The rapid emergence of quantum computing threatens current Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) security standards, mainly, American Gas Association (AGA)-12. Therefore, researchers are developing various security schemes based on either quantum or post-quantum algorithms. However, the efficiency of quantum algorithms impacts the security of the post-quantum digital signature scheme. We propose an intrusion resistant algorithm exploiting and applying quantum principles in the post-quantum signature algorithm. We use the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol, a quantum key distribution scheme, to obtain the cipher, and the practical Stateless Hash-based Signatures (SPHINCS)-256 protocol to obtain a post-quantum signature. However, instead of Chacha-12, a well-known cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator, we apply a quantum random number generator to obtain a truly random Hash to Obtain Random Subset (HORS) signature with Tree (HORST) secret key used in SPHINCS-256. We have implemented the design in Python with the Quantum Information Toolkit. We have validated the proposed algorithm using the Probabilistic Model Checking for Performance and Reliability Analysis (PRISM) and Scyther tools. Moreover, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical tests show that the proposed algorithm key pairs have randomness of 98% and RSA and ECDSA are below 96%.
The rapid emergence of quantum computing threatens current Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) security standards, mainly, American Gas Association (AGA)-12. Therefore, researchers are developing various security schemes based on either quantum or post-quantum algorithms. However, the efficiency of quantum algorithms impacts the security of the post-quantum digital signature scheme. We propose an intrusion resistant algorithm exploiting and applying quantum principles in the post-quantum signature algorithm. We use the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol, a quantum key distribution scheme, to obtain the cipher, and the practical Stateless Hash-based Signatures (SPHINCS)-256 protocol to obtain a post-quantum signature. However, instead of Chacha-12, a well-known cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator, we apply a quantum random number generator to obtain a truly random Hash to Obtain Random Subset (HORS) signature with Tree (HORST) secret key used in SPHINCS-256. We have implemented the design in Python with the Quantum Information Toolkit. We have validated the proposed algorithm using the Probabilistic Model Checking for Performance and Reliability Analysis (PRISM) and Scyther tools. Moreover, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical tests show that the proposed algorithm key pairs have randomness of 98% and RSA and ECDSA are below 96%.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are vulnerable to traditional cyber-attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, denial of service, eavesdropping, and masquerade attacks, as well as future attacks based on Grover's and Shor's algorithm implemented in quantum hardware. This paper proposes a quantum-robust scheme based on entanglement and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. The scheme employs a modified Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) to generate shared secret keys, also authenticating BBM92, a quantum key distribution protocol to generate a symmetric key. The paper uses ASCON-128 and SHA-3 to encrypt and authenticate messages, and provides a comparative analysis of two entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocols. The proposed scheme is compared to the current SCADA standard, AGA-12, and is shown to provide confidentiality, integrity, intrusion resistance, message authentication, and scalability. The randomness of key pairs generated by our algorithm and RSA key pairs is 87.5% and 84.37%, respectively, addressing confidentiality and integrity. Using the BBM92 protocol, our proposed algorithm detects the presence of an adversary by generating an average error rate of 26.07% and information leakage of 76.01%. AGA-12 relies on SHA-1 hash function that Google has cracked recently. However, our algorithm includes SHA-3, a collision and quantum-resistant hash that provides message authentication.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are ubiquitous in industrial control processes, such as power grids, water supply systems, traffic control, oil and natural gas mining, space stations and nuclear plants. However, their security faces the threat of being compromised due to the increasing use of open-access networks. Furthermore, one of the research gaps involves the emergence of quantum computing, which has exposed a new type of risk to SCADA systems. Failure to secure SCADA systems can lead to catastrophic consequences. For example, a malicious attack can take control of the power supply to a city, shut down the water supply system, or cause malfunction of a nuclear reactor. The primary purpose of this paper is to identify the new type of attack based on quantum computing and design a novel security scheme to defend against traditional attacks as well as the quantum attack. The methodology of the proposed signcryption is built on the foundation of the classical Bennett and Brassard 1984 (BB84) cryptographic scheme and does not involve computationally expensive third-party validation. The proposed signcryption scheme provides both encryption and intrusion detection. In particular, it detects the man-in-the-middle attack that can lead to other types of attacks. We have simulated the proposed algorithm using the Quantum Information Toolkit in Python. Furthermore, we have validated and analyzed the proposed design through security verification tools, namely, Scyther and PRISM.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a combined system of elements of hardware and software that is used for controlling industrial processes either remotely or locally. It also useful for monitoring, gathering and processing real time data, and directly interacting with different electronic as well as integrated devices such as valves, pumps, motors, and sensors. Over the years, it has become increasingly interconnected with the internet, making it vulnerable to cyber threats. In order to contain the system's internet attacks, various methods have been used, especially the encryption techniques such as symmetric and asymmetric approaches as well as the decoy SCADA method. However, with the arrival more advanced security threats such as those based on quantum computing, there is a need to introduce security measures that can neutralize such threats. One promising method is quantum cryptography, which is an encryption technique based on quantum mechanics theories. In this study, a quantum-cryptography-based algorithm is proposed. It is based on the QKD and hash-based signature scheme, which act as key generators and authenticators respectively. In order to evaluate the algorithm's performance, it is subjected to a random substitute and intercept resend attack. Using the probabilistic model checker tool, the probability of succumbing to the two attacks is checked. The results show that the algorithm would significantly improve SCADA's resistance against quantum and classical cyber threats.
