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Naukovij žurnal «Tehnìka ta energetika»

Quantum cryptography: Theoretical foundations and practical implementations for the protection of critical infrastructure

Ihor Limar, Євген СЕВАСТЄЄВ

Published Aug 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The purpose of the article was to theoretically determine harmonised criteria for the applicability of quantum key distribution for the protection of critical infrastructure, taking into account the long-term risk of decryption by adversaries possessing quantum computational resources and traffic archiving capabilities. The methodology relied on a theoretical systems analysis of three Quantum Key Distribution subsystems – sources, detectors, and channels (fibre/free space) – complemented by simplified models of the link budget and bit error probability. A concise scenario analysis was conducted for banking networks, energy systems, and government communications, taking into account scalability, compatibility, and cost. The main results showed that laser intensity stability of 1-2% and higher detector efficiencies – 60-70% for Avalanche Photodiodes and 80-90% for Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors – extended practical distances and reduced errors. Without trusted nodes in fibre, 150-200 km was achievable; for urban Free-Space Optics lines, 5-20 km was optimal, while longer distances required network segmentation or satellite segments. Architecturally, it was justified that: for banks – rings with trusted nodes and Free-Space Optics reserve; for energy systems – dual fibre channels “control centre-substation” with a local key cache; for government communications – segmented domains with interagency gateways and satellite redundancy. In all scenarios, a Quantum Key Distribution + Post-Quantum Cryptography hybrid with short key rotation and operational countermeasures against attacks on detectors and channels was appropriate, confirming practical suitability for urban and regional networks. The practical significance lay in providing engineering teams in banking, energy, and government communications with ready-made architectural profiles – from rings and dual fibre channels to segmented domains – with Key Management System/Hardware Security Module integration, definition of Service Level Objective/Service Level Agreement, and phased roadmaps. For regulators and operators, this formed a basis for updating requirements and audits, as well as for planning redundancy (Free-Space Optics/satellite) and Total Cost of Ownership categories

DOI
10.31548/machinery/4.2025.09

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Abstract: This study advances a unifying systems perspective on quantum-safe network security by synthesizing recent progress in quantum cryptography with practical integration patterns across carrier-grade infrastructures. Concept analysis distinguishes the roles of quantum key distribution (QKD), device-independent variants, quantum authentication, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within zero-trust architectures. Building on this, a layered framework—spanning physical/entanglement resources, key management, crypto-agility, control plane orchestration, and policy/compliance—is articulated to support end-to-end, composable guarantees. The problem addressed is the realization of verifiable, quantum-resilient security under operational constraints involving latency, key-rate variability, and heterogeneous trust assumptions. Methodology combines a structured literature synthesis with formal composability mapping to universal composability principles, adversarial threat modeling for quantum-enabled attackers, and testbed/simulation evaluation of hybrid QKD–PQC pipelines across L2–L3 segments and 5G/6G backhaul scenarios. Key results indicate that (i) selective QKD deployment on high-value links coupled with PQC at endpoints enhances resilience while preserving crypto-agility; (ii) automated key-lifecycle orchestration reduces exposure windows; and (iii) device-independent assurances strengthen guarantees where trust relaxation is necessary. The impact is a deployment-ready reference architecture, measurable integration metrics, and guidance aligned with emerging standards for critical infrastructure and national networks. The implications extend to procurement, compliance, and roadmap planning for quantum-era network security. Keywords: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), hybrid QKD–PQC, composable security, device-independent QKD, zero-trust networks, key management and orchestration, 5G/6G backhaul, network security architecture, standards and interoperability

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Abstract: This study develops a scope of analytical framework for integrating quantum cryptography, quantum communications, post-quantum cryptography and nano-enabled hardware security into global cybersecurity architectures for DefenceTech, FinTech and SpaceTech. The research problem is framed by the convergence of three pressures: the long-lived confidentiality exposure created by harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks, the rapid standardization of post-quantum algorithms, and the need for hardware-rooted trust in physically exposed devices, satellites, edge nodes and payment infrastructures. The paper synthesizes quantum key distribution, quantum-network standardization, crypto-agile migration, physical unclonable functions and sectoral governance into a single evaluation model. It uses a public-source calibrated realistic dataset of 18 high-value scenarios across defence, finance and space systems. The dataset is not represented as confidential operational telemetry; rather, it is explicitly constructed from publicly available threat, standards and engineering indicators to support transparent modelling. The methodology combines literature review, structured scenario analysis, weighted risk scoring, residual-risk modelling, expected annual loss estimation and feasibility-sensitive control selection. Mathematical equations are used to express QKD channel attenuation, secret-key-rate intuition, cryptographic migration risk, expected loss and multi-criteria optimization. Results indicate that hybrid PQC adoption produces the broadest near-term risk reduction, QKD offers the strongest value where long-lived secrets and controlled optical paths exist, and nano-enabled roots of trust are especially relevant to contested devices and supply chains. The study proposes a staged global framework in which crypto-agility, hybrid PQC, QKD network governance and nano-PUF attestation are treated as complementary layers rather than competing security paradigms. The conclusion identifies future work in real operational benchmarking, satellite-QKD testbeds, standards-aligned implementation assurance and machine-verifiable security reasoning. Keywords: Quantum cryptography; quantum key distribution; post-quantum cryptography; quantum communications; nano-enabled cybersecurity; physical unclonable functions; DefenceTech; FinTech; SpaceTech; crypto-agility; QKD networks; ML-KEM; ML-DSA; hardware root of trust; cyber resilience

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Focus on Quantum Cryptography: Theory and Practice

Norbert Lütkenhaus, A. J. Shields

Quantum cryptography, and especially quantum key distribution (QKD), is steadily progressing to become a viable tool for cryptographic services. In recent years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the secure bit rate of QKD, as well as its extension to ever longer fibre- and air-based links and the emergence of metro-scale trusted networks. In the foreseeable future even global-scale communications may be possible using quantum repeaters or Earth–satellite links. A handful of start-ups and some bigger companies are already active in the field. The launch of an initiative to form industrial standards for QKD, under the auspices of the European Telecommunication Standards Institute, described in the paper by Laenger and Lenhart in this Focus Issue, can be taken as a sign of the growing commercial interest. Recent progress has seen an increase in the secure bit rate of QKD links, by orders of magnitude, to over 1 Mb s −1 . 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Outstanding issues include proving the unconditional security of some of the schemes. Much of the work done to date relates to point-to-point links. Another recent advance has been the development of trusted networks for QKD. This is important for further increasing the range of the technology, and for overcoming denial-of-service attacks on an individual link. It is interesting to see that the optimization of QKD devices differs for point-to-point and network applications. Network operation is essential for widespread adoption of the technology, as it can dramatically reduce the deployment costs and allow connection flexibility. Also important is the multiplexing of the quantum signals with conventional network traffic. For the future, quantum repeaters should be developed for longer range links. On the theoretical side, different approaches to security proofs have recently started to converge, offering several paradigms of the same basic idea. Our improved theoretical understanding places more stringent demands on the QKD devices. We are aware by now that finite size effects in key generation arise not only from parameter estimation. It will not be possible to generate a key from just a few hundred received signals. It is a stimulating challenge for the theory of security proofs to develop lean proof strategies that work with finite signal block sizes. As QKD advances to a real-world cryptographic solution, side channel attacks must be carefully analysed. Theoretical security proofs for QKD schemes are so far based on physical models of these devices. It is in the nature of models that any real implementation will deviate from this model, creating a potential weakness for an eavesdropper to exploit. 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Peterson, D Rosenberg, N Dallmann, R J Hughes, K P McCabe, J E Nordholt and K T Tyagi Clock synchronization by remote detection of correlated photon pairs Caleb Ho, Antía Lamas-Linares and Christian Kurtsiefer Megabits secure key rate quantum key distribution Q Zhang, H Takesue, T Honjo, K Wen, T Hirohata, M Suyama, Y Takiguchi, H Kamada, Y Tokura, O Tadanaga, Y Nishida, M Asobe and Y Yamamoto Practical long-distance quantum key distribution system using decoy levels D Rosenberg, C G Peterson, J W Harrington, P R Rice, N Dallmann, K T Tyagi, K P McCabe, S Nam, B Baek, R H Hadfield, R J Hughes and J E Nordholt Detector decoy quantum key distribution Tobias Moroder, Marcos Curty and Norbert Lütkenhaus Daylight operation of a free space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system Matthew P Peloso, Ilja Gerhardt, Caleb Ho, Antía Lamas-Linares and Christian Kurtsiefer Observation of 1.5 μm band entanglement using single photon detectors based on sinusoidally gated InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes Benjamin Miquel and Hiroki Takesue

