Most post-quantum (PQ) authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols proposed for IoT, edge, and 6G systems still rely on ad-hoc lattice constructions, often derived from the Ring-Learning-With-Errors (RLWE) problem. Although mathematically elegant, these protocols repeatedly exhibit structural weaknesses, such as signal-leakage, key-reuse, and no mapping to NIST PQ security levels, that prevent real deployment. This article reviews these systemic issues and contrasts them with standardized, KEM-based PQ designs such as ML-KEM (Kyber). We show that encapsulation-based AKA architectures inherit both efficiency and full cryptographic assurance, eliminating the leakage channels and cumulative vulnerabilities inherent in RLWE protocols. We advocate a transition from ad-hoc lattice protocols to standardized encapsulation-based frameworks as the foundation for secure PQ authentication in consumer, IoT, and 6G systems.
Most post-quantum (PQ) authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols proposed for IoT, edge, and 6G systems still rely on ad-hoc lattice constructions, often derived from the Ring-Learning-With-Errors (RLWE) problem. Although mathematically elegant, these protocols repeatedly exhibit structural weaknesses, such as signal-leakage, key-reuse, and no mapping to NIST PQ security levels, that prevent real deployment. This article reviews these systemic issues and contrasts them with standardized, KEM-based PQ designs such as ML-KEM (Kyber). We show that encapsulation-based AKA architectures inherit both efficiency and full cryptographic assurance, eliminating the leakage channels and cumulative vulnerabilities inherent in RLWE protocols. We advocate a transition from ad-hoc lattice protocols to standardized encapsulation-based frameworks as the foundation for secure PQ authentication in consumer, IoT, and 6G systems.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
In emerging environments such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT), secure authentication and key negotiation play a crucial role in protecting data transmitted over public networks. However, many existing authentication protocols are still designed based on classical public-key cryptography primitives, and quantum computing may threaten their security. To address this challenge, we propose a post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol that uses the lattice-based Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Our proposed protocol integrates cryptographic authentication, smart card protection, and post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, enabling mutual authentication between users and servers and securely establishing session keys. The security of the protocol is formally analyzed in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model under the random oracle assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying KEM scheme. Furthermore, through informal security analysis, we have further demonstrated that the protocol possesses important security properties, including anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward confidentiality, and resistance to known attacks. In addition, the computational cost and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with several representative authentication protocols. The results show that the proposed protocol can provide strong security while maintaining low computational cost and communication overhead.
The integration of NIST-standardized lattice-based cryptographic algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) into TLS 1.3 enables post-quantum secure authentication for Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments. This work implements these algorithms within the X.509 certificate infrastructure and evaluates their performance on resource-constrained IIoT hardware (Raspberry Pi 4). Experimental measurements covering key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, and signature operations were obtained using a liboqs-enabled TLS 1.3 stack. The results show that PQ TLS 1.3 achieves comparable handshake latency to conventional TLS on IIoT-class gateways, with certificate size identified as the dominant overhead. These findings confirm the practicality of post-quantum authentication in IIoT systems while acknowledging limitations related to the hardware scope and simulated networking. Future work will extend validation to field deployments and additional PQC candidates.
The integration of Internet of Things (IoT) technology into transportation systems holds immense potential to transform the way we move people and goods, offering benefits such as increased efficiency, reduced emissions, improved safety, and enhanced user experience. With the ubiquitous and high-speed connectivity, sixth-generation (6G) technology is envisaged to make unprecedented revolutions in several fields and applications including IoT applications and transportation systems. The convergence of 6G networks with these applications will provide seamless connectivity and help to integrate functionalities such as sensing, communication, and computing, resulting in superior service quality. However, the IoT network is highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. With the recent developments in quantum computers and quantum algorithms, it is important to make them secure from quantum attacks as well. In this paper, we propose a quantum-safe authentication protocol using a Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (PQKEM) for IoT applications in transportation systems. The protocol is built using CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based PQKEM, selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in round 3 of the post-quantum standardization process. We provide a formal security proof of the proposed authentication protocol using the Real-Or-Random (RoR) model. We also present a performance analysis of the proposed authentication protocol.
As Vehicular Networks evolve toward the Intelligent Internet of Vehicles (IoV), ensuring quantum-resilient security has become essential. The current 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, although well-established, relies on classical cryptographic primitives such as AES, Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and Key Derivation Functions (KDFs), which are increasingly vulnerable to advances in quantum computing. To mitigate this, we propose PQAKA, a Post-Quantum Authentication and Key Agreement protocol tailored for 5G-based Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. By integrating the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standardized Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy against classical and quantum adversaries while maintaining compatibility with existing Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF)/Authentication Server Function (AUSF)/Unified Data Management (UDM) entities. Mapped to the 5G control plane, the protocol ensures that vehicles are authenticated before accessing Internet-based services such as navigation, traffic & weather updates, and over-the-air software delivery. Formal verification through ProVerif validates the correctness and security guarantees of the PQAKA protocol, while the informal analysis substantiates its resilience against a spectrum of adversarial vectors. Under hostile threat conditions, PQAKA achieves an authentication success rate of 72%, indicating its potential in quantum-resilient vehicular communication architectures.
The imminent threat posed by the advent of quantum computers to contemporary public-key cryptographic schemes, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), necessitates a fundamental shift in cryptographic paradigms. Shor's algorithm, specifically, presents a catastrophic vulnerability to these foundational security protocols, underpinning global digital communication and commerce. This paper provides a comprehensive exploration into lattice-based cryptography as a robust and promising candidate for a post-quantum cryptographic future. We delve into the mathematical underpinnings of lattices, elucidating the computational hardness of problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, which form the bedrock of their security. The paper reviews the historical development of lattice-based schemes, their theoretical advantages, and their practical implications, particularly in the context of the ongoing NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. We analyze the construction of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and digital signature schemes from lattice problems, comparing their performance characteristics and security guarantees against classical methods. The work argues that lattice-based cryptography offers a compelling alternative to RSA, providing not only quantum resistance but also presenting attractive features in terms of efficiency, design simplicity, and versatility for various cryptographic primitives. The discussion extends to implementation challenges, security analysis, and the broader implications for the global migration towards a quantum-secure cryptographic infrastructure.