Quantum computers have garnered significant attention recently, owing to their potential to surpass the computational capabilities of classical systems. However, stringent operational requirements render quantum computing devices inherently costly. To democratize access to quantum computers, efforts have been made to make these devices accessible via cloud platforms. This has led to multiple users gaining access to the same quantum computers sequentially through cloud-based interfaces. However, quantum computers today are susceptible to noise, which causes computational errors. Compounded with widespread user access, this susceptibility opens avenues for side-channel threats within quantum computing systems, where malicious users may exploit these vulnerabilities to intercept and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. Given the wide-ranging applicability of quantum computing across various domains, the ramifications of confidential information leakage can be detrimental. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive exploration of existing side-channel attack vectors targeting quantum computing systems, along with an analysis of their implications aiming to facilitate the development of secure and accessible quantum computing systems.
Quantum computers have garnered significant attention recently, owing to their potential to surpass the computational capabilities of classical systems. However, stringent operational requirements render quantum computing devices inherently costly. To democratize access to quantum computers, efforts have been made to make these devices accessible via cloud platforms. This has led to multiple users gaining access to the same quantum computers sequentially through cloud-based interfaces. However, quantum computers today are susceptible to noise, which causes computational errors. Compounded with widespread user access, this susceptibility opens avenues for side-channel threats within quantum computing systems, where malicious users may exploit these vulnerabilities to intercept and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. Given the wide-ranging applicability of quantum computing across various domains, the ramifications of confidential information leakage can be detrimental. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive exploration of existing side-channel attack vectors targeting quantum computing systems, along with an analysis of their implications aiming to facilitate the development of secure and accessible quantum computing systems.
Quantum computing is becoming increasingly widespread due to the potential and capabilities to solve complex problems beyond the scope of classical computers. As Quantum Cloud services are adopted by businesses and research groups, they allow for greater progress and application in many fields. However, the inherent vulnerabilities of these environments pose significant security concerns. This survey delivers a comprehensive analysis of the security challenges that emerged in quantum cloud systems, with a distinct focus on multi-tenant vulnerabilities and the classical-quantum interface. Key threats such as crosstalk attacks, quantum-specific side-channel vulnerabilities, and insider threats are all examined, as well as their effects on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of quantum circuits. The design and implementation of various quantum architectures from quantum cloud providers are also discussed. In addition, this paper delves into emerging quantum security solutions and best practices to mitigate these risks. This survey offers insights into current research gaps and proposes future directions for secure and resilient quantum cloud infrastructures.
With the growing interest in emerging and upcoming quantum computers, it is important to consider possible hardware security vulnerabilities and countermeasures. This work proposes side-channel attacks targeting classical-quantum interface circuits in superconducting quantum computers. Particularly, a single flux quantum (SFQ) technology-based classical controller, which is a promising candidate for large-scale in-fridge qubit control and readout circuitry, is considered. We have uncovered a substantial side-channel leakage from superconducting interface circuits through the power supply variations. An attacker, who has access to room temperature electronics where the power is generated, can successfully decode certain information about various components within quantum computers.
The rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also increases the importance of securing these computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. This work shows the first exploration and study of power-based side-channel attacks in quantum computers. The explored attacks could be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and the algorithms being run, or data hard-coded into the circuits. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum computing systems.
Quantum computing offers significant acceleration capabilities over its classical counterpart in various application domains. Consequently, there has been substantial focus on improving quantum computing capabilities. However, to date, the security implications of these quantum computing platforms have been largely overlooked. With the emergence of cloud-based quantum computing services, it is critical to investigate the extension of classical computer security threats to the realm of quantum computing. In this study, we investigated timing-based side-channel vulnerabilities within IBM's cloud-based quantum service. The proposed attack effectively subverts the confidentiality of the executed quantum algorithm, using a more realistic threat model compared to existing approaches. Our experimental results, conducted using IBM's quantum cloud service, demonstrate that with just 10 measurements, it is possible to identify the underlying quantum computer that executed the circuit. Moreover, when evaluated using the popular Grover circuit, we showcase the ability to leak the quantum oracle with a mere 500 measurements. These findings underline the pressing need to address timing-based vulnerabilities in quantum computing platforms and advocate for enhanced security measures to safeguard sensitive quantum algorithms and data.
With the rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also grows the importance of securing these quantum computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. Indeed, this work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. Such attacks can be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and possibly even the secret algorithms being run. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum~computers.
Quantum computing (QC) is an emerging paradigm with the potential to transform numerous application domains by addressing classically intractable problems. However, its growing presence in cyberspace has introduced new security and privacy challenges. Similar to classical computing systems, the QC stack including software and hardware relies extensively on third parties, many of which are emerging and trust-seeking or less-trusted. This stack often contains sensitive intellectual property (IP) that demands protection. Unique features of quantum systems can enable classical-style attacks: for instance, crosstalk in multitenant settings can facilitate fault-injection attacks, while malicious calibration services can misreport error rates or miscalibrate qubits to induce denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. Given the high cost and limited availability of likely trustworthy quantum hardware, users may be enticed to explore emerging and trust-seeking but cheaper and readily available quantum hardware, which can enable the stealth of IP and tampering of quantum programs and/or computation outcomes. Similarly, emerging compilation services may compromise circuit confidentiality or insert Trojans. Despite the strategic significance of QC and its potential to process sensitive information, its security and privacy concerns remain underexplored. This article presents a comprehensive overview of QC fundamentals, key vulnerabilities, recent attack vectors, and corresponding defenses, and concludes with directions for future research to strengthen the quantum security community.