Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are vulnerable to traditional cyber-attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, denial of service, eavesdropping, and masquerade attacks, as well as future attacks based on Grover's and Shor's algorithm implemented in quantum hardware. This paper proposes a quantum-robust scheme based on entanglement and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. The scheme employs a modified Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) to generate shared secret keys, also authenticating BBM92, a quantum key distribution protocol to generate a symmetric key. The paper uses ASCON-128 and SHA-3 to encrypt and authenticate messages, and provides a comparative analysis of two entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocols. The proposed scheme is compared to the current SCADA standard, AGA-12, and is shown to provide confidentiality, integrity, intrusion resistance, message authentication, and scalability. The randomness of key pairs generated by our algorithm and RSA key pairs is 87.5% and 84.37%, respectively, addressing confidentiality and integrity. Using the BBM92 protocol, our proposed algorithm detects the presence of an adversary by generating an average error rate of 26.07% and information leakage of 76.01%. AGA-12 relies on SHA-1 hash function that Google has cracked recently. However, our algorithm includes SHA-3, a collision and quantum-resistant hash that provides message authentication.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are vulnerable to traditional cyber-attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, denial of service, eavesdropping, and masquerade attacks, as well as future attacks based on Grover's and Shor's algorithm implemented in quantum hardware. This paper proposes a quantum-robust scheme based on entanglement and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. The scheme employs a modified Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) to generate shared secret keys, also authenticating BBM92, a quantum key distribution protocol to generate a symmetric key. The paper uses ASCON-128 and SHA-3 to encrypt and authenticate messages, and provides a comparative analysis of two entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocols. The proposed scheme is compared to the current SCADA standard, AGA-12, and is shown to provide confidentiality, integrity, intrusion resistance, message authentication, and scalability. The randomness of key pairs generated by our algorithm and RSA key pairs is 87.5% and 84.37%, respectively, addressing confidentiality and integrity. Using the BBM92 protocol, our proposed algorithm detects the presence of an adversary by generating an average error rate of 26.07% and information leakage of 76.01%. AGA-12 relies on SHA-1 hash function that Google has cracked recently. However, our algorithm includes SHA-3, a collision and quantum-resistant hash that provides message authentication.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a combined system of elements of hardware and software that is used for controlling industrial processes either remotely or locally. It also useful for monitoring, gathering and processing real time data, and directly interacting with different electronic as well as integrated devices such as valves, pumps, motors, and sensors. Over the years, it has become increasingly interconnected with the internet, making it vulnerable to cyber threats. In order to contain the system's internet attacks, various methods have been used, especially the encryption techniques such as symmetric and asymmetric approaches as well as the decoy SCADA method. However, with the arrival more advanced security threats such as those based on quantum computing, there is a need to introduce security measures that can neutralize such threats. One promising method is quantum cryptography, which is an encryption technique based on quantum mechanics theories. In this study, a quantum-cryptography-based algorithm is proposed. It is based on the QKD and hash-based signature scheme, which act as key generators and authenticators respectively. In order to evaluate the algorithm's performance, it is subjected to a random substitute and intercept resend attack. Using the probabilistic model checker tool, the probability of succumbing to the two attacks is checked. The results show that the algorithm would significantly improve SCADA's resistance against quantum and classical cyber threats.
