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IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings

Side-channel Attacks Targeting Classical-Quantum Interface in Quantum Computers

Yerzhan Mustafa, Selçuk Köse

Published May 19, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

With the growing interest in emerging and upcoming quantum computers, it is important to consider possible hardware security vulnerabilities and countermeasures. This work proposes side-channel attacks targeting classical-quantum interface circuits in superconducting quantum computers. Particularly, a single flux quantum (SFQ) technology-based classical controller, which is a promising candidate for large-scale in-fridge qubit control and readout circuitry, is considered. We have uncovered a substantial side-channel leakage from superconducting interface circuits through the power supply variations. An attacker, who has access to room temperature electronics where the power is generated, can successfully decode certain information about various components within quantum computers.

DOI
10.1109/iscas58744.2024.10558006

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With the growing interest in emerging and upcoming quantum computers, it is important to consider possible hardware security vulnerabilities and countermeasures. This work proposes side-channel attacks targeting classical-quantum interface circuits in superconducting quantum computers. Particularly, a single flux quantum (SFQ) technology-based classical controller, which is a promising candidate for large-scale in-fridge qubit control and readout circuitry, is considered. We have uncovered a substantial side-channel leakage from superconducting interface circuits through the power supply variations. An attacker, who has access to room temperature electronics where the power is generated, can successfully decode certain information about various components within quantum computers.
Single flux quantum (SFQ) technology is currently used as a cryogenic control and readout circuitry of superconducting quantum computers. The low power operation and high switching frequency of SFQ technology are instrumental to efficiently scale a quantum computer. With the growing interest in the hardware security of SFQ circuits, a novel side-channel leakage mechanism in SFQ-to-dc converters is uncovered in this article. The leakage mechanism is investigated for two logic styles, namely, rapid SFQ (RSFQ) and energy-efficient RSFQ (ERSFQ). By observing the fluctuations in the power supply provided by the room temperature electronics, a malicious adversary can extract critical information about the applied input signals. This type of side-channel leakage can lead to serious security vulnerabilities for superconducting electronics and quantum computers. Two potential side-channel attacks that exploit this vulnerability and target SFQ-based qubit control and readout systems are proposed.
The rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also increases the importance of securing these computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. This work shows the first exploration and study of power-based side-channel attacks in quantum computers. The explored attacks could be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and the algorithms being run, or data hard-coded into the circuits. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum computing systems.
Quantum computers have garnered significant attention recently, owing to their potential to surpass the computational capabilities of classical systems. However, stringent operational requirements render quantum computing devices inherently costly. To democratize access to quantum computers, efforts have been made to make these devices accessible via cloud platforms. This has led to multiple users gaining access to the same quantum computers sequentially through cloud-based interfaces. However, quantum computers today are susceptible to noise, which causes computational errors. Compounded with widespread user access, this susceptibility opens avenues for side-channel threats within quantum computing systems, where malicious users may exploit these vulnerabilities to intercept and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. Given the wide-ranging applicability of quantum computing across various domains, the ramifications of confidential information leakage can be detrimental. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive exploration of existing side-channel attack vectors targeting quantum computing systems, along with an analysis of their implications aiming to facilitate the development of secure and accessible quantum computing systems.
With the rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also grows the importance of securing these quantum computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. Indeed, this work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. Such attacks can be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and possibly even the secret algorithms being run. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum~computers.
Abstract With the growing deployment of quantum computing, side-channel attacks have emerged as one of the most serious security threats for cloud quantum service providers. This study investigates whether it is possible to infer the execution order and start times of quantum gates—and ultimately reconstruct the victim circuit—solely from measurements of the power consumption of quantum controllers. While most previous research has focused on reconstructing quantum circuits composed of standard basis gates, the possibility of reconstructing users’ custom quantum circuits from the power leakage of quantum controllers has received little attention. Our approach is evaluated under two observation models: per-channel power and total power. In the per-channel setting, the power trace of each channel is analyzed separately and compared with simulated pulse templates for different gates, in order to identify the most likely gate type and its start time. In this setting, template-based power comparison accurately determines both the gate and its onset time, and simple decision rules reduce misclassification between similar gates. In the total-power setting, an optimization model is employed to recover the logical ordering of the circuit with good accuracy, without requiring access to individual channel traces. The results show that even with a single measurement, circuit reconstruction is feasible provided that the pulse shapes and the device topology are known.
Scalability of today’s superconducting quantum computers is limited due to the huge costs of generating/routing microwave control pulses per qubit from room temperature. One active research area in both industry and academia is to push the classical controllers to the dilution refrigerator in order to increase the scalability of quantum computers. Superconducting Single Flux Quantum (SFQ) is a classical logic technology with low power consumption and ultra-high speed, and thus is a promising candidate for in-fridge classical controllers with maximized scalability. Prior work has demonstrated high-fidelity SFQ-based single-qubit gates. However, little research has been done on SFQ-based multi-qubit gates, which are necessary to realize SFQ-based universal quantum computing.In this paper, we present the first thorough analysis of SFQ-based two-qubit gates. Our observations show that SFQ-based two-qubit gates tend to have high leakage to qubit non-computational subspace, which presents severe design challenges. We show that despite these challenges, we can realize gates with high fidelity by carefully designing optimal control methods and qubit architectures. We develop optimal control methods that suppress leakage, and also investigate various qubit architectures that reduce the leakage. After carefully engineering our SFQ-friendly quantum system, we show that it can achieve similar gate fidelity and gate time to microwave-based quantum systems. The promising results of this paper show that (1) SFQ-based universal quantum computation is both feasible and effective; and (2) SFQ is a promising approach in designing classical controller for quantum machines because it can increase the scalability while preserving gate fidelity and performance.