Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks

Towards Versatile and Field-Ready Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Yoann Piétri

Published Jul 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/icton71309.2026.11705356

Related papers

Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution: current status and prospects

Takuya Hirano

The Japan Society of Applied Physics•Jul 6, 2021•0 citations

Continuous‐Variable Quantum Key Distribution with Gaussian Modulation—The Theory of Practical Implementations (Adv. Quantum Technol. 1/2018)

Fabian Laudenbach, Christoph Pacher, Chi‐Hang Fred Fung +6 more

Quantum key distribution allows two parties to establish an encryption key that, by the laws of physics, no other party can have knowledge on and therefore enables information-theoretic communication security. In particular, quantum key distribution with continuous variables (CV-QKD) represents a way to exercise quantum cryptography at a high technological readiness level taking advantage of the leading-edge technological infrastructure provided by the telecom industry. The review by Fabian Laudenbach et al. (article number 1800011) provides a detailed introduction to the mathematical tools and relations required for the security analysis of CV-QKD and particularly deals with the effects of necessarily imperfect hardware components.

Advanced Quantum Technologies•Aug 1, 2018•25 citations

Recent progress in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution

Philippe Grangier

•Jul 16, 2018•0 citations

Field test of classical symmetric encryption with continuous variables quantum key distribution

Paul Jouguet, Sébastien Kunz-Jacques, Thierry Debuisschert +8 more

We report on the design and performance of a point-to-point classical symmetric encryption link with fast key renewal provided by a Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) system. Our system was operational and able to encrypt point-to-point communications during more than six months, from the end of July 2010 until the beginning of February 2011. This field test was the first demonstration of the reliability of a CVQKD system over a long period of time in a server room environment. This strengthens the potential of CVQKD for information technology security infrastructure deployments.

arXiv:1201.3744•Optics Express•Jun 11, 2012•121 citations

Practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with an optical amplifier

Yi Zheng, Yiliang Wang, Chenlei Fang +2 more

In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical amplifier can be used to improve the performance of the system by compensating for the imperfections of the detectors. However, the eavesdropper Eve can actively utilize a reverse external magnetic field to deteriorate the performance of the optical amplifier, which may affect the practical security of the system. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with an optical amplifier under the effect of the reverse external magnetic field. Based on the investigation of the parameter estimation under the above influence, we find that the evaluation of the secret key rate may be overestimated, which will open a security loophole for Eve to successfully launch an intercept-resend attack in the practical CVQKD system with an optical amplifier. In order to close this security loophole, we can monitor the reverse external magnetic field or change the type of the optical isolator to make the secret key rate of the system evaluated exactly.

Physical Review A•Feb 20, 2024•11 citations

A Review on Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Security

Aida Garcia-Callejo, Andrés Ruiz-Chamorro, Daniel Cano +1 more

Lecture notes in networks and systems•Nov 20, 2022•6 citations
Quantum key distribution allows two parties to establish an encryption key that, by the laws of physics, no other party can have knowledge on and therefore enables information-theoretic communication security. In particular, quantum key distribution with continuous variables (CV-QKD) represents a way to exercise quantum cryptography at a high technological readiness level taking advantage of the leading-edge technological infrastructure provided by the telecom industry. The review by Fabian Laudenbach et al. (article number 1800011) provides a detailed introduction to the mathematical tools and relations required for the security analysis of CV-QKD and particularly deals with the effects of necessarily imperfect hardware components.
We report on the design and performance of a point-to-point classical symmetric encryption link with fast key renewal provided by a Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) system. Our system was operational and able to encrypt point-to-point communications during more than six months, from the end of July 2010 until the beginning of February 2011. This field test was the first demonstration of the reliability of a CVQKD system over a long period of time in a server room environment. This strengthens the potential of CVQKD for information technology security infrastructure deployments.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical amplifier can be used to improve the performance of the system by compensating for the imperfections of the detectors. However, the eavesdropper Eve can actively utilize a reverse external magnetic field to deteriorate the performance of the optical amplifier, which may affect the practical security of the system. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with an optical amplifier under the effect of the reverse external magnetic field. Based on the investigation of the parameter estimation under the above influence, we find that the evaluation of the secret key rate may be overestimated, which will open a security loophole for Eve to successfully launch an intercept-resend attack in the practical CVQKD system with an optical amplifier. In order to close this security loophole, we can monitor the reverse external magnetic field or change the type of the optical isolator to make the secret key rate of the system evaluated exactly.