This paper offers a lattice-based digital signature construction, optimized for the provision of post-quantum security in resource-constrained environments, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The offered scheme is built upon structured hardness assumptions, defined over polynomial rings that exhibit inherent algebraic symmetry. By exploiting the cyclic properties of these ring structures and implementing efficient Number Theoretic Transforms (NTTs), the construction achieves compact signatures that are under 3 KB and a runtime feasibility that uses less than 10 KB of RAM. The signature generation process incorporates balanced rejection sampling and carefully designed polynomial encodings that preserve structural regularity and computational efficiency. The security of the offered scheme is proven. The benchmark results generated from using the ARM Cortex-M4 platform demonstrate its practical usability. This study highlights how symmetric algebraic frameworks based on lattice-based cryptography can be leveraged to achieve both theoretical security and real-world performance in the post-quantum era.
This paper offers a lattice-based digital signature construction, optimized for the provision of post-quantum security in resource-constrained environments, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The offered scheme is built upon structured hardness assumptions, defined over polynomial rings that exhibit inherent algebraic symmetry. By exploiting the cyclic properties of these ring structures and implementing efficient Number Theoretic Transforms (NTTs), the construction achieves compact signatures that are under 3 KB and a runtime feasibility that uses less than 10 KB of RAM. The signature generation process incorporates balanced rejection sampling and carefully designed polynomial encodings that preserve structural regularity and computational efficiency. The security of the offered scheme is proven. The benchmark results generated from using the ARM Cortex-M4 platform demonstrate its practical usability. This study highlights how symmetric algebraic frameworks based on lattice-based cryptography can be leveraged to achieve both theoretical security and real-world performance in the post-quantum era.
With the rapid expansion of consumer electronics and the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem, ensuring secure communication in resource-constrained edge devices has become a critical challenge, especially under the threat of quantum attacks. Although lattice-based cryptographic schemes provide post-quantum security, they often suffer from large key storage and high computational overhead, limiting their applicability in edge environments. To address these challenges, we propose an identity-based linkable ring signcryption scheme constructed on the post quantum Lattice cryptography, tailored for edge-enabled IoT systems. The scheme employs a trapdoor generation algorithm to establish the master keys, utilizes compact Gaussian sampling to derive private keys for ring members, and integrates rejection sampling to generate user signatures with strong anonymity. Furthermore, a key encapsulation mechanism ensures identity protection during encryption. Security analysis under the Random Oracle Model (ROM) demonstrates the scheme's resistance to forgery and its linkability property. Performance evaluation shows that the proposed approach achieves smaller public keys, reduced encryption/decryption costs, and enhanced efficiency, making it well-suited for lightweight IoT and consumer electronics applications in the post-quantum era.
Proxy re-signature enables transitive authentication of digital identities across different domains and has significant application value in areas such as digital rights management, cross-domain certificate validation, and distributed system access control. However, most existing proxy re-signature schemes, which are predominantly based on traditional public-key cryptosystems, face security vulnerabilities and certificate management bottlenecks. While identity-based schemes alleviate some issues, they introduce key escrow concerns. Certificateless schemes effectively resolve both certificate management and key escrow problems but remain vulnerable to quantum computing threats. To address these limitations, this paper constructs an efficient post-quantum certificateless proxy re-signature scheme based on algebraic lattices. Building upon algebraic lattice theory and leveraging the Dilithium algorithm, our scheme innovatively employs a lattice basis reduction-assisted parameter selection strategy to mitigate the potential algebraic attack vectors inherent in the NTRU lattice structure. This ensures the security and integrity of multi-party communication in quantum-threat environments. Furthermore, the scheme significantly reduces computational overhead and optimizes signature storage complexity through structured compression techniques, facilitating deployment on resource-constrained devices like Internet of Things (IoT) terminals. We formally prove the unforgeability of the scheme under the adaptive chosen-message attack model, with its security reducible to the hardness of the corresponding underlying lattice problems.
Conventional Asymmetrical RSA and ECC chord cryptosystems have the horns of a dilemma due to the advent of quantum computers. In this paper, we introduce PQ-Lattice-a decentralized lattice-based postquantum authenticated key exchange protocol for IoT. The protocol uses CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulationand CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures in a blockchain empowered identity management framework providing decentralization, mutual authentication and fine grained revocation without the dependence on trusted authority. Extensive performance evaluation on an ARM Cortex-M4 device shows that PQ-Lattice has the average computation time of 32.4 ms, communication overhead of 3.5 KB andstorage cost of 44 KB, which consumes around 28 mJ for a single authentication round. This result has demonstrated the feasibility in terms of power consumption for the constrained IoT nodes compared with traditional ECC and RSA, where latency is reduced up to 45% while energy efficiency increases by 47%. Security proof under the hardness of Module-LWE is given showing resilience against classical, as well asquantum attacks (replay, impersonation and Sybil). The presented PQ-Lattice architecture is therefore an efficient (in terms of scalability, and energy consumption) quantum-resilient authentication answer tailored to the next generation IoT platform.
The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to an unprecedented scale of data exchange across heterogeneous and resource-constrained devices. Ensuring confidentiality and secure key management in such environments is challenging. Traditional public-key infrastructures require heavy certificate-handling overhead. Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) offers a lightweight alternative by deriving public keys directly from device identities, making it attractive for IoT deployments. However, IoT devices are highly vulnerable to side-channel and key-extraction attacks, motivating the need for Forward-Secure IBE(FS-IBE), where the compromise of a current secret key does not threaten past communications. Existing FS-IBE constructions based on classical hardness assumptions are not secure in the era of post-quantum, while the lattice-based (LWE-based) forward-secure scheme suffer from large key and ciphertext sizes, limiting their suitability for constrained IoT systems. Here, we propose a new lattice-based fs-IBE scheme in the ring setting, relying on the RLWE assumption to achieve post-quantum security and significant efficiency gains. Our design uses trapdoor delegation with a minimal-cover mechanism over a binary tree. It results in compact public parameters and efficient per-epoch key updates. Compared to prior LWE-based constructions, our scheme reduces public key, secret key, and ciphertext sizes, and thus, making it better suited for practical IoT environments.
A lightweight, robust, and efficient security mechanism is necessary to combat quantum-generation threats across multiple domains, including healthcare, transportation, and industrial automation, in the Internet of Things (IoT). Post-quantum cryptography has emerged in response to the increasing vulnerability of traditional cryptographic methods, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks. Taking advantage of the hardness of Short Integer Solutions (SIS) and Learning with Errors (LWE), we propose a lattice-based signature scheme for IoT applications. A computationally efficient IoT device model that maintains authenticated, integrity, and anonymity is proposed. The scheme has the advantage of being faster and more efficient than existing key size schemes such as IBS, CLS, and FALCON, according to a detailed security assessment. The proposed scheme maintains practical deployment ability while reducing post-quantum security in IoT ecosystems.
Conventional public-key cryptographic systems are increasingly threatened by advances in quantum computing, accelerating the need for robust post-quantum cryptographic solutions. Among these, Falcon, a compact lattice-based digital signature scheme, has emerged as a leading candidate in the NIST post-quantum standardization process due to its efficiency and theoretical security grounded in hard lattice problems. This work introduces Falcon-M, a modified version of the Falcon algorithm that significantly reduces implementation complexity. It does so by replacing Falcon’s intricate trapdoor-based key-generation mechanism with a simplified approach that utilizes randomized polynomial Gaussian sampling and fast Fourier transform (FFT) operations. Falcon-M incorporates SHA-512 hashing and discrete Gaussian sampling to preserve cryptographic soundness and statistical randomness while maintaining the core structure of Falcon’s signing and verification processes. We formally specify the Falcon-M algorithm, provide an updated pseudocode, and offer a comparative analysis with the original Falcon in terms of algorithmic complexity, security assumptions, and implementation overhead. Additionally, we present formal lemmas and theorems to ensure correctness and define theoretical bounds on forgery resistance. Although Falcon-M does not rely on a formal cryptographic trapdoor, we demonstrate that it achieves strong practical security based on assumptions related to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. Falcon-M is thus well-suited for lightweight post-quantum applications, particularly in resource-constrained environments, such as embedded systems and Internet-of-Things (IoT) platforms.