As quantum computing progresses, longstanding security assumptions that form the foundations of today's digital infrastructure are being undermined, and new cryptographic mechanisms are needed that can resist attacks from a quantum computer. In this study, the bibliometric analysis of 1346 Web of Science Core Collection documents from 2015 to 2026 have been used to map the development, intellectual structure and emerging cybersecurity applications of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Bibliometrix/Biblioshiny and VOSviewer were used to perform performance analysis and science mapping, including annual production, citation dynamics, author productivity, institutional and country contributions, source concentration, keyword co-occurrence, thematic positioning, and topic evolution. The results indicate that research has accelerated quickly, from less than 10 publications per year in 2015-2016 to 456 in 2025, and that 2026 is a partial indexing year. Citation influence is dominated by China and the United States, and the most visible affiliations include the Chinese Academy of Sciences, State University System of Florida, and Florida Atlantic University. IEEE Access is the leading publication outlet. Keyword and thematic analyses show that the field has moved from foundational cryptanalysis and mathematical constructions toward lattice-based cryptography, hardware acceleration, NIST standardization, CRYSTALS-Kyber/ML-KEM, authentication, blockchain, Internet of Things, and migration-oriented cybersecurity. The study further identifies a post-standardization shift from algorithm competition to implementation assurance, crypto-agility, interoperability, side-channel resilience, and sector-specific deployment. These findings provide an updated evidence base for researchers, cybersecurity practitioners, standards bodies, and organizations planning quantum-safe migration.
As quantum computing progresses, longstanding security assumptions that form the foundations of today's digital infrastructure are being undermined, and new cryptographic mechanisms are needed that can resist attacks from a quantum computer. In this study, the bibliometric analysis of 1346 Web of Science Core Collection documents from 2015 to 2026 have been used to map the development, intellectual structure and emerging cybersecurity applications of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Bibliometrix/Biblioshiny and VOSviewer were used to perform performance analysis and science mapping, including annual production, citation dynamics, author productivity, institutional and country contributions, source concentration, keyword co-occurrence, thematic positioning, and topic evolution. The results indicate that research has accelerated quickly, from less than 10 publications per year in 2015-2016 to 456 in 2025, and that 2026 is a partial indexing year. Citation influence is dominated by China and the United States, and the most visible affiliations include the Chinese Academy of Sciences, State University System of Florida, and Florida Atlantic University. IEEE Access is the leading publication outlet. Keyword and thematic analyses show that the field has moved from foundational cryptanalysis and mathematical constructions toward lattice-based cryptography, hardware acceleration, NIST standardization, CRYSTALS-Kyber/ML-KEM, authentication, blockchain, Internet of Things, and migration-oriented cybersecurity. The study further identifies a post-standardization shift from algorithm competition to implementation assurance, crypto-agility, interoperability, side-channel resilience, and sector-specific deployment. These findings provide an updated evidence base for researchers, cybersecurity practitioners, standards bodies, and organizations planning quantum-safe migration.
With the emergence of quantum computers, classical cryptography is facing significant challenges. Address this compelling problem, it is the need of hour to develop Post Quantum cryptography (PQC), or quantum-resistant cryptography. PQC is a rapidly evolving field in computer science. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) posted a call for inviting new generation of PQC algorithms. This paper aims to explore the significance and relevance of PQC in the future. Performing bibliometric analysis is important for gathering the necessary information about this discipline. Performance analysis and science mapping are done to extract valuable insights from the dataset. The dataset includes 14,230 records extracted from the Scopus database. The analysis is done using qualitative as well as quantitative approaches. The quantity approach focuses on the number of publications and document type analysis of the publications, while the quality approach includes the citation analysis of research publications. Bibliographic coupling is also carried out to understand the relationship in a visualisation format between authors, documents, sources, and countries. After performing the analysis, it has been observed that China has made the most significant contribution to the field of PQC. Additionally, the most highly cited author identified is Nicolas Gisin from the University of Geneva. This study provides valuable insights into prominent keywords, emerging trends and key research areas within the PQC domain, offering a comprehensive overview of the current research landscape.
