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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

From cosmology to QBism: A response

Steven French

Published Aug 19, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102209

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Recent discussions of QBism have turned increasingly toward the question of its ontology. I argue that key insights into QBism's ontology of agency can be identified by reconstructing its response to Wigner's friend paradox. I clarify the relation between two formulations of that response: one grounded in the claim that quantum states are agents' personal probability assignments, and another grounded in the injunction to treat all users of quantum theory as agents on equal footing. Once disambiguated, these formulations reveal an implicit commitment to a mutually recognitive conception of agency, according to which the agential status of a user of quantum theory depends constitutively on the acknowledgement of other agents. This analysis clarifies what is at stake in recent QBist engagements with phenomenology - namely, the search for a more philosophically robust account of this conception of agency. I show how Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity underpins the recognitive structure implicated in QBism before tracing these themes to Hegel's account of mutual recognition. By locating QBism within a longstanding tradition of mutual recognition, I claim that we not only illuminate its theoretical structure but also open up novel conceptual resources for the rigorous articulation and justification of its ontology.
This paper represents an elaboration of the lectures delivered by one of us (CAF) during "Course 197 -- Foundations of Quantum Physics" at the International School of Physics "Enrico Fermi" in Varenna, Italy, July 2016. Much of the material for it is drawn from arXiv:1003.5209, arXiv:1401.7254, and arXiv:1405.2390. However there are substantial additions of original material in Sections 4, 7, 8 and 9, along with clarifications and expansions of the older content throughout. Topics include the meaning of subjective probability; no-cloning, teleportation, and quantum tomography from the subjectivist Bayesian perspective; the message QBism receives from Bell inequality violations (namely, that nature is creative); the import of symmetric informationally complete (SIC) quantum measurements for the technical side of QBism; quantum cosmology QBist-style; and a potential meaning for the holographic principle within QBism.