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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and the ontological foundations of orthodoxy

David Schroeren

Published Nov 2, 2021• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper develops quantum state individualism, a fundamental ontology for what is usually known as 'orthodox quantum mechanics.' The central import of this ontology is that allows for a systematic evaluation of some of the main conclusions of the recent literature on quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, quantum state individualism supports the 'gappy' version of Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy; it implies that fundamental reality is perfectly precise; and third, it provides a non-disjunctive definition of determinables and thereby shields Wilson's account against the charge that it requires either a departure from classical logic or a revision of the quantum formalism.

DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.008

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This paper develops quantum state individualism, a fundamental ontology for what is usually known as 'orthodox quantum mechanics.' The central import of this ontology is that allows for a systematic evaluation of some of the main conclusions of the recent literature on quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, quantum state individualism supports the 'gappy' version of Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy; it implies that fundamental reality is perfectly precise; and third, it provides a non-disjunctive definition of determinables and thereby shields Wilson's account against the charge that it requires either a departure from classical logic or a revision of the quantum formalism.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Abstract This work sets out to answer a single question: what is the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics? However, we adopt a different approach to that normally used. Rather than surveying physicists, or poring over the precise details of the thoughts of Bohr and Heisenberg, we review a collection of 42 textbooks on quantum mechanics, encompassing the most popular and prominent works of this nature. We then gauge their response to 13 propositions to build up a picture of exactly what is believed by an orthodox quantum mechanic. We demonstrate that this orthodoxy has many aspects of Copenhagen-like viewpoints, but also shows some interesting emerging deviations. Moreover, it is more nuanced than some reductive characterisations that condense the orthodoxy down to the ontological primacy of the quantum state. The revealed orthodoxy has three consistent pillars: measurement inherently disturbs quantum states, these states refer to individual instances, not ensembles, and quantum systems do not have definite properties prior to measurement. More fully, it entails that individual particles exist in wave-like super-positions and present particle behaviours only when forced to by outside influences. The act of measuring such a system inherently induces random changes in its state, manifesting as a form of measurement error that corresponds to the uncertainty principle. This implies that measurement does not reveal underlying values of quantum properties.
There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.
Abstract This chapter, the theoretical nucleus of this monograph, synthesizes insights from Chinese Madhyamaka and Wilson’s determinable-based account to construct the central framework of the theory of ontic indeterminacy. It clarifies foundational matters concerning the kinds of entity that bear indeterminacy and the reasons for adopting the theory’s standard formulation for instances of worldly indeterminacy. The chapter then elaborates on an object-level characterization of what it means for a thing to be ontically indeterminate by explaining the complementary ideas of conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. This characterization is further supported by its consonance with a quandary constraint on theories of indeterminacy. Finally, the chapter responds to potential objections to clarify and support the proposed framework while challenging a form of reductionism that views macroscopic indeterminacy as superficial.