The accelerated pace of development in the Field of Quantum Computing is very alarming for many of the presently used cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC underlying much of security in the modern world. This is an indication that the need for development of quantum-resistant algorithms especially for security in data integrity and communication in the environment driven by quantum computers, commonly referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). For addressing this, the Research presents a scientometric lenses on PQC to provide a systematic review of its related research terrain, thematic trends and key contributors for directionality purposes. In the scientific aspect, the work uses new-generation scientometric techniques, including co-words, thematic maps, and network diagrams based on 2874 articles sourced from the WoS and SCOPUS databases, which were systematically evaluated using the PRISMA protocol in R Studio. Such an approach could help disentangle the publication profiles, collaborative structures, and emergent institutionalization of PQC research. Identified insights demonstrate that the growth pattern of PQC has become steeper, with the number of annual publications reaching 623 in 2023, where Florida Atlantic University and Tsinghua University are also the most active institutions. Despite this progress, major research gaps persist, particularly in scaling PQC algorithms, cross-platform adaptability, and testing in real-world settings, which are essential for applications in constrained environments like IoT networks. Thus, this study sets a foundation of reference on PQC research and presents noble advice to scholars, legislators, and entrepreneurs. These findings make the case for constant development and reliable procedures to safeguard computational assets from new forms of attack posed by quantum computing and, in doing so, point to an exciting future in the post-quantum world.
The accelerating development of quantum computing represents one of the most significant paradigm shifts in the history of information security. Cryptographic systems that currently underpin global digital infrastructure—including RSA, Diffie–Hellman, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography—rely on mathematical assumptions that collapse under quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) emerges as the most viable and immediate solution to secure communications in the quantum era, offering cryptographic primitives that can be deployed on today’s classical hardware while resisting both classical and quantum attacks. This review provides a comprehensive, detailed examination of PQC, analyzing its mathematical foundations, algorithmic families, standardization progress, and deployment challenges. Special emphasis is placed on the NIST PQC standardization process, the risk posed by “harvest-now-decrypt-later” adversaries, the complexities of global cryptographic migration, and the implications for critical digital infrastructures such as cloud computing, blockchain systems, long-lifespan data archives, IoT ecosystems, and national cybersecurity. Through standalone equations, tables, and figures—including a conceptual visual provided by the user—this paper offers a complete, cohesive, and rigorous synthesis. The findings underscore that the transition to PQC is not optional but imperative, requiring coordinated scientific, governmental, and industrial effort to safeguard the digital future.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is moving from evaluation to deployment as NIST finalizes standards for ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA. This survey maps the space from foundations to practice. We first develop a taxonomy across lattice-, code-, hash-, multivariate-, isogeny-, and MPC-in-the-Head families, summarizing security assumptions, cryptanalysis, and standardization status. We then compare performance and communication costs using representative, implementation-grounded measurements, and review hardware acceleration (AVX2, FPGA/ASIC) and implementation security with a focus on side-channel resistance. Building upward, we examine protocol integration (TLS, DNSSEC), PKI and certificate hygiene, and deployment in constrained and high-assurance environments (IoT, cloud, finance, blockchain). We also discuss complementarity with quantum technologies (QKD, QRNGs) and the limits of near-term quantum computing. Throughout, we emphasize crypto-agility, hybrid migration, and evidence-based guidance for operators. We conclude with open problems spanning parameter agility, leakage-resilient implementations, and domain-specific rollout playbooks. This survey aims to be a practical reference for researchers and practitioners planning quantum-safe systems, bridging standards, engineering, and operations.
The impressively fast development of quantum computing is a serious threat to classical public-key cryptography, and algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's will render RSA and elliptic curve systems essentially useless as soon as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Although it is still some way off before such machines are available, the harvest-now-encrypt-later threat highlights the need for proactive defense. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024, including ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) for digital signatures and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) as a stateless hash-based alternative. This paper is a summary of the evolving post-quantum landscape, starting with the standards and their underlying security and then moving on to migration policies such as CNSA 2.0 and CISA, NSA and NIST guidance. It also looks at integration patterns for important protocols such as TLS, IPsec, SSH, and code signing. A performance, interoperability and overhead evaluation methodology is presented with results showing that hybrid deployment and crypto-agile architectures make PQC adoption a viable option. The paper concludes by providing a governance-oriented roadmap, where inventory, prioritization and pilot deployments are identified as near-term actions, with open questions remaining on performance optimization, implementation security and algorithm resilience over time.
Quantum computing poses an existential threat to classical public-key cryptography, particularly RSA and elliptic-curve systems, which form the backbone of secure communication, authentication, and digital trust. Once scalable quantum computers emerge, algorithms such as Shor’s will be capable of breaking these schemes, jeopardizing confidentiality and integrity across the internet and enterprise systems. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) offers a viable defense, providing quantum-resistant algorithms that can be implemented on today’s hardware and protocols. Recent standardization milestones—including NIST’s approval of ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) for signatures, and the selection of HQC as a complementary KEM—mark a turning point for practical adoption. This paper surveys the quantum threat model, algorithm families, performance trade-offs, and integration patterns such as hybrid modes and crypto-agile architectures. It further outlines a phased migration roadmap for enterprises, emphasizing harvest-now-decrypt-later risks and compliance imperatives. By bridging technical, operational, and policy perspectives, the study provides actionable guidance to prepare organizations for a secure and quantum-resilient future.