Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Angelaki

OTHER MATTERS

Jonathan Basile

Published Sep 2, 2020• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.

DOI
10.1080/0969725x.2020.1807132

Related papers

Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning

Karen Barad

A theoretical physicist and feminist theorist, Karen Barad elaborates her theory of agential realism, a schema that is at once a new epistemology, ontology, and ethics.

•Jan 1, 2007•7,214 citations

The Black Hole of Quantum Theory

N. Katherine Hayles

In Quirks of the Quantum, Samuel Chase Coale argues that the twentieth century is the quantum era, riddled with all of the indeterminacies, blurriness, and entanglements that he attributes to quantum theory, which he describes as the “philosophical basis for quantum physics” (1). He acknowledges that “to truly understand quantum mechanics as a science, one would have to study mathematics,” which he readily admits his book does not undertake. Instead, he relies on the “tropes, metaphors and models” (ibid.) that scientists have published about the implications of quantum theory. He thus distinguishes mathematical formulae from philosophical constructions, privileging the latter over the former. Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. He does the same with postmodernism, so that it begins to seem almost a branch of quantum physics rather than a philosophical and cultural movement with complex roots in cultural, economic, and technological developments. For example, John Johnston in Information Multiplicity: American Fiction in the Age of Media Saturation argues persuasively that the postmodern American novel has been distinctively shaped by the glut of information that the Internet and contemporary communication media make available, a point also made by Fredric Jameson in his seminal study Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Yet for Coale, “that flow of information suggests the quantum flux, constantly in motion with islands of possible comprehension like the tracks and trails of ‘particles’ that are measured in individual experiments” (109). The importance of globalization, the complex economic structures emerging from late capitalism, the transformations the web has wrought—all these in Coale's analysis become subsets of quantum physics.Within the limits of his methodology, which are significant, Coale provides good readings of several postmodern authors, including Joan Didion, Tim O'Brien, Thomas Pynchon, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo. Although many have discussed the fragmentation, nonlinear narratives, lack of coherent subjectivities, and indeterminacy of novels by these writers as postmodern constructions, for Coale they become manifestations of quantum theory (not surprisingly, since he sees postmodernism itself as a branch of the same). With chapters on the quantum flux, quantum style, and death as quantum dissolution, he combines good readings with inflated claims for them as manifestations of quantum theory. The exceptions to this quantum inflation are his discussions of DeLillo's novels. He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!

NOVEL A Forum on Fiction•Apr 24, 2015•0 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Inclusive Materialism

Javier Pérez-Jara

Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.

Philosophies•Sep 3, 2024•2 citations

On the Limits of "Undecidability": Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism

Christopher Norris

On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...

Yale journal of criticism/The Yale journal of criticism•Sep 1, 1998•1 citation

From Quantum Mechanics to Quantum Reality

Slavoj Žižek

Throughout the 20 th century, quantum mechanics was celebrated as the ultimate proof that modern science is leaving behind deterministic mechanical materialism and admitted that it is dealing with non-material entities; moreover, the notion that our reality takes place through being observed opens up to a subjectivist denial of objective reality.Some quantum scientists themselves claimed that the only way to account for our entire universe is to presuppose a global external observer (i.e., God).The text rejects not only this direct theological solution but also the traditional "realist" stance which secretly relies on a divine dimension (the divine status of natural laws).It proposes a reading of the ontological implications of quantum physics which opens up the way for a consequent materialism, even if, from a traditional reading, this may appear to be an odd materialism without matter.

Filozofia•Jun 12, 2023•2 citations

Problems of Quantum Mechanics (UET7B)

H. J. Spencer

This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}

•May 1, 2017•0 citations
Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway relies on mutually incompatible grounding gestures, one of which describes the relationality of an always already material-discursive reality, while the other seeks to ground this relation one-sidedly in matter. These two materialisms derive from the gesture she borrows from the New Materialist (and other related) fields, which posits her work as an advance over the history of “representationalism” and “social constructivism.” In turn, this one-sided materialism produces a skewed reading of the quantum mechanical phenomena with which she engages. Her attempt to create an ontological (not epistemological) interpretation of quantum mechanics proves deconstructible. Instead, a science of undecidability or science of quant à helps us to understand debates among scientists and philosophers over the completeness or incompleteness of quantum mechanics and its epistemological or ontological status – by demonstrating that these questions will necessarily remain unresolved.
In Quirks of the Quantum, Samuel Chase Coale argues that the twentieth century is the quantum era, riddled with all of the indeterminacies, blurriness, and entanglements that he attributes to quantum theory, which he describes as the “philosophical basis for quantum physics” (1). He acknowledges that “to truly understand quantum mechanics as a science, one would have to study mathematics,” which he readily admits his book does not undertake. Instead, he relies on the “tropes, metaphors and models” (ibid.) that scientists have published about the implications of quantum theory. He thus distinguishes mathematical formulae from philosophical constructions, privileging the latter over the former. Philosophy, however, does not provide a “basis” for quantum mechanics; rather, quantum mechanics describes the phenomena, and then philosophy struggles with what the physical theory implies.Coale makes wide-ranging references to what quantum physicists, including Neils Bohr, have thought about these implications. Strangely, he does not include in his account Karen Barad's excellent Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. A former physicist, Barad develops the quantum philosophy of Neils Bohr into an approach she calls agential realism, which insists that humans and nonhumans are ineluctably bound together in the production of meaning. She argues that quantum mechanics demonstrates the “ontological inseparability of intra-acting agencies,” which emerge as separate entities only as a result of “cuts” we make to simplify phenomena and render them susceptible to measurement and analysis (148). Although her conclusions are similar to Coale's, her approach is distinguished by a deep knowledge of quantum mechanics as a mathematical theory, and her formulations are rigorous and precise. Her absence from Coale's book is the more notable because his analysis needs an infusion of the kind of deep thinking that Barad embodies. By contrast, his book engages in a discursive inflation of quantum physics, wherein the rigor and precision it has as a physical theory is buried under an avalanche of verbiage that makes quantum physics appear so broad and vague that almost anything can fit under its umbrella.A good example of this problem is the way in which Coale uses “entanglement.” In quantum mechanics, it refers to the correlation of the quantum characteristics of two subatomic particles. For example, when two photons interact (say, by pumping a laser beam through a nonlinear crystal such as beta-barium borate, which splits some of the photon stream into photon pairs with correlated polarizations), they can become entangled such that their wave functions (i.e., the eigenstates described by their superpositions) are coordinated. If they are then separated, measurement on one of them determines how the wave function for the other will collapse, even if they are by then far apart. The distance (and time intervals) separating the two photons can be quite large; entanglement has been shown to operate as far removed as fourteen miles. Moreover, it also operates on the macroscale, for example in the ability of migratory birds to sense the inclination of the earth's magnetic field (via entangled electrons in the molecules of their eyes). This is mysterious to the extent that no one knows how or why the particles become coordinated, but it is nevertheless quite distinct from such uses of “entanglement” that would include, for example, two lovers becoming entangled with one another or the World Bank becoming entangled in the global economic system. Citing Patrick O'Donnell, Coale appropriates the word to mean, following O'Donnell, “the complex relationship between self, objects, and the world” (164), which stretches the meaning so far that it leaves quantum mechanics (or quantum theory, as Coale would have it) far behind.In similar fashion, Coale assimilates to quantum theory most of deconstruction, especially the indeterminacy, undermining of origins, and undecidability that Jacques Derrida brilliantly developed in Of Grammatology and later works. He does the same with postmodernism, so that it begins to seem almost a branch of quantum physics rather than a philosophical and cultural movement with complex roots in cultural, economic, and technological developments. For example, John Johnston in Information Multiplicity: American Fiction in the Age of Media Saturation argues persuasively that the postmodern American novel has been distinctively shaped by the glut of information that the Internet and contemporary communication media make available, a point also made by Fredric Jameson in his seminal study Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Yet for Coale, “that flow of information suggests the quantum flux, constantly in motion with islands of possible comprehension like the tracks and trails of ‘particles’ that are measured in individual experiments” (109). The importance of globalization, the complex economic structures emerging from late capitalism, the transformations the web has wrought—all these in Coale's analysis become subsets of quantum physics.Within the limits of his methodology, which are significant, Coale provides good readings of several postmodern authors, including Joan Didion, Tim O'Brien, Thomas Pynchon, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo. Although many have discussed the fragmentation, nonlinear narratives, lack of coherent subjectivities, and indeterminacy of novels by these writers as postmodern constructions, for Coale they become manifestations of quantum theory (not surprisingly, since he sees postmodernism itself as a branch of the same). With chapters on the quantum flux, quantum style, and death as quantum dissolution, he combines good readings with inflated claims for them as manifestations of quantum theory. The exceptions to this quantum inflation are his discussions of DeLillo's novels. He mentions in the introduction that he found several articles on quantum theory and references of quantum phenomena in DeLillo's notebooks at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. These bear fruit in his readings of DeLillo's novels, especially his fine reading of The Body Artist and the section on DeLillo's Underworld, arguably the best interpretation in the book. This section alone almost justifies the price of admission.Were Coale to frame his book as a contribution to postmodern literary criticism, it would take its place among many other such books and articles as a well-written and interesting contribution that makes good observations about a number of important authors and their works. By insisting that all of this fits under quantum theory, he overreaches what the theory can justly claim and, in the process, dilutes the effectiveness of his book. Without a doubt, we need more informed criticism of the interactions between literature, culture, and science, but such work is more effective when it focuses on the specificities of scientific theories and their complex entanglements with cultural and technological practices. Lest it fall under Coale's quantum umbrella, I should add that I do not intend in this formulation a reference to quantum theory!
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
Throughout the 20 th century, quantum mechanics was celebrated as the ultimate proof that modern science is leaving behind deterministic mechanical materialism and admitted that it is dealing with non-material entities; moreover, the notion that our reality takes place through being observed opens up to a subjectivist denial of objective reality.Some quantum scientists themselves claimed that the only way to account for our entire universe is to presuppose a global external observer (i.e., God).The text rejects not only this direct theological solution but also the traditional "realist" stance which secretly relies on a divine dimension (the divine status of natural laws).It proposes a reading of the ontological implications of quantum physics which opens up the way for a consequent materialism, even if, from a traditional reading, this may appear to be an odd materialism without matter.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}