New Journal of Physics•Apr 30, 2009•48 citations

Deployed trusted-node quantum key distribution over 300 km with a multi-core fiber access link

Martin Clason, Joakim Argillander, Didrik Bergström +8 more

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is increasingly considered for deployment in realistic communication networks, where long distances, heterogeneous fiber infrastructure, and coexistence with classical traffic present substantial challenges. Here, we demonstrate trusted-node QKD between Linköping University and the Stockholm hub of the Swedish national quantum communication infrastructure over 270 km of deployed single-mode fiber, extended by a 33 km multi-core fiber (MCF) segment emulating a metropolitan access link, for a total distance of 303 km. The two sub-links use commercial QKD systems whose receivers are interfaced with external superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors, enabling operation at losses beyond those supported by standard internal gated-mode detectors. We operate the link while actively switching the QKD channel between two MCF cores, with co-propagating Ethernet traffic and injected broadband optical noise in the other cores. The results demonstrate the integration of commercial QKD into demanding, dynamically reconfigurable fiber infrastructure relevant to future hybrid quantum-classical networks. Finally, using the generated secret keys, we illustrate how limited and time-varying QKD throughput affects one-time-pad-protected image transmission: image fidelity depends strongly on the available QKD-generated key budget and the choice of compression algorithm, highlighting application-level challenges for QKD-based encryption in realistic scenarios.

quant-pharXiv:2606.06107•Jun 5, 2026•0 citations

INTEGRATION OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION INTO NEXT-GENERATION TELECOM SYSTEMS

Ergashova Durdona Khusniddin kizi

As quantum computing threatens to compromise classical cryptographic systems, the need for future-proof, information-theoretically secure methods of communication has become critical. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to enable the secure generation and exchange of encryption keys, immune to computational attacks. This paper investigates the integration of QKD into telecom infrastructures to enable ultra-secure communication. We examine the performance of key QKD protocols, such as BB84 and E91, over fiber-optic and free-space channels, and simulate their deployment within realistic metropolitan network topologies. Results show that secure key rates of up to 10 kbps can be maintained over 50–80 km fiber links with Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER) below 5%. The study also explores architecture models based on trusted relay nodes and WDM coexistence, highlighting practical deployment considerations. Our findings suggest that QKD is a viable enhancement for telecom security and a necessary foundation for long-term quantum-resilient communication systems.

