Molecular structure (MS) has been treated as a convention or an epiphenomenon by physicists and quantum chemists interpreting the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as the essential reality criterion in the submicroscopic world (R2 world). This paper argues that, (a) even in the R2 world there is a class of entities which are real per se, even though they cannot be separated from their material support, and MS may belong to that class; (b) MS actualizes a particular molecule from the many potentialities of a given set of nuclei and electrons, all present in the same Schrödinger equation; (c) MS is a fact established in the XIXth century, albeit as a result of circumstantial evidence (because of its belonging to the R2 world); (d) the fact that MS is known, as all objects of the atomic world, in terms of analogies with macroscopic models, is not valid grounds for questioning its reality; (e) MS is a set of topological as well as geometrical relations. All along the discussion, observability according to Bohr, Heisenberg, Feynman is taken as the essential criterion of reality in the R2 world. On its basis, quantum mechanics is by no means in conflict with the reality of molecular structure and shape. On the other hand, the question of the minimum lifetime required for a MS proper to exist should be left open, pending a detailed analysis of measurement techniques.
Molecular structure (MS) has been treated as a convention or an epiphenomenon by physicists and quantum chemists interpreting the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as the essential reality criterion in the submicroscopic world (R2 world). This paper argues that, (a) even in the R2 world there is a class of entities which are real per se, even though they cannot be separated from their material support, and MS may belong to that class; (b) MS actualizes a particular molecule from the many potentialities of a given set of nuclei and electrons, all present in the same Schrödinger equation; (c) MS is a fact established in the XIXth century, albeit as a result of circumstantial evidence (because of its belonging to the R2 world); (d) the fact that MS is known, as all objects of the atomic world, in terms of analogies with macroscopic models, is not valid grounds for questioning its reality; (e) MS is a set of topological as well as geometrical relations. All along the discussion, observability according to Bohr, Heisenberg, Feynman is taken as the essential criterion of reality in the R2 world. On its basis, quantum mechanics is by no means in conflict with the reality of molecular structure and shape. On the other hand, the question of the minimum lifetime required for a MS proper to exist should be left open, pending a detailed analysis of measurement techniques.
Abstract The classical concept of molecular structure (namely, a set of atoms with a well‐defined geometrical arrangement in space) originated well before the advent of quantum theory, and, contrary to widespread views, these two conceptual schemes (classical molecular structure and quantum theory) are not easy to reconcile. We begin with a preliminary discussion of molecular structure in terms of space and time correlations in the framework of quantum theory. Then we summarize the salient features of some critical views raised‐during recent years (essentially by Woolley) concerning the concept of molecular structure. The essential claim of this viewpoint is that “molecular structure” is not an intrinsic attribute of an isolated molecule, and appears rather as an effect of the environment (other molecules? vacuum electromagnetic field, according to quantum electrodynamics?). Afterwards, we discuss these issues in detail: we show that it is necessary to distinguish between a “quantum” or “potential” structure (which may be deduced in a straightforward way from the quantum treatment of the molecule), and the “classical” molecular structure (according to which the molecule is considered as a set of rotating and vibrating material points, corresponding to the atoms); we briefly discuss some aspects of the Born–Oppenheimer approximation. From our discussion, we deduce that the “classical structure” concept is indeed non‐trivial from a purely quantum‐mechanical point of view; in actual fact, it is related to the problem of the “classical limit” of quantum mechanics, and it appears that, at the present time, none of these classical concepts and behaviours is convincingly derivable from a strict quantum mechanical basis. Finally, we consider these same problems from the point of view of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which is one of the stochastic models for microphysics proposed so far as a possible alternative or extension of usual quantum theory. In the framework of such a theory, the “classical limit” and, in particular, the “classical molecular structure” no longer poses a problem, but aside from these satisfactory qualitative aspects, several quantitative failures of SED prevent us from accepting it, at least in its present state, as a genuine physical alternative to quantum theory. We therefore conclude that “classical molecular structure”, and classical concepts in general, remain an open problem in the framework of present‐day quantum physics.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.
Some aspects of the interpretation of microscopic physics in terms of quantum theory are discussed. It is first emphasized that quantum theory is formulated in a Cartesian coordinate system; in other coordinates the result obtained with the help of the Hamiltonian formalism and commutation relations between ''canonically conjugated'' coordinate and momentum operators leads to a wrong version of quantum mechanics. In this connection the Feynman integral formalism is also discussed. In this formalism the measure is not well defined, and there is no idea how to distinguish between the true version of quantum mechanics and an incorrect one. In this respect, the Feynman approach consists of a mnemonic rule to generate perturbation series from an undefined zero-order term. The origin of time in the quantum framework is then analyzed in detail and illustrated by the example of atomic collisions. It is shown that the time-dependent Schr ¨ odinger equation for the closed three-body (two nuclei + electron) system has no physical meaning because in the high-impact energy limit it transforms into an equation with two independent time-like variables; time naturally appears in the stationary Schr ¨ odinger equation as a result of extraