Identity principle is a fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics. In this paper, from a philosophical point of view, we revisit the identity principle of quantum mechanics. We attribute the identity to the existence of a precision limit for observation: the microscopic objects become indistinguishable when the difference between them is lower than the precision limit. This precision limit is determined not by the measuring apparatus, but by the action quantum h behand the objective physical law. We deduce logically how to relate the identity principle with the probabilistic interpretation, uncertainty principle, quantization in quantum mechanics, attempting to sorting out some logic for quantum theory. The indistinguishability of identical particles makes it impossible to accurately obtain all the details about the microscopic objects at the same time, and consequently the microscopic objects can only be described statistically, leading to the probabilistic determinism and indeterminacy of initial state in quantum mechanics. By reviewing Bohmian mechanics, one of the nonlocal hidden variable theories, we discuss the possibility of restoring determinism and causality in quantum mechanics by restoring the determinacy of initial state. However, any hidden variable theory constructed by using only the terminologies of classical physics cannot reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions. It is the identity principle that makes it impossible to restore causality and determinism, and is the root that makes quantum mechanics different from classical physics. Finally, the boundary between the so-called classical and quantum worlds is discussed. We hope these philosophical arguments can provide a kind of epistemic understanding for quantum mechanics.
Identity principle is a fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics. In this paper, from a philosophical point of view, we revisit the identity principle of quantum mechanics. We attribute the identity to the existence of a precision limit for observation: the microscopic objects become indistinguishable when the difference between them is lower than the precision limit. This precision limit is determined not by the measuring apparatus, but by the action quantum h behand the objective physical law. We deduce logically how to relate the identity principle with the probabilistic interpretation, uncertainty principle, quantization in quantum mechanics, attempting to sorting out some logic for quantum theory. The indistinguishability of identical particles makes it impossible to accurately obtain all the details about the microscopic objects at the same time, and consequently the microscopic objects can only be described statistically, leading to the probabilistic determinism and indeterminacy of initial state in quantum mechanics. By reviewing Bohmian mechanics, one of the nonlocal hidden variable theories, we discuss the possibility of restoring determinism and causality in quantum mechanics by restoring the determinacy of initial state. However, any hidden variable theory constructed by using only the terminologies of classical physics cannot reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions. It is the identity principle that makes it impossible to restore causality and determinism, and is the root that makes quantum mechanics different from classical physics. Finally, the boundary between the so-called classical and quantum worlds is discussed. We hope these philosophical arguments can provide a kind of epistemic understanding for quantum mechanics.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the assumption (``factorism'') that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particles system. Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible with the everyday meaning of ``particle'', and also with how this term is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible. Earlier we have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but \emph{emergent}. However, in those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum particles---identical or not---are distinguishable in the same way as classical particles.
Abstract According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.
We argue that measurement data in quantum physics can be rigorously interpreted only as a result of a statistical, macroscopic process, taking into account the indistinguishable character of identical particles. Quantum determinism is in principle possible on the condition that a fully-fledged quantum model is used to describe the measurement device in interaction with the studied object as one system. In contrast, any approach that relies on Born's rule discriminates the dynamics of a quantum system from that of the detector with which it interacts during measurement. In this work, we critically analyze the validity of this measurement postulate applied to single-event signals. In fact, the concept of ``individual'' particle becomes inadequate once both indistinguishability and a scattering approach allowing an unlimited interaction time for an effective detection, are considered as they should be, hence preventing the separability of two successive measurement events. In this context, measurement data should therefore be understood only as a result of statistics over many events. Accounting for the intrinsic noise of the sources and the detectors, we also show with the illustrative cases of the Schrödinger cat and the Bell experiment that once the Born rule is abandoned on the level of a single particle, realism, locality and causality are restored. We conclude that indiscernibility and long-time detection process make quantum physics not fundamentally probabilistic.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle constitutes one of the foundational pillars of quantum mechanics and represents a definitive rupture with the deterministic ideal of classical physics. This work develops a comprehensive analysis of the uncertainty principle from a mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspective, demonstrating that it should not be interpreted as an instrumental or epistemological limitation, but rather as an ontological property inherent to the formalstructure of quantum theory.Within the framework of Hilbert spaces, self-adjoint operators, and non-commutative algebras, it is shown that uncertainty emerges necessarily as a consequence of the structural incompatibility between conjugate observables. The study articulates the uncertainty principle with classical chaos theory and the sciences of complexity, establishing a fundamental distinction between epistemological unpredictability and ontological indeterminacy. While classical chaos preserves well-defined trajectories that are practically inaccessible, quantum mechanics eliminates the very notion of trajectory as a fundamental entity.This rupture manifests itself in the granularity of phase space, the impossibility of defining exact initial conditions, and the consequent reformulation of determinism. Contemporary experimental developments designed to exclude instrumental disturbances are analyzed, reinforcing the ontological interpretation of the uncertainty principle.Finally, the implications for simulation, predictability, and quantumOverall, this work argues that the uncertainty principle does not undermine scientific rationality, but rather redefines itsscope and deepens our understanding of physical reality. Keywords: uncertainty principle; quantum mechanics; mathematical structure; non-commutative operators; chaos theory; complexity; determinism; physical ontology.