Journal of Applied Science and Social Science•Apr 7, 2026•0 citations

Focus on Quantum Cryptography

Paul G. Kwiat

In our modern era of telecommunications and the Internet, information has become a valuable commodity. Sometimes it must therefore be protected against theft - in this case, loss of secret information to an eavesdropper. Most of today's transactions are protected using encryption unproven to be secure against a computational attack by a classical computer and, in fact, the standardly used encryption algorithms are provably vulnerable to the mind-boggling parallelism of a quantum computer, should one ever be physically realized. Enter quantum cryptography. Underlying nearly all forms of encryption is the necessity for a truly secret key, a random string of zeros and ones; the basic notion of quantum cryptography is to employ single photon transmissions (or the closest attainable approximation to these) to distribute the random key material, while removing the threat of an undetected eavesdropper. Now, nearly twenty years since the seminal quantum cryptography paper by Bennett and Brassard (Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New York: IEEE) pp 175-9), we take a look at several state-of-the-art implementations, and glimpse how future quantum cryptosystems might look. We start with papers from three of the world's leading experimental quantum cryptography efforts: Stucki et al and Bethune and Risk describe working systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) over telecommunications fibres (at 1550 nanometres and 1300 nanometres, respectively). The former's achievement of quantum key exchange over 67 kilometres of optical fibre is a world record, as is the experimental demonstration by Hughes et al of daylight free-space QKD over a 10 km atmospheric range. Next, Lütkenhaus and Jahma explore the possible vulnerabilities of such systems (which employ attenuated laser pulses instead of actual single photon states) to conceivable future eavesdropping technologies. Enzer et al have implemented a totally new protocol, using polarization-entangled photons, which in some circumstances can tolerate higher error rates than the traditional one of Bennett and Brassard; moreover, the use of entanglement provides a means of `automatic source verification'. Finally, looking to the future, Elliott gives a provocative view of how these technologies may be merged into network operation, and Shapiro describes a method to combine a novel source of entangled photons with a means to transfer the photons' quantum state to trapped-atom quantum memories. If realized, these systems could presage the world's first quantum network. Focus on Quantum Cryptography Contents Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden Autocompensating quantum cryptography Donald S Bethune and William P Risk Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs and Charles G Peterson Quantum key distribution with realistic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack Norbert Lütkenhaus and Mika Jahma Entangled-photon six-state quantum cryptography Daphna G Enzer, Phillip G Hadley, Richard J Hughes, Charles G Peterson and Paul G Kwiat Building the quantum network Chip Elliott Architectures for long-distance quantum teleportation Jeffrey H Shapiro Ground to satellite secure key exchange using quantum cryptography J G Rarity, P R Tapster, P M Gorman and P Knight Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification Hoi-Kwong Lo Paul G Kwiat University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

New Journal of Physics•Jul 12, 2002•9 citations
The purpose of the article was to theoretically determine harmonised criteria for the applicability of quantum key distribution for the protection of critical infrastructure, taking into account the long-term risk of decryption by adversaries possessing quantum computational resources and traffic archiving capabilities. The methodology relied on a theoretical systems analysis of three Quantum Key Distribution subsystems – sources, detectors, and channels (fibre/free space) – complemented by simplified models of the link budget and bit error probability. A concise scenario analysis was conducted for banking networks, energy systems, and government communications, taking into account scalability, compatibility, and cost. The main results showed that laser intensity stability of 1-2% and higher detector efficiencies – 60-70% for Avalanche Photodiodes and 80-90% for Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors – extended practical distances and reduced errors. Without trusted nodes in fibre, 150-200 km was achievable; for urban Free-Space Optics lines, 5-20 km was optimal, while longer distances required network segmentation or satellite segments. Architecturally, it was justified that: for banks – rings with trusted nodes and Free-Space Optics reserve; for energy systems – dual fibre channels “control centre-substation” with a local key cache; for government communications – segmented domains with interagency gateways and satellite redundancy. In all scenarios, a Quantum Key Distribution + Post-Quantum Cryptography hybrid with short key rotation and operational countermeasures against attacks on detectors and channels was appropriate, confirming practical suitability for urban and regional networks. The practical significance lay in providing engineering teams in banking, energy, and government communications with ready-made architectural profiles – from rings and dual fibre channels to segmented domains – with Key Management System/Hardware Security Module integration, definition of Service Level Objective/Service Level Agreement, and phased roadmaps. For regulators and operators, this formed a basis for updating requirements and audits, as well as for planning redundancy (Free-Space Optics/satellite) and Total Cost of Ownership categories
Abstract: This study advances a unifying systems perspective on quantum-safe network security by synthesizing recent progress in quantum cryptography with practical integration patterns across carrier-grade infrastructures. Concept analysis distinguishes the roles of quantum key distribution (QKD), device-independent variants, quantum authentication, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within zero-trust architectures. Building on this, a layered framework—spanning physical/entanglement resources, key management, crypto-agility, control plane orchestration, and policy/compliance—is articulated to support end-to-end, composable guarantees. The problem addressed is the realization of verifiable, quantum-resilient security under operational constraints involving latency, key-rate variability, and heterogeneous trust assumptions. Methodology combines a structured literature synthesis with formal composability mapping to universal composability principles, adversarial threat modeling for quantum-enabled attackers, and testbed/simulation evaluation of hybrid QKD–PQC pipelines across L2–L3 segments and 5G/6G backhaul scenarios. Key results indicate that (i) selective QKD deployment on high-value links coupled with PQC at endpoints enhances resilience while preserving crypto-agility; (ii) automated key-lifecycle orchestration reduces exposure windows; and (iii) device-independent assurances strengthen guarantees where trust relaxation is necessary. The impact is a deployment-ready reference architecture, measurable integration metrics, and guidance aligned with emerging standards for critical infrastructure and national networks. The implications extend to procurement, compliance, and roadmap planning for quantum-era network security. Keywords: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), hybrid QKD–PQC, composable security, device-independent QKD, zero-trust networks, key management and orchestration, 5G/6G backhaul, network security architecture, standards and interoperability
Abstract: This study develops a scope of analytical framework for integrating quantum cryptography, quantum communications, post-quantum cryptography and nano-enabled hardware security into global cybersecurity architectures for DefenceTech, FinTech and SpaceTech. The research problem is framed by the convergence of three pressures: the long-lived confidentiality exposure created by harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks, the rapid standardization of post-quantum algorithms, and the need for hardware-rooted trust in physically exposed devices, satellites, edge nodes and payment infrastructures. The paper synthesizes quantum key distribution, quantum-network standardization, crypto-agile migration, physical unclonable functions and sectoral governance into a single evaluation model. It uses a public-source calibrated realistic dataset of 18 high-value scenarios across defence, finance and space systems. The dataset is not represented as confidential operational telemetry; rather, it is explicitly constructed from publicly available threat, standards and engineering indicators to support transparent modelling. The methodology combines literature review, structured scenario analysis, weighted risk scoring, residual-risk modelling, expected annual loss estimation and feasibility-sensitive control selection. Mathematical equations are used to express QKD channel attenuation, secret-key-rate intuition, cryptographic migration risk, expected loss and multi-criteria optimization. Results indicate that hybrid PQC adoption produces the broadest near-term risk reduction, QKD offers the strongest value where long-lived secrets and controlled optical paths exist, and nano-enabled roots of trust are especially relevant to contested devices and supply chains. The study proposes a staged global framework in which crypto-agility, hybrid PQC, QKD network governance and nano-PUF attestation are treated as complementary layers rather than competing security paradigms. The conclusion identifies future work in real operational benchmarking, satellite-QKD testbeds, standards-aligned implementation assurance and machine-verifiable security reasoning. Keywords: Quantum cryptography; quantum key distribution; post-quantum cryptography; quantum communications; nano-enabled cybersecurity; physical unclonable functions; DefenceTech; FinTech; SpaceTech; crypto-agility; QKD networks; ML-KEM; ML-DSA; hardware root of trust; cyber resilience
Quantum cryptography, and especially quantum key distribution (QKD), is steadily progressing to become a viable tool for cryptographic services. In recent years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the secure bit rate of QKD, as well as its extension to ever longer fibre- and air-based links and the emergence of metro-scale trusted networks. In the foreseeable future even global-scale communications may be possible using quantum repeaters or Earth–satellite links. A handful of start-ups and some bigger companies are already active in the field. The launch of an initiative to form industrial standards for QKD, under the auspices of the European Telecommunication Standards Institute, described in the paper by Laenger and Lenhart in this Focus Issue, can be taken as a sign of the growing commercial interest. Recent progress has seen an increase in the secure bit rate of QKD links, by orders of magnitude, to over 1 Mb s −1 . This has resulted mainly from an improvement in the detection technology. Here changes in the way conventional semiconductor detectors are gated, as well as the development of novel devices based on non-linear processes and superconducting materials, are leading the way. Additional challenges for QKD at GHz clock rates include the design of high speed electronics, remote synchronization and high rate random number generation. Substantial effort is being devoted to increasing the range of individual links, which is limited by attenuation and other losses in optical fibres and air links. An important advance in the past few years has been the introduction of protocols with the same scaling as an ideal single-photon set-up. The good news is that these schemes use standard optical devices, such as weak laser pulses. Thanks to these new protocols and improvements in the detection technology, the range of a single fibre link can exceed a few hundred km. Outstanding issues include proving the unconditional security of some of the schemes. Much of the work done to date relates to point-to-point links. Another recent advance has been the development of trusted networks for QKD. This is important for further increasing the range of the technology, and for overcoming denial-of-service attacks on an individual link. It is interesting to see that the optimization of QKD devices differs for point-to-point and network applications. Network operation is essential for widespread adoption of the technology, as it can dramatically reduce the deployment costs and allow connection flexibility. Also important is the multiplexing of the quantum signals with conventional network traffic. For the future, quantum repeaters should be developed for longer range links. On the theoretical side, different approaches to security proofs have recently started to converge, offering several paradigms of the same basic idea. Our improved theoretical understanding places more stringent demands on the QKD devices. We are aware by now that finite size effects in key generation arise not only from parameter estimation. It will not be possible to generate a key from just a few hundred received signals. It is a stimulating challenge for the theory of security proofs to develop lean proof strategies that work with finite signal block sizes. As QKD advances to a real-world cryptographic solution, side channel attacks must be carefully analysed. Theoretical security proofs for QKD schemes are so far based on physical models of these devices. It is in the nature of models that any real implementation will deviate from this model, creating a potential weakness for an eavesdropper to exploit. There are two solutions to this problem: the traditional path of refining the models to reduce the deviations, or the radically different approach of device-independent security proofs, in which none or only a few well controlled assumptions about the devices are made. Clearly, it is desirable to find security proofs that require only minimal or fairly general model descriptions and are based on observable tests during the run of QKD sessions. It is now 25 years since the first proposal for QKD was published and 20 since the first experimental realization. The intervening years have brought several technological and theoretical advances, which have driven new insights into the application of quantum theory to the wider field of information technology. We are looking forward to the new twists and turns this field will take in the next 25 years! Focus on Quantum Cryptography: Theory and Practice Contents Security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution: towards a de Finetti theorem for rotation symmetry in phase space A Leverrier, E Karpov, P Grangier and N J Cerf Optical networking for quantum key distribution and quantum communications T E Chapuran, P Toliver, N A Peters, J Jackel, M S Goodman, R J Runser, S R McNown, N