Abstract In this article I examine several related views expressed by Robin Hendry concerning molecular structure, emergence and chemical bonding. There is a long-standing problem in the philosophy of chemistry arising from the fact that molecular structure cannot be strictly derived from quantum mechanics. Two or more compounds which share a molecular formula, but which differ with respect to their structures, have identical Hamiltonian operators within the quantum mechanical formalism. As a consequence, the properties of all such isomers yield precisely the same calculated quantities such as their energies, dipole moments etc. The only means through which the difference between the isomers can be recovered is to build their structures into the quantum mechanical calculations, something that is carried out by the application of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation. Consequently, it has been argued by many authors that molecular structure is written in ‘by hand’ rather than derived. Robin Hendry is one such author, but he goes a great deal further by proposing that this situation implies the existence of emergence and downward causation. In the current article I argue that there are alternative explanations which render emergence and downward causation redundant. Such an alternative lies in the notion of quantum decoherence and the appeal to work in the foundations of physics, which posits that the various isomers exist as a superposition until their wavefunctions are collapsed either by observation or by interacting with their environment. Hendry also alludes to a debate among chemists as to whether chemical bonds are real or not, in the sense of directional connections between two or more nuclei in any given molecule. I reject this view and propose that the structural and energetic views of chemical bonding, that have been discussed by some philosophers of chemistry including Hendry, do not refer to any essential ontological differences. I agree that chemists view bonding in a more realistic fashion and may consider bonds to be in some senses real, while physicists may consider bonding in more abstract energetic terms. However, I do not believe that such differences in scientific practice and attitudes should be considered to offer a window as to the ontological status of bonding or whether bonding is real. Finally, I discuss the kinetic energy school of chemical bonding which would seem to challenge any notion of bonds as directional entities, since bonding is no longer regarded as being primarily due to the build-up of electron density between nuclei.
Abstract In this article I examine several related views expressed by Robin Hendry concerning molecular structure, emergence and chemical bonding. There is a long-standing problem in the philosophy of chemistry arising from the fact that molecular structure cannot be strictly derived from quantum mechanics. Two or more compounds which share a molecular formula, but which differ with respect to their structures, have identical Hamiltonian operators within the quantum mechanical formalism. As a consequence, the properties of all such isomers yield precisely the same calculated quantities such as their energies, dipole moments etc. The only means through which the difference between the isomers can be recovered is to build their structures into the quantum mechanical calculations, something that is carried out by the application of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation. Consequently, it has been argued by many authors that molecular structure is written in ‘by hand’ rather than derived. Robin Hendry is one such author, but he goes a great deal further by proposing that this situation implies the existence of emergence and downward causation. In the current article I argue that there are alternative explanations which render emergence and downward causation redundant. Such an alternative lies in the notion of quantum decoherence and the appeal to work in the foundations of physics, which posits that the various isomers exist as a superposition until their wavefunctions are collapsed either by observation or by interacting with their environment. Hendry also alludes to a debate among chemists as to whether chemical bonds are real or not, in the sense of directional connections between two or more nuclei in any given molecule. I reject this view and propose that the structural and energetic views of chemical bonding, that have been discussed by some philosophers of chemistry including Hendry, do not refer to any essential ontological differences. I agree that chemists view bonding in a more realistic fashion and may consider bonds to be in some senses real, while physicists may consider bonding in more abstract energetic terms. However, I do not believe that such differences in scientific practice and attitudes should be considered to offer a window as to the ontological status of bonding or whether bonding is real. Finally, I discuss the kinetic energy school of chemical bonding which would seem to challenge any notion of bonds as directional entities, since bonding is no longer regarded as being primarily due to the build-up of electron density between nuclei.
