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Other Matters: Karen Barad's Two Materialisms and the Science of Undecidability

Jonathan Basile

Published Sep 13, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.

DOI
10.17613/mtbx-ma98

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OTHER MATTERS

Jonathan Basile

Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.

Angelaki•Sep 2, 2020•9 citations

Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning

Karen Barad

A theoretical physicist and feminist theorist, Karen Barad elaborates her theory of agential realism, a schema that is at once a new epistemology, ontology, and ethics.

•Jan 1, 2007•7,214 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Inclusive Materialism

Javier Pérez-Jara

Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.

Philosophies•Sep 3, 2024•2 citations

The Black Hole of Quantum Theory

N. Katherine Hayles

In Quirks of the Quantum, Samuel Chase Coale argues that the twentieth century is the quantum era, riddled with all of the indeterminacies, blurriness, and entanglements that he attributes to quantum theory, which he describes as the “philosophical basis for quantum physics” (1). He acknowledges that “to truly understand quantum mechanics as a science, one would have to study mathematics,” which he readily admits his book does not undertake. Instead, he relies on the “tropes, metaphors and models” (ibid.) that scientists have published about the implications of quantum theory. He thus distinguishes mathematical formulae from philosophical constructions, privileging the latter over the former. Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. He does the same with postmodernism, so that it begins to seem almost a branch of quantum physics rather than a philosophical and cultural movement with complex roots in cultural, economic, and technological developments. For example, John Johnston in Information Multiplicity: American Fiction in the Age of Media Saturation argues persuasively that the postmodern American novel has been distinctively shaped by the glut of information that the Internet and contemporary communication media make available, a point also made by Fredric Jameson in his seminal study Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Yet for Coale, “that flow of information suggests the quantum flux, constantly in motion with islands of possible comprehension like the tracks and trails of ‘particles’ that are measured in individual experiments” (109). The importance of globalization, the complex economic structures emerging from late capitalism, the transformations the web has wrought—all these in Coale's analysis become subsets of quantum physics.Within the limits of his methodology, which are significant, Coale provides good readings of several postmodern authors, including Joan Didion, Tim O'Brien, Thomas Pynchon, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo. Although many have discussed the fragmentation, nonlinear narratives, lack of coherent subjectivities, and indeterminacy of novels by these writers as postmodern constructions, for Coale they become manifestations of quantum theory (not surprisingly, since he sees postmodernism itself as a branch of the same). With chapters on the quantum flux, quantum style, and death as quantum dissolution, he combines good readings with inflated claims for them as manifestations of quantum theory. The exceptions to this quantum inflation are his discussions of DeLillo's novels. He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!

NOVEL A Forum on Fiction•Apr 24, 2015•0 citations

A few remarks on the interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics in Karen Barad's agential realism

Andrei A. Paramonov

The article deals with the approach to understanding science and technology as well as natural and cultural practices developed by the American philosopher Karen Barad in the concept of agential realism. The peculiarity of her approach consists in referring as a starting point to quantum mechanics in its interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr. Barad proposes a reinterpretation of Bohr's propositions through revealing their ontological content. In this regard, the article addresses the epistemological and ontological problems that quantum physics has faced, such as the conditions for the possibility of an objective description of the world, the nature of measurement, and the relationship between language and the material world. Discussed is the shift that Barad argues is asserted in Bohr's philosophy-physics, which consists of quantum mechanics moving from the linguistic concepts in which the world of classical science was represented to what Barad calls material-discursive practices through which the world is articulated and explained. The possibilities of a different interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics are considered.

Vox Philosophical journal•Dec 30, 2023•0 citations

Barad, Bohr, and quantum mechanics

Jan Faye, Rasmus Jaksland

Abstract The last decade has seen an increasing number of references to quantum mechanics in the humanities and social sciences. This development has in particular been driven by Karen Barad’s agential realism: a theoretical framework that, based on Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, aims to inform social theorizing. In dealing with notions such as agency, power, and embodiment as well as the relation between the material and the discursive level, the influence of agential realism in fields such as feminist science studies and posthumanism has been profound. However, no one has hitherto paused to assess agential realism’s proclaimed quantum mechanical origin including its relation to the writings of Niels Bohr. This is the task taken up here. We find that many of the implications that agential realism allegedly derives from a Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics dissent from Bohr’s own views and are in conflict with those of other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Agential realism is at best consistent with quantum mechanics and consequently, it does not capture what quantum mechanics in any strict sense implies for social science or any other domain of inquiry. Agential realism may be interesting and thought provoking from the perspective of social theorizing, but it is neither sanctioned by quantum mechanics nor by Bohr’s authority. This conclusion not only holds for agential realism in particular, it also serves as a general warning against the other attempts to use quantum mechanics in social theorizing.

Synthese•Apr 18, 2021•41 citations
Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.
Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
In Quirks of the Quantum, Samuel Chase Coale argues that the twentieth century is the quantum era, riddled with all of the indeterminacies, blurriness, and entanglements that he attributes to quantum theory, which he describes as the “philosophical basis for quantum physics” (1). He acknowledges that “to truly understand quantum mechanics as a science, one would have to study mathematics,” which he readily admits his book does not undertake. Instead, he relies on the “tropes, metaphors and models” (ibid.) that scientists have published about the implications of quantum theory. He thus distinguishes mathematical formulae from philosophical constructions, privileging the latter over the former. Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. He does the same with postmodernism, so that it begins to seem almost a branch of quantum physics rather than a philosophical and cultural movement with complex roots in cultural, economic, and technological developments. For example, John Johnston in Information Multiplicity: American Fiction in the Age of Media Saturation argues persuasively that the postmodern American novel has been distinctively shaped by the glut of information that the Internet and contemporary communication media make available, a point also made by Fredric Jameson in his seminal study Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Yet for Coale, “that flow of information suggests the quantum flux, constantly in motion with islands of possible comprehension like the tracks and trails of ‘particles’ that are measured in individual experiments” (109). The importance of globalization, the complex economic structures emerging from late capitalism, the transformations the web has wrought—all these in Coale's analysis become subsets of quantum physics.Within the limits of his methodology, which are significant, Coale provides good readings of several postmodern authors, including Joan Didion, Tim O'Brien, Thomas Pynchon, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo. Although many have discussed the fragmentation, nonlinear narratives, lack of coherent subjectivities, and indeterminacy of novels by these writers as postmodern constructions, for Coale they become manifestations of quantum theory (not surprisingly, since he sees postmodernism itself as a branch of the same). With chapters on the quantum flux, quantum style, and death as quantum dissolution, he combines good readings with inflated claims for them as manifestations of quantum theory. The exceptions to this quantum inflation are his discussions of DeLillo's novels. He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!
The article deals with the approach to understanding science and technology as well as natural and cultural practices developed by the American philosopher Karen Barad in the concept of agential realism. The peculiarity of her approach consists in referring as a starting point to quantum mechanics in its interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr. Barad proposes a reinterpretation of Bohr's propositions through revealing their ontological content. In this regard, the article addresses the epistemological and ontological problems that quantum physics has faced, such as the conditions for the possibility of an objective description of the world, the nature of measurement, and the relationship between language and the material world. Discussed is the shift that Barad argues is asserted in Bohr's philosophy-physics, which consists of quantum mechanics moving from the linguistic concepts in which the world of classical science was represented to what Barad calls material-discursive practices through which the world is articulated and explained. The possibilities of a different interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics are considered.
Abstract The last decade has seen an increasing number of references to quantum mechanics in the humanities and social sciences. This development has in particular been driven by Karen Barad’s agential realism: a theoretical framework that, based on Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, aims to inform social theorizing. In dealing with notions such as agency, power, and embodiment as well as the relation between the material and the discursive level, the influence of agential realism in fields such as feminist science studies and posthumanism has been profound. However, no one has hitherto paused to assess agential realism’s proclaimed quantum mechanical origin including its relation to the writings of Niels Bohr. This is the task taken up here. We find that many of the implications that agential realism allegedly derives from a Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics dissent from Bohr’s own views and are in conflict with those of other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Agential realism is at best consistent with quantum mechanics and consequently, it does not capture what quantum mechanics in any strict sense implies for social science or any other domain of inquiry. Agential realism may be interesting and thought provoking from the perspective of social theorizing, but it is neither sanctioned by quantum mechanics nor by Bohr’s authority. This conclusion not only holds for agential realism in particular, it also serves as a general warning against the other attempts to use quantum mechanics in social theorizing.