Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent the cyber-physical infrastructure core of critical infrastructure, where any security violation can cause severe operational and physical repercussions. The integration of operational technology with Information Technology networks has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, while the emergence of quantum computing poses a basic threat to classical cryptographic approaches currently in use within industrial control systems. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Post-Quantum Cryptographic (ZT-PQC) solution specifically tailored for resource-constrained SCADA systems. The solution combines lightweight symmetric encryption for field devices, hybrid and pure post-quantum cryptography for higher layers, and continuous Zero-Trust policy enforcement throughout the communication process. A layer-aware cryptographic offloading approach is utilized to strike a balance between quantum resilience and real-time operational requirements. The feasibility of the proposed solution is assessed using a validated synthetic SCADA dataset simulating practical communication patterns, attack models, and system constraints. Experimental results show that the solution provides quantum-resistant security with acceptable latency, minimal communication overhead, and compatibility with existing SCADA systems, thus being amenable to incremental deployment in critical infrastructure systems.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent the cyber-physical infrastructure core of critical infrastructure, where any security violation can cause severe operational and physical repercussions. The integration of operational technology with Information Technology networks has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, while the emergence of quantum computing poses a basic threat to classical cryptographic approaches currently in use within industrial control systems. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Post-Quantum Cryptographic (ZT-PQC) solution specifically tailored for resource-constrained SCADA systems. The solution combines lightweight symmetric encryption for field devices, hybrid and pure post-quantum cryptography for higher layers, and continuous Zero-Trust policy enforcement throughout the communication process. A layer-aware cryptographic offloading approach is utilized to strike a balance between quantum resilience and real-time operational requirements. The feasibility of the proposed solution is assessed using a validated synthetic SCADA dataset simulating practical communication patterns, attack models, and system constraints. Experimental results show that the solution provides quantum-resistant security with acceptable latency, minimal communication overhead, and compatibility with existing SCADA systems, thus being amenable to incremental deployment in critical infrastructure systems.
The convergence of quantum computing capabilities and sophisticated cyberattacks poses unprecedented threats to critical infrastructure communications. Traditional cryptographic defenses and perimeter-based security models are increasingly inadequate against quantum-enabled adversaries and advanced persistent threats targeting operational technology (OT) environments. This paper presents a comprehensive framework for implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within a zero-trust architecture to secure critical infrastructure communications across control centers, substations, hospitals, and ports. Our approach integrates NIST-endorsed quantum-resistant cryptographic suites with identity-first network segmentation, authenticated SCADA protocol encryption, and continuous verification mechanisms. The proposed framework addresses the unique challenges of legacy industrial systems while providing scalable security for hybrid OT/IT environments. Through systematic analysis of current vulnerabilities and implementation strategies, this research demonstrates how a post-quantum zero-trust backbone can prevent catastrophic cyberattacks while maintaining operational continuity in critical infrastructure sectors.
Quantum computing is rapidly approaching a stage where classical cryptographic systems, particularly RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman, will no longer provide adequate security for critical infrastructure. The emergence of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms introduces unprecedented vulnerability to national cyber-defense ecosystems, underpinning power grids, transportation, military communications, and banking systems. This paper presents a unified post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security framework integrating lattice-based primitives, hybrid key-exchange mechanisms, and secure orchestration for resource-constrained operational-technology environments. The proposed architecture leverages NIST-recommended schemes, including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, to ensure long-term confidentiality, integrity, and interoperability across legacy and modern control environments. A defense-in-depth trust-fabric is introduced to protect critical data flows across edge controllers, automation PLCs, substations, cloud-SCADA gateways, and defense communication systems. Performance evaluation demonstrates a 39.4% reduction in key-exchange latency, 46% faster authentication cycles, and zero-downtime cryptographic transition capability. Our findings position this framework as a practical migration blueprint supporting national PQC readiness and cyber-resilience mandates.
The growing interconnection of critical engineering infrastructure through IoT introduces unprecedented exposure to cyber threats. Emerging quantum computing capabilities pose a transformative risk to classical cryptographic primitives such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography, which underpin secure communication and device authentication in industrial control systems, power grids, transportation networks, and healthcare infrastructure. This paper investigates quantum-resistant encryption, often termed post-quantum cryptography (PQC), as a sustainable security paradigm for IoT communication within critical systems. By analyzing lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, and hash-based schemes, the study evaluates trade-offs between computational cost, memory footprint, and latency constraints intrinsic to resource-limited IoT nodes. A hybrid architectural framework integrating the National Institute of Standards and Technology-standardized algorithms (e.g., Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices—Kyber, Dilithium) with lightweight symmetric primitives (e.g., Ascon, GIFT block cipher in Combined Feedback mode) is proposed for secure data transmission across heterogeneous IoT layers. Experimental simulations benchmark key-exchange throughput, ciphertext expansion, and resilience against quantum-adversarial models, demonstrating up to 65% reduction in handshake latency compared to baseline lattice implementations under constrained conditions. The paper concludes with policy and engineering recommendations for the adoption of quantum-resistant IoT protocols in energy, transportation, and industrial automation sectors, highlighting alignment with global PQC migration roadmaps and IEC 62443 cybersecurity standards.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a combined system of elements of hardware and software that is used for controlling industrial processes either remotely or locally. It also useful for monitoring, gathering and processing real time data, and directly interacting with different electronic as well as integrated devices such as valves, pumps, motors, and sensors. Over the years, it has become increasingly interconnected with the internet, making it vulnerable to cyber threats. In order to contain the system's internet attacks, various methods have been used, especially the encryption techniques such as symmetric and asymmetric approaches as well as the decoy SCADA method. However, with the arrival more advanced security threats such as those based on quantum computing, there is a need to introduce security measures that can neutralize such threats. One promising method is quantum cryptography, which is an encryption technique based on quantum mechanics theories. In this study, a quantum-cryptography-based algorithm is proposed. It is based on the QKD and hash-based signature scheme, which act as key generators and authenticators respectively. In order to evaluate the algorithm's performance, it is subjected to a random substitute and intercept resend attack. Using the probabilistic model checker tool, the probability of succumbing to the two attacks is checked. The results show that the algorithm would significantly improve SCADA's resistance against quantum and classical cyber threats.
Quantum computing promises significant computational speed-ups that could compromise the security of current public-key cryptography. As quantum technologies advance, SCADA systems will increasingly require enhanced cybersecurity measures. Two main quantum-safe approaches exist: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD offers the unique advantage of information-theoretic security, ensuring security regardless of an adversary’s computational power. This thesis addresses two identified research gaps: protecting SCADA networks against potential quantum-computer-based attacks and identifying relevant use cases for QKD to guide further research and adoption. The objective was to assess whether QKD is a viable solution for securing SCADA communications in hydropower plants against quantum threats. The analysis included designing a QKD-based SCADA communication architecture for a hydropower network, conducting a quantum vulnerability assessment, simulating the proposed setup and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of QKD migration. The results indicate that, at the time of writing, QKD is not a viable option for securing SCADA communications in hydropower plants, as its disadvantages outweigh its benefits. For instance, QKD cannot guarantee availability, which is a critical requirement for SCADA in many critical infrastructures, including hydropower, and it is more costly than alternative quantum-safe solutions.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic mechanisms, necessitating the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into security frameworks for IoT-enabled power electronics. Smart grids and industrial automation systems rely on interconnected IoT devices for real-time control, monitoring, and data exchange, making them highly vulnerable to emerging quantum threats. This book chapter explores PQC frameworks tailored for securing power electronics in smart grid and industrial applications, addressing critical challenges such as computational overhead, communication latency, system compatibility, and scalability. The impact of PQC on real-time performance was evaluated, considering its influence on industrial IoT networks, cryptographic handshake efficiency, and data transmission reliability. Hybrid cryptographic solutions that combine classical and post-quantum approaches are assessed for their feasibility in power electronics IoT systems. Security resilience under adverse network conditions, including cyberattacks and network disruptions, was also analyzed to ensure seamless PQC integration without compromising operational stability. Through a comprehensive study of PQC implementation, performance optimization, and interoperability testing, this chapter provides insights into the future of secure and resilient power electronics systems in quantum-era cybersecurity landscapes.