A theoretical scheme for zero-knowledge proof quantum identity authentication is proposed by the absolutely impartial third party CA, which has been realized based on remote state preparation and assisted cloning controlled means. In the process of identification, only CA knows the information of quantum identity card and the first party Alice and the second party Bob can accomplish the quantum identity authentication without knowing it. We discuss the probability of accomplishing this job. The security of this scheme is unconditional and it is guaranteed by quantum mechanism.
This paper presents a new method for quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. The logic of classical zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) due to Schnorr is applied in quantum circuits and algorithms. This novel approach gives an exact way with which a prover
P can prove they know some secret by encapsulating it in a quantum state before sending to a verifier
V by means of a quantum channel - allowing for a ZKP wherein an eavesdropper or manipulation can be detected with a fail-safe design. This is achieved by moving away from the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem towards the hardness of estimating quantum states. This paper presents a method with which this can be achieved and some bounds for the security of the protocol provided. With the anticipated advent of a `quantum internet', such protocols and ideas may soon have utility and execution in the real world.