Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Toward an Ontological Theory of Indeterminacy

Chien-hsing Ho

Published Sep 26, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter, the theoretical nucleus of this monograph, synthesizes insights from Chinese Madhyamaka and Wilson’s determinable-based account to construct the central framework of the theory of ontic indeterminacy. It clarifies foundational matters concerning the kinds of entity that bear indeterminacy and the reasons for adopting the theory’s standard formulation for instances of worldly indeterminacy. The chapter then elaborates on an object-level characterization of what it means for a thing to be ontically indeterminate by explaining the complementary ideas of conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. This characterization is further supported by its consonance with a quandary constraint on theories of indeterminacy. Finally, the chapter responds to potential objections to clarify and support the proposed framework while challenging a form of reductionism that views macroscopic indeterminacy as superficial.

DOI
10.1093/9780197870679.003.0004

Related papers

Emergent quantum indeterminacy

Cristian Mariani

Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

Ratio•Mar 20, 2021•11 citations

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and the ontological foundations of orthodoxy

David Schroeren

This paper develops quantum state individualism, a fundamental ontology for what is usually known as 'orthodox quantum mechanics.' The central import of this ontology is that allows for a systematic evaluation of some of the main conclusions of the recent literature on quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, quantum state individualism supports the 'gappy' version of Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy; it implies that fundamental reality is perfectly precise; and third, it provides a non-disjunctive definition of determinables and thereby shields Wilson's account against the charge that it requires either a departure from classical logic or a revision of the quantum formalism.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A•Nov 2, 2021•24 citations

Indeterminacy, Indeterminism, and Quantum Mechanics

Wesley C. Salmon

Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.

•May 7, 1998•0 citations

Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Properties, and Quantum Theory

Alisa Bokulich

It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.

Res Philosophica•Jan 1, 2014•64 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

George Darby

There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy•Aug 13, 2009•62 citations

Indeterminacy

Alastair Wilson

Abstract In Everettian quantum mechanics, the universal quantum state is fundamental, non-contingent, and wholly determinate. By contrast, the parallel worlds of diverging EQM, and the contingency constituted by self-location amongst those worlds, are emergent and partly indeterminate. In particular, it is indeterminate both how many worlds there are, and what microscopic qualitative features those worlds have. This chapter discusses various ways to understand indeterminacy in the Everettian multiverse, and argues that the indeterminacies of EQM present no obstacle to the analytic ambitions of quantum modal realism. Everettians can understand quantum indeterminacy using models of indeterminacy that are familiar from the philosophical literature on vagueness.

•Feb 11, 2020•0 citations
Abstract This chapter, the theoretical nucleus of this monograph, synthesizes insights from Chinese Madhyamaka and Wilson’s determinable-based account to construct the central framework of the theory of ontic indeterminacy. It clarifies foundational matters concerning the kinds of entity that bear indeterminacy and the reasons for adopting the theory’s standard formulation for instances of worldly indeterminacy. The chapter then elaborates on an object-level characterization of what it means for a thing to be ontically indeterminate by explaining the complementary ideas of conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. This characterization is further supported by its consonance with a quandary constraint on theories of indeterminacy. Finally, the chapter responds to potential objections to clarify and support the proposed framework while challenging a form of reductionism that views macroscopic indeterminacy as superficial.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
This paper develops quantum state individualism, a fundamental ontology for what is usually known as 'orthodox quantum mechanics.' The central import of this ontology is that allows for a systematic evaluation of some of the main conclusions of the recent literature on quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, quantum state individualism supports the 'gappy' version of Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy; it implies that fundamental reality is perfectly precise; and third, it provides a non-disjunctive definition of determinables and thereby shields Wilson's account against the charge that it requires either a departure from classical logic or a revision of the quantum formalism.
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.
There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.
Abstract In Everettian quantum mechanics, the universal quantum state is fundamental, non-contingent, and wholly determinate. By contrast, the parallel worlds of diverging EQM, and the contingency constituted by self-location amongst those worlds, are emergent and partly indeterminate. In particular, it is indeterminate both how many worlds there are, and what microscopic qualitative features those worlds have. This chapter discusses various ways to understand indeterminacy in the Everettian multiverse, and argues that the indeterminacies of EQM present no obstacle to the analytic ambitions of quantum modal realism. Everettians can understand quantum indeterminacy using models of indeterminacy that are familiar from the philosophical literature on vagueness.