Dallmann, R J Hughes, K P McCabe, J E Nordholt, C G Peterson, K T Tyagi, L Mercer and H Dardy Proof-of-concept of real-world quantum key distribution with quantum frames I Lucio-Martinez, P Chan, X Mo, S Hosier and W Tittel Composability in quantum cryptography Jörn Müller-Quade and Renato Renner Distributed authentication for randomly compromised networks Travis R Beals, Kevin P Hynes and Barry C Sanders Feasibility of 300 km quantum key distribution with entangled states Thomas Scheidl, Rupert Ursin, Alessandro Fedrizzi, Sven Ramelow, Xiao-Song Ma, Thomas Herbst, Robert Prevedel, Lothar Ratschbacher, Johannes Kofler, Thomas Jennewein and Anton Zeilinger Decoy-state quantum key distribution with both source errors and statistical fluctuations Xiang-Bin Wang, Lin Yang, Cheng-Zhi Peng and Jian-Wei Pan High rate, long-distance quantum key distribution over 250 km of ultra low loss fibres D Stucki, N Walenta, F Vannel, R T Thew, N Gisin, H Zbinden, S Gray, C R Towery and S Ten Topological optimization of quantum key distribution networks R Alléaume, F Roueff, E Diamanti and N Lütkenhaus The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna M Peev, C Pacher, R Alléaume, C Barreiro, J Bouda, W Boxleitner, T Debuisschert, E Diamanti, M Dianati, J F Dynes, S Fasel, S Fossier, M Fürst, J-D Gautier, O Gay, N Gisin, P Grangier, A Happe, Y Hasani, M Hentschel, H Hübel, G Humer, T Länger, M Legré, R Lieger, J Lodewyck, T Lorünser, N Lütkenhaus, A Marhold, T Matyus, O Maurhart, L Monat, S Nauerth, J-B Page, A Poppe, E Querasser, G Ribordy, S Robyr, L Salvail, A W Sharpe, A J Shields, D Stucki, M Suda, C Tamas, T Themel, R T Thew, Y Thoma, A Treiber, P Trinkler, R Tualle-Brouri, F Vannel, N Walenta, H Weier, H Weinfurter, I Wimberger, Z L Yuan, H Zbinden and A Zeilinger Stable quantum key distribution with active polarization control based on time-division multiplexing J Chen, G Wu, L Xu, X Gu, E Wu and H Zeng Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light Vadim Makarov Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography Sebastian Nauerth, Martin Fürst, Tobias Schmitt-Manderbach, Henning Weier and Harald Weinfurter Standardization of quantum key distribution and the ETSI standardization initiative ISG-QKD Thomas Länger and Gaby Lenhart Entangled quantum key distribution with a biased basis choice Chris Erven, Xiongfeng Ma, Raymond Laflamme and Gregor Weihs Finite-key analysis for practical implementations of quantum key distribution Raymond Y Q Cai and Valerio Scarani Field test of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution prototype S Fossier, E Diamanti, T Debuisschert, A Villing, R Tualle-Brouri and P Grangier Physics and application of photon number resolving detectors based on superconducting parallel nanowires F Marsili, D Bitauld, A Gaggero, S Jahanmirinejad, R Leoni, F Mattioli and A Fiore Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks Stefano Pironio, Antonio Acín, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin, Serge Massar and Valerio Scarani 1310 nm differential-phase-shift QKD system using superconducting single-photon detectors Lijun Ma, S Nam, Hai Xu, B Baek, Tiejun Chang, O Slattery, A Mink and Xiao Tang Practical gigahertz quantum key distribution based on avalanche photodiodes Z L Yuan, A R Dixon, J F Dynes, A W Sharpe and A J Shields Simple security proof of quantum key distribution based on complementarity M Koashi Feasibility of satellite quantum key distribution C Bonato, A Tomaello, V Da Deppo, G Naletto and P Villoresi Programmable instrumentation and gigahertz signaling for single-photon quantum communication systems Alan Mink, Joshua C Bienfang, Robert Carpenter, Lijun Ma, Barry Hershman, Alessandro Restelli and Xiao Tang Experimental polarization encoded quantum key distribution over optical fibres with real-time continuous birefringence compensation G B Xavier, N Walenta, G Vilela de Faria, G P Temporão, N Gisin, H Zbinden and J P von der Weid Feasibility of free space quantum key distribution with coherent polarization states D Elser, T Bartley, B Heim, Ch Wittmann, D Sych and G Leuchs A fully automated entanglement-based quantum cryptography system for telecom fiber networks Alexander Treiber, Andreas Poppe, Michael Hentschel, Daniele Ferrini, Thomas Lorünser, Edwin Querasser, Thomas Matyus, Hannes Hübel and Anton Zeilinger Dense wavelength multiplexing of 1550 nm QKD with strong classical channels in reconfigurable networking environments N A Peters, P Toliver, T E Chapuran, R J Runser, S R McNown, C G Peterson, D Rosenberg, N Dallmann, R J Hughes, K P McCabe, J E Nordholt and K T Tyagi Clock synchronization by remote detection of correlated photon pairs Caleb Ho, Antía Lamas-Linares and Christian Kurtsiefer Megabits secure key rate quantum key distribution Q Zhang, H Takesue, T Honjo, K Wen, T Hirohata, M Suyama, Y Takiguchi, H Kamada, Y Tokura, O Tadanaga, Y Nishida, M Asobe and Y Yamamoto Practical long-distance quantum key distribution system using decoy levels D Rosenberg, C G Peterson, J W Harrington, P R Rice, N Dallmann, K T Tyagi, K P McCabe, S Nam, B Baek, R H Hadfield, R J Hughes and J E Nordholt Detector decoy quantum key distribution Tobias Moroder, Marcos Curty and Norbert Lütkenhaus Daylight operation of a free space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system Matthew P Peloso, Ilja Gerhardt, Caleb Ho, Antía Lamas-Linares and Christian Kurtsiefer Observation of 1.5 μm band entanglement using single photon detectors based on sinusoidally gated InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes Benjamin Miquel and Hiroki Takesue
