptographic techniques, while effective against classical attacks, face increasing threats from quantum computing. This paper proposes a quantum key secure transmission method tailored for LEO satellite-ground communication scenarios. The method integrates quantum key distribution (QKD) with dynamic channel estimation and orbital mobility prediction to support secure and low-latency key handshakes between satellites and ground stations. A hybrid encryption strategy is introduced, where QKD-generated keys are used to refresh symmetric session keys in real time, significantly enhancing resistance to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method ensures stable key distribution under Doppler-shifted and intermittent link conditions, achieving improved secrecy capacity and resilience against quantum-level adversaries. This work provides a viable and scalable quantum-safe communication solution for future secure satellite networks.
As quantum computing progresses, longstanding security assumptions that form the foundations of today's digital infrastructure are being undermined, and new cryptographic mechanisms are needed that can resist attacks from a quantum computer. In this study, the bibliometric analysis of 1346 Web of Science Core Collection documents from 2015 to 2026 have been used to map the development, intellectual structure and emerging cybersecurity applications of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Bibliometrix/Biblioshiny and VOSviewer were used to perform performance analysis and science mapping, including annual production, citation dynamics, author productivity, institutional and country contributions, source concentration, keyword co-occurrence, thematic positioning, and topic evolution. The results indicate that research has accelerated quickly, from less than 10 publications per year in 2015-2016 to 456 in 2025, and that 2026 is a partial indexing year. Citation influence is dominated by China and the United States, and the most visible affiliations include the Chinese Academy of Sciences, State University System of Florida, and Florida Atlantic University. IEEE Access is the leading publication outlet. Keyword and thematic analyses show that the field has moved from foundational cryptanalysis and mathematical constructions toward lattice-based cryptography, hardware acceleration, NIST standardization, CRYSTALS-Kyber/ML-KEM, authentication, blockchain, Internet of Things, and migration-oriented cybersecurity. The study further identifies a post-standardization shift from algorithm competition to implementation assurance, crypto-agility, interoperability, side-channel resilience, and sector-specific deployment. These findings provide an updated evidence base for researchers, cybersecurity practitioners, standards bodies, and organizations planning quantum-safe migration.
With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technology, IoT edge devices widely deployed in industrial settings are facing severe threats to their quantum-resistant security. This work focuses on the challenges of adapting Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) for resource-constrained environments. This work systematically identifies four critical obstacles: difficulties in physical integration due to device heterogeneity; constraints imposed by the limited computing power and storage resources of edge nodes on PQC algorithm execution; compatibility gaps between QKD/PQC and existing industrial protocols (such as Modbus and Profinet); and the engineering cost pressures associated with large-scale deployment. To address these issues, the paper proposes three synergistic lightweight countermeasures: (1) a tiered deployment architecture for quantum-safe security that accommodates device heterogeneity, enabling dynamic trade-offs between security strength and resource overhead; (2) middleware for quantum-classical hybrid network protocol coordination, ensuring seamless integration between QKD/PQC and industrial control protocols; and (3) a three-tier distributed key management mechanism (edge node, network proxy, and central system) that offloads computation- and storage-intensive tasks to high-resource nodes, thereby alleviating bottlenecks at the edge. Experimental validation within a smart manufacturing factory's sensor network demonstrates that the proposed scheme maintains post-quantum security capabilities (with QKD integration validated at the proof-of-concept level) while reducing per-node deployment costs by approximately 92.4% compared to pure QKD solutions and by about 32% compared to pure PQC solutions, all while facilitating seamless, non-disruptive upgrades. This study indicates that lightweight algorithm design, hardware-software co-optimization, and tiered architectural deployment constitute a viable pathway for advancing IoT edge security into the quantum-safe era.
Abstract: This study advances a unifying systems perspective on quantum-safe network security by synthesizing recent progress in quantum cryptography with practical integration patterns across carrier-grade infrastructures. Concept analysis distinguishes the roles of quantum key distribution (QKD), device-independent variants, quantum authentication, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within zero-trust architectures. Building on this, a layered framework—spanning physical/entanglement resources, key management, crypto-agility, control plane orchestration, and policy/compliance—is articulated to support end-to-end, composable guarantees. The problem addressed is the realization of verifiable, quantum-resilient security under operational constraints involving latency, key-rate variability, and heterogeneous trust assumptions. Methodology combines a structured literature synthesis with formal composability mapping to universal composability principles, adversarial threat modeling for quantum-enabled attackers, and testbed/simulation evaluation of hybrid QKD–PQC pipelines across L2–L3 segments and 5G/6G backhaul scenarios. Key results indicate that (i) selective QKD deployment on high-value links coupled with PQC at endpoints enhances resilience while preserving crypto-agility; (ii) automated key-lifecycle orchestration reduces exposure windows; and (iii) device-independent assurances strengthen guarantees where trust relaxation is necessary. The impact is a deployment-ready reference architecture, measurable integration metrics, and guidance aligned with emerging standards for critical infrastructure and national networks. The implications extend to procurement, compliance, and roadmap planning for quantum-era network security. Keywords: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), hybrid QKD–PQC, composable security, device-independent QKD, zero-trust networks, key management and orchestration, 5G/6G backhaul, network security architecture, standards and interoperability