Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Indeterminacy

Alastair Wilson

Published Feb 11, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In Everettian quantum mechanics, the universal quantum state is fundamental, non-contingent, and wholly determinate. By contrast, the parallel worlds of diverging EQM, and the contingency constituted by self-location amongst those worlds, are emergent and partly indeterminate. In particular, it is indeterminate both how many worlds there are, and what microscopic qualitative features those worlds have. This chapter discusses various ways to understand indeterminacy in the Everettian multiverse, and argues that the indeterminacies of EQM present no obstacle to the analytic ambitions of quantum modal realism. Everettians can understand quantum indeterminacy using models of indeterminacy that are familiar from the philosophical literature on vagueness.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198846215.003.0006

Related papers

Metaphysical indeterminacy in Everettian quantum mechanics

David Glick, Baptiste Le Bihan

The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science•Jan 4, 2024•3 citations

Diverging Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Alastair Wilson

Abstract This chapter sets out the version of quantum mechanics—diverging EQM—that constitutes the physics component of quantum modal realism. After a potted history of Everettian quantum mechanics, and an introduction to recent decoherence-based versions of the approach, I sketch a distinctive metaphysical understanding of Everettian quantum mechanics that involves diverging ‘parallel worlds’ instead of overlapping ‘splitting worlds’. I argue that the choice between divergence and overlap is underdetermined by the physics itself; I then adapt an argument of David Lewis’s that supports divergence over overlap, emphasizing the need to make room for objective probabilities in the Everettian picture. The chapter concludes by rejecting some unpersuasive motivations for overlap.

•Feb 11, 2020•0 citations

Emergent quantum indeterminacy

Cristian Mariani

Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

Ratio•Mar 20, 2021•11 citations

Indeterminacy, Indeterminism, and Quantum Mechanics

Wesley C. Salmon

Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.

•May 7, 1998•0 citations

Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Properties, and Quantum Theory

Alisa Bokulich

It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.

Res Philosophica•Jan 1, 2014•64 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

George Darby

There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy•Aug 13, 2009•62 citations
Abstract In Everettian quantum mechanics, the universal quantum state is fundamental, non-contingent, and wholly determinate. By contrast, the parallel worlds of diverging EQM, and the contingency constituted by self-location amongst those worlds, are emergent and partly indeterminate. In particular, it is indeterminate both how many worlds there are, and what microscopic qualitative features those worlds have. This chapter discusses various ways to understand indeterminacy in the Everettian multiverse, and argues that the indeterminacies of EQM present no obstacle to the analytic ambitions of quantum modal realism. Everettians can understand quantum indeterminacy using models of indeterminacy that are familiar from the philosophical literature on vagueness.
The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.
Abstract This chapter sets out the version of quantum mechanics—diverging EQM—that constitutes the physics component of quantum modal realism. After a potted history of Everettian quantum mechanics, and an introduction to recent decoherence-based versions of the approach, I sketch a distinctive metaphysical understanding of Everettian quantum mechanics that involves diverging ‘parallel worlds’ instead of overlapping ‘splitting worlds’. I argue that the choice between divergence and overlap is underdetermined by the physics itself; I then adapt an argument of David Lewis’s that supports divergence over overlap, emphasizing the need to make room for objective probabilities in the Everettian picture. The chapter concludes by rejecting some unpersuasive motivations for overlap.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.
There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.