Abstract The question of whether chemical structure is reducible to Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) should be of interest to philosophers of chemistry and philosophers of physics alike. Among the three realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, EQM resolves the measurement problem by claiming that measurements (now interpreted as instances of decoherence) have indeterminate outcomes absolutely speaking, but determinate outcomes relative to emergent worlds—Maudlin (Topoi, 14:7-15, 1995). Philosophers who wish to be sensitive to the practice of quantum chemistry e.g. Scerri (The changing views of a philosopher of chemistry on the question of reduction, 2016) should be interested in EQM because Franklin and Seifert (J. Philos. Sci, 2020) claim that resolving the measurement problem also resolves the reducibility of chemical structure, and EQM is the interpretation which involves no mathematical structure beyond that used by practicing scientists. Philosophers interested in the quantum interpretation debate should be interested in the reducibility of chemistry because chemical structure is precisely the kind of determinate three-dimensional fact which EQM should be able to ground if it is to be empirically coherent—see Allori (Quantum Rep, 5:80-101, 2023). The prospects for reduction of chemical structure are poor if it cannot succeed in EQM; the prospects for EQM as a guide to ontology are poor if it cannot reduce chemical structure. Unfortunately for proponents of chemical reduction and EQM, there are three serious barriers to the reduction of chemistry to EQM. The first concern is that quantum treatments of chemical structure rely on the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which holds nuclear locations fixed while minimizing the energy of the electronic configuration—Hendry (Philosophical Perspectives in Quantum Chemistry, 147-172, 2022), but this approximation is not licensed by EQM. The Born-Oppenheimer approximation relies on nuclei and molecular orbitals being simultaneously present, but in the three-dimensional ontology following from the Everett interpretation these only emerge at different energy scales and are not simultaneously present—Miller (Found. Chem, 25:405-417, 2023). The second concern is that the emergent worlds of EQM are supposed to be decoherent at the macro-scale—Wilson (The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism 2020), but the recent development of superchemistry suggests that chemical reactions can occur in coherent states—Zhang et al. (Nat. Phys, 1-5, 2023). The third concern is that emergent worlds are only pragmatic pseudo-processes—Wallace (The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to the Everett Interpretation, 2012b), but this means EQM trades realist physics for mere instrumentalism about chemistry. Absent a commitment to chemical realism, reduction is an empty promise. The prospects for reduction of chemical structure to EQM are therefore poor.
The chemical bond is a central organizing concept in chemistry, yet it is absent from the molecular Hamiltonian and no "bond operator" exists. Bonding is therefore not a primitive physical entity but a derived descriptor emerging from the quantum state. The logical consequences of this observation are revisited. Statements such as "bonding stabilizes structure" when taken literally risk circular reasoning (petitio principii), whereby bonding is inferred from a stationary structure and then invoked as its cause. The same caution applies to concepts such as steric repulsion, which is also a derived descriptor. Bonding accompanies stable or metastable states and correlates with their properties without constituting their cause. Illustrative examples are drawn from QTAIM, non-covalent interaction (NCI) approach, protein structure, and hydrogen-hydrogen bonding. Causation, language, and the autonomy of chemistry are also briefly discussed. The aim is not at all to diminish the role of bonding, but to place it at the correct logical level, that is, as a powerful, state-dependent descriptor that organizes, classifies, and predicts chemical behavior without serving as its fundamental cause.
