Breakthroughs in the field of quantum computing are forcing society to adapt the systems it employs to future threats. Telecommunications networks are no exception, and technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) have been developed to establish secure and confidential mechanisms for quantum-safe key distribution. However, the lack of flexibility and scalability of this technology hinders its implementation in 5G/6G networks. In this context, this paper presents the design and development of a QKD classical channel authentication system based on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms for securing multi-site 5G/6G networks. It also presents the deployment in an experimental infrastructure with a 5G core securization use case, and a comprehensive validation and performance evaluation, measuring key parameters such as protocol timing, error rate, and keyrate. Results show that the PQC authentication offers a similar performance compared to the inflexible, vendor-specific authentication mechanism, obtaining Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) measurements ranging from 2.5% to 3.5% in both cases, while only reducing the keyrate 4.53% (from 525.27 bps to 501.44 bps).
Breakthroughs in the field of quantum computing are forcing society to adapt the systems it employs to future threats. Telecommunications networks are no exception, and technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) have been developed to establish secure and confidential mechanisms for quantum-safe key distribution. However, the lack of flexibility and scalability of this technology hinders its implementation in 5G/6G networks. In this context, this paper presents the design and development of a QKD classical channel authentication system based on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms for securing multi-site 5G/6G networks. It also presents the deployment in an experimental infrastructure with a 5G core securization use case, and a comprehensive validation and performance evaluation, measuring key parameters such as protocol timing, error rate, and keyrate. Results show that the PQC authentication offers a similar performance compared to the inflexible, vendor-specific authentication mechanism, obtaining Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) measurements ranging from 2.5% to 3.5% in both cases, while only reducing the keyrate 4.53% (from 525.27 bps to 501.44 bps).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security for key exchange; however, its effective implementation is contingent upon the security of the classical communication channel, especially for authentication purposes. This work presents a system-level study of quantum-safe authentication for the classical channel in multi-site QKD networks, comparing two post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) approaches within a unified evaluation framework: one based on lattice-based digital signatures, and one based on message authentication codes (MACs) bootstrapped by PQC key establishment. We develop a multi-site network model to analyze the scalability and deployment limitations of traditional pre-shared key methods. The framework is evaluated using both simulations and hardware-based experiments, considering communication cost, computational overhead, and the impact on the key generation rate. The results show that signature-based authentication offers stateless per-message verification at a higher per-block cost, while MAC-based authentication is better suited to high-throughput environments, both at the same linear onboarding cost. The study quantifies the trade-offs between security, scalability, and performance, and provides practical guidance for deploying quantum-safe authentication in real-world QKD systems.
With the advent of 6G communication systems on the horizon, ensuring that they are secure from quantum computing threats, in a post-quantum era, is of paramount importance. Quantum attacks, computational hardness-based classical cryptographic algorithms are becoming more susceptible to quantum attacks. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has been proposed to address this challenge, which can provide unconditional security based on quantum mechanics for establishing security cryptographic keys. In this work, we review how QKD could fit into the 6G design as part of the general siytematic vision of security exploring its potential implementations, the technical feasibility, and the applications considering both fiber and wireless scenarios. We provide a comparative investigation of performance indicators of QKD systems in simulated 6G scenarios: secret key generation rates, quantum bit error rates (QBER), resistance to noise and user mobility. In addition, hybrid security models between classical post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and QKD to achieve multilayered security protocols are demonstrated. Furthermore, the contribution that could be made by AI/ML to improve QKD performance is analyzed, with particular attention to smart error correction, adaptive key management, anomaly detection, and dynamic routing. Despite significant progress, a number of critical challenges are still open in terms of scale, standardization, interoperability and deployment. In Section VI, we offer a forward-looking research direction, highlighting the importance of the AI empowered QKD, protocols global standardization, and creation of realworld testbeds to drive the QKD from the testbed to the 6G network. It is hoped that the insights provide here will inspire research community and industry partners to build quantum-safe communication infrastructure for the future.
Quantum computing is posing a serious risk to classical cryptographic tools such as RSA and ECC as sophisticated quantum algorithms are able to crack their mathematical foundation in a time bound that is a a polynomial in the number of repetitions. In this paper, we will describe the process of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into a hybrid approach to secure communications in the post-quantum world. The suggested methodology is a combination of the computational efficiency and scalability of PQC and the information-theoretic security and eavesdropping detection abilities of QKD. Simulation observations indicate that PQC-only systems are both faster in generating keys and scalable, but do not have a strong eavesdropping detection. On the other hand, non-conditional security is only a feature of systems based on QKD, but it is also highly overhead and slows down key rate. The hybrid PQC-Q KD model provides a balanced performance, high resilience, high authentication, high confidentiality, and realistic deployability. On balance, this discussion demonstrates that the hybrid approach is better than standalone methods and can provide a strong solution to protect against new quantum threats. The large-scale network protocol can be optimized, resources and further integration with other emerging technologies, such as 5G/6G, IoT or cloud computing, can be directed in future research.
The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
Quantum computing poses significant challenges to the current cryptographic landscape, particularly with the upcoming deployment of 6G networks. Traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), are vulnerable to quantum-based attacks. This vulnerability has led to the development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), and Satellite-based QKD solutions. This paper provides a comprehensive review of these quantum-safe technologies, discussing their integration within the context of 6G networks. Key performance indicators (KPIs), scalability issues, and hybrid cryptographic solutions are analyzed, along with the potential of Satellite-based QKD in securing global communications. The paper also explores use cases in healthcare, financial services, defense, and autonomous systems, evaluating future research directions and issues in scaling these quantum-safe technologies across industries.