Modern public-key cryptography relies on the hardness of mathematical problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. However, the development of quantum computing poses an imminent threat to these assumptions. Shor’s algorithm, in particular, can factor large semiprimes exponentially faster than classical algorithms, compromising systems like RSA, DSA, and ECC. This paper explores the mathematical foundations of pre-quantum cryptography, discusses the limitations of classical security models when confronted with quantum capabilities, and then pays attention to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a field dedicated to developing cryptographic schemes resilient against both classical and quantum attacks. Among the proposed families, this paper focuses specifically on hash function–based cryptography for its simplicity and minimal reliance on algebraic structure. This study focuses in particular on SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based digital signature scheme currently under consideration by NIST. Through detailed mathematical explanation and a visual example, we analyze its construction using Winternitz One-Time Signatures and Merkle trees. The results highlight SPHINCS+ as a robust candidate for post-quantum security due to its reliance on well-understood hash primitives and its resistance to known quantum algorithms such as Grover’s. Finally, this paper discusses ongoing challenges such as performance trade-offs, standardization, and real-world deployment. This research underscores the urgency of adopting quantum-resistant cryptographic systems before large-scale quantum computers become a reality.
In recent years, the advancement of quantum computing technology has posed potential security threats to RSA cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published several Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in August 2024, including the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA). Although these PQC algorithms are designed to resist quantum computing attacks, they may not provide adequate security in certain specialized application scenarios. To address this issue, this study proposes quantum random number generator (QRNG)-based PQC algorithms. These algorithms leverage quantum computing to generate random numbers, which serve as the foundation for key pair generation, key encapsulation, and digital signature generation. A generalized architecture of QRNG is proposed, along with the design of six QRNGs. Each generator is evaluated according to the statistical validation procedures outlined in NIST SP 800-90B, including tests for verification of entropy sources and independent and identically distributed (IID) outputs. Experimental results assess the computation time of the six QRNGs, as well as the performance of QRNG-based ML-KEM, QRNG-based ML-DSA, and QRNG-based SLH-DSA. These findings provide valuable reference data for future deployment of PQC-based Transport Layer Security in web systems.
Recently, NIST released the quantum cryptography standard, which includes three new encryption algorithms capable of effectively resisting attacks from quantum computers. Experts predict that quantum computers with the ability to break current encryption methods may emerge within the next decade. In particular, the advent of Shor’s algorithm [1] has rendered public-key encryption systems based on factoring and discrete logarithm problems vulnerable. Therefore, the release of the PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) standard is especially timely and significant. NIST encourages system administrators to begin integrating these standards into their systems immediately to ensure future security.Among these three new encryption algorithms, SLH-DSA (derived from SPHINCS+ [2]) is a stateless hash-based digital signature scheme. This innovative scheme is designed to provide robust security while maintaining efficiency. In the SLH-DSA signature scheme, the One-Time Signature (OTS) serves as its fundamental building block. This means that improving the OTS directly enhances the overall performance of the SLH-DSA scheme.Hash-based signature schemes are generally constructed using OTS schemes. The underlying OTS scheme plays a crucial role in determining the key size and signature size of hash-based signature schemes. We propose a novel signature scheme that allows partial key reuse while maintaining a minimum quantum security level of 128 bits. Compared to the popular Winternitz OTS scheme [3] [4] [5], our proposed signature scheme demonstrates superior performance in terms of key and signature sizes for the same number of signatures, while still preserving post-quantum security.