The rapid emergence of quantum computing threatens current Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) security standards, mainly, American Gas Association (AGA)-12. Therefore, researchers are developing various security schemes based on either quantum or post-quantum algorithms. However, the efficiency of quantum algorithms impacts the security of the post-quantum digital signature scheme. We propose an intrusion resistant algorithm exploiting and applying quantum principles in the post-quantum signature algorithm. We use the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol, a quantum key distribution scheme, to obtain the cipher, and the practical Stateless Hash-based Signatures (SPHINCS)-256 protocol to obtain a post-quantum signature. However, instead of Chacha-12, a well-known cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator, we apply a quantum random number generator to obtain a truly random Hash to Obtain Random Subset (HORS) signature with Tree (HORST) secret key used in SPHINCS-256. We have implemented the design in Python with the Quantum Information Toolkit. We have validated the proposed algorithm using the Probabilistic Model Checking for Performance and Reliability Analysis (PRISM) and Scyther tools. Moreover, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical tests show that the proposed algorithm key pairs have randomness of 98% and RSA and ECDSA are below 96%.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a serious threat to traditional cryptographic systems such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which rely on computational difficulty for security. Quantum algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s have the potential to break or weaken these methods, putting modern communication systems at risk. To address this challenge, this work presents a quantum-safe com-munication framework that combines the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) techniques, aiming to ensure secure data exchange in the presence of quantum-capable adversaries. In this system, the BB84 protocol is simulated to enable secure key exchange between two parties over a virtual quantum channel. The generated key is refined through processes such as basis matching, error correction, and privacy amplification using SHA-256 to ensure reliability and secrecy. For secur-ing communication, One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption is used alongside HMAC-SHA3-256 to provide both confidentiality and message integrity. Additionally, file encryption is handled using the XChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm, selected for its efficiency and strong protection against potential vulnerabilities like nonce reuse. To further enhance security, the framework integrates a hybrid key management approach using the Kyber-512 Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) combined with a Key Deriva-tion Function (KDF), merging classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the system, achieving a Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) of 2.5% and successful performance in both message and file en-cryption. Overall, this work contributes toward the development of practical and resilient communication systems designed for the emerging quantum era.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent the cyber-physical infrastructure core of critical infrastructure, where any security violation can cause severe operational and physical repercussions. The integration of operational technology with Information Technology networks has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, while the emergence of quantum computing poses a basic threat to classical cryptographic approaches currently in use within industrial control systems. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Post-Quantum Cryptographic (ZT-PQC) solution specifically tailored for resource-constrained SCADA systems. The solution combines lightweight symmetric encryption for field devices, hybrid and pure post-quantum cryptography for higher layers, and continuous Zero-Trust policy enforcement throughout the communication process. A layer-aware cryptographic offloading approach is utilized to strike a balance between quantum resilience and real-time operational requirements. The feasibility of the proposed solution is assessed using a validated synthetic SCADA dataset simulating practical communication patterns, attack models, and system constraints. Experimental results show that the solution provides quantum-resistant security with acceptable latency, minimal communication overhead, and compatibility with existing SCADA systems, thus being amenable to incremental deployment in critical infrastructure systems.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are ubiquitous in industrial control processes, such as power grids, water supply systems, traffic control, oil and natural gas mining, space stations and nuclear plants. However, their security faces the threat of being compromised due to the increasing use of open-access networks. Furthermore, one of the research gaps involves the emergence of quantum computing, which has exposed a new type of risk to SCADA systems. Failure to secure SCADA systems can lead to catastrophic consequences. For example, a malicious attack can take control of the power supply to a city, shut down the water supply system, or cause malfunction of a nuclear reactor. The primary purpose of this paper is to identify the new type of attack based on quantum computing and design a novel security scheme to defend against traditional attacks as well as the quantum attack. The methodology of the proposed signcryption is built on the foundation of the classical Bennett and Brassard 1984 (BB84) cryptographic scheme and does not involve computationally expensive third-party validation. The proposed signcryption scheme provides both encryption and intrusion detection. In particular, it detects the man-in-the-middle attack that can lead to other types of attacks. We have simulated the proposed algorithm using the Quantum Information Toolkit in Python. Furthermore, we have validated and analyzed the proposed design through security verification tools, namely, Scyther and PRISM.
The emergence of quantum computing poses a significant security threat to the current classical cryptography system since it has the potential to outperform the current classical computer in some specific tasks due to its unique principle of operation. This necessitates finding a method that is resistant to quantum computers to securely transfer information. This research addresses these challenges by proposing a novel method combining quantum key distribution (QKD), specifically the E91 protocol, with the classical encryption-authentication protocol ChaCha20-Poly1305, and concealing information within another message through steganography to securely transfer audio messages. A shared secret key is created between the communicating parties using E91 QKD, which exploits the stellar protection of quantum entanglement against eavesdropping. The shared key is hashed through the SHA–3 hash function to generate a fixed-length, high-entropy symmetric key. The audio message is hidden inside another audio signal through steganography. The steganographic signal is encrypted using ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD in order to provide another layer of obfuscation as well as a means to verify integrity. Through rigorous experiments, we validated the robustness of the proposed methodology in both classical and quantum attacks. The processing of secret audio signals of varying duration (00:01:32 to 00:01:36) exhibits consistent encryption results. The encrypted stego audios show high randomness, with an average entropy of 15.9984, an average correlation of 1 . 4627 × 1 0 − 5 , an average UACI of 49.9977%, and an average NSCR of 99.9985%. We demonstrated the safety of the shared key using the CHSH inequality test, where in the presence of an eavesdropper, the CHSH value is much less than 2 2 . In addition, the integrity of the secret audio is also validated through the verification of the authenticator tag generated during the encryption process. Our research offers a novel framework for secure audio transmission, combining classical encryption and authentication methods with QKD to enhance confidentiality, integrity, and resilience against eavesdropping and tampering, ensuring robust end-to-end security.