Abstract The classical concept of molecular structure (namely, a set of atoms with a well‐defined geometrical arrangement in space) originated well before the advent of quantum theory, and, contrary to widespread views, these two conceptual schemes (classical molecular structure and quantum theory) are not easy to reconcile. We begin with a preliminary discussion of molecular structure in terms of space and time correlations in the framework of quantum theory. Then we summarize the salient features of some critical views raised‐during recent years (essentially by Woolley) concerning the concept of molecular structure. The essential claim of this viewpoint is that “molecular structure” is not an intrinsic attribute of an isolated molecule, and appears rather as an effect of the environment (other molecules? vacuum electromagnetic field, according to quantum electrodynamics?). Afterwards, we discuss these issues in detail: we show that it is necessary to distinguish between a “quantum” or “potential” structure (which may be deduced in a straightforward way from the quantum treatment of the molecule), and the “classical” molecular structure (according to which the molecule is considered as a set of rotating and vibrating material points, corresponding to the atoms); we briefly discuss some aspects of the Born–Oppenheimer approximation. From our discussion, we deduce that the “classical structure” concept is indeed non‐trivial from a purely quantum‐mechanical point of view; in actual fact, it is related to the problem of the “classical limit” of quantum mechanics, and it appears that, at the present time, none of these classical concepts and behaviours is convincingly derivable from a strict quantum mechanical basis. Finally, we consider these same problems from the point of view of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which is one of the stochastic models for microphysics proposed so far as a possible alternative or extension of usual quantum theory. In the framework of such a theory, the “classical limit” and, in particular, the “classical molecular structure” no longer poses a problem, but aside from these satisfactory qualitative aspects, several quantitative failures of SED prevent us from accepting it, at least in its present state, as a genuine physical alternative to quantum theory. We therefore conclude that “classical molecular structure”, and classical concepts in general, remain an open problem in the framework of present‐day quantum physics.
The concept of atomic and molecular orbitals has been a fundamental pillar in modern chemistry, shedding light on the structures and reactivity of chemical compounds. This article examines the evolution and significance of orbital theory, its applications in chemistry, and the ongoing debate about the existence of orbitals from both physics and chemistry perspectives. Philosophical aspects related to the ontology of orbitals are explored, emphasizing the complex interplay between mathematical abstractions and tangible reality. The multifaceted nature of orbitals, their role in quantum mechanics, and their implications for understanding the quantum realm are discussed. While the debate surrounding the ontological status of orbitals remains ongoing, it highlights the profound nature of inquiries into the fundamental essence of reality. This exploration underscores the significance of continuous research and discourse in advancing our understanding of these fundamental constituents of the quantum world.
According to a traditional assumption, in principle chemistry could be derived from physics because chemical entities are nothing else than very complex physical entities. This assumption counts against the autonomy of chemistry as a scientific discipline or, at least, supports its secondary position with respect to physics. In this paper we review the arguments used for and against the idea that chemistry is nothing else than a branch of physics. In particular, we consider the status of chemical entities in the light of the discussions around the supposed visualization of orbitals. On this basis, we defend the autonomous existence of the chemical world. Keywords: Molecular chemistry, Quantum mechanics, Reduction, Orbitals, Wavefunction, Semiclassical-electrons, Born-Oppenheimer approximation, Autonomous Existence, medieval alchemy, Dirac's words, phenomenological science, macroscopic phenomena, multicomponent systems, billiard-ball, secondary science, illuminating metaphor, Existence of Orbitals, SchrOdinger equation, contextuality of quantum mechanics, hypothetical superposition, quasi-classical WKB, unacceptable self-contradiction
Molecular structure (MS) has been treated as a convention or an epiphenomenon by physicists and quantum chemists interpreting the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as the essential reality criterion in the submicroscopic world (R2 world). This paper argues that, (a) even in the R2 world there is a class of entities which are real per se, even though they cannot be separated from their material support, and MS may belong to that class; (b) MS actualizes a particular molecule from the many potentialities of a given set of nuclei and electrons, all present in the same Schrödinger equation; (c) MS is a fact established in the XIXth century, albeit as a result of circumstantial evidence (because of its belonging to the R2 world); (d) the fact that MS is known, as all objects of the atomic world, in terms of analogies with macroscopic models, is not valid grounds for questioning its reality; (e) MS is a set of topological as well as geometrical relations. All along the discussion, observability according to Bohr, Heisenberg, Feynman is taken as the essential criterion of reality in the R2 world. On its basis, quantum mechanics is by no means in conflict with the reality of molecular structure and shape. On the other hand, the question of the minimum lifetime required for a MS proper to exist should be left open, pending a detailed analysis of measurement techniques.