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is increasingly considered for deployment in realistic communication networks, where long distances, heterogeneous fiber infrastructure, and coexistence with classical traffic present substantial challenges. Here, we demonstrate trusted-node QKD between Linköping University and the Stockholm hub of the Swedish national quantum communication infrastructure over 270 km of deployed single-mode fiber, extended by a 33 km multi-core fiber (MCF) segment emulating a metropolitan access link, for a total distance of 303 km. The two sub-links use commercial QKD systems whose receivers are interfaced with external superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors, enabling operation at losses beyond those supported by standard internal gated-mode detectors. We operate the link while actively switching the QKD channel between two MCF cores, with co-propagating Ethernet traffic and injected broadband optical noise in the other cores. The results demonstrate the integration of commercial QKD into demanding, dynamically reconfigurable fiber infrastructure relevant to future hybrid quantum-classical networks. Finally, using the generated secret keys, we illustrate how limited and time-varying QKD throughput affects one-time-pad-protected image transmission: image fidelity depends strongly on the available QKD-generated key budget and the choice of compression algorithm, highlighting application-level challenges for QKD-based encryption in realistic scenarios.
As quantum computing threatens to compromise classical cryptographic systems, the need for future-proof, information-theoretically secure methods of communication has become critical. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to enable the secure generation and exchange of encryption keys, immune to computational attacks. This paper investigates the integration of QKD into telecom infrastructures to enable ultra-secure communication. We examine the performance of key QKD protocols, such as BB84 and E91, over fiber-optic and free-space channels, and simulate their deployment within realistic metropolitan network topologies. Results show that secure key rates of up to 10 kbps can be maintained over 50–80 km fiber links with Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER) below 5%. The study also explores architecture models based on trusted relay nodes and WDM coexistence, highlighting practical deployment considerations. Our findings suggest that QKD is a viable enhancement for telecom security and a necessary foundation for long-term quantum-resilient communication systems.
In our modern era of telecommunications and the Internet, information has become a valuable commodity. Sometimes it must therefore be protected against theft - in this case, loss of secret information to an eavesdropper. Most of today's transactions are protected using encryption unproven to be secure against a computational attack by a classical computer and, in fact, the standardly used encryption algorithms are provably vulnerable to the mind-boggling parallelism of a quantum computer, should one ever be physically realized. Enter quantum cryptography. Underlying nearly all forms of encryption is the necessity for a truly secret key, a random string of zeros and ones; the basic notion of quantum cryptography is to employ single photon transmissions (or the closest attainable approximation to these) to distribute the random key material, while removing the threat of an undetected eavesdropper. Now, nearly twenty years since the seminal quantum cryptography paper by Bennett and Brassard (Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New York: IEEE) pp 175-9), we take a look at several state-of-the-art implementations, and glimpse how future quantum cryptosystems might look. We start with papers from three of the world's leading experimental quantum cryptography efforts: Stucki et al and Bethune and Risk describe working systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) over telecommunications fibres (at 1550 nanometres and 1300 nanometres, respectively). The former's achievement of quantum key exchange over 67 kilometres of optical fibre is a world record, as is the experimental demonstration by Hughes et al of daylight free-space QKD over a 10 km atmospheric range. Next, Lütkenhaus and Jahma explore the possible vulnerabilities of such systems (which employ attenuated laser pulses instead of actual single photon states) to conceivable future eavesdropping technologies. Enzer et al have implemented a totally new protocol, using polarization-entangled photons, which in some circumstances can tolerate higher error rates than the traditional one of Bennett and Brassard; moreover, the use of entanglement provides a means of `automatic source verification'. Finally, looking to the future, Elliott gives a provocative view of how these technologies may be merged into network operation, and Shapiro describes a method to combine a novel source of entangled photons with a means to transfer the photons' quantum state to trapped-atom quantum memories. If realized, these systems could presage the world's first quantum network. Focus on Quantum Cryptography Contents Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden Autocompensating quantum cryptography Donald S Bethune and William P Risk Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs and Charles G Peterson Quantum key distribution with realistic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack Norbert Lütkenhaus and Mika Jahma Entangled-photon six-state quantum cryptography Daphna G Enzer, Phillip G Hadley, Richard J Hughes, Charles G Peterson and Paul G Kwiat Building the quantum network Chip Elliott Architectures for long-distance quantum teleportation Jeffrey H Shapiro Ground to satellite secure key exchange using quantum cryptography J G Rarity, P R Tapster, P M Gorman and P Knight Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification Hoi-Kwong Lo Paul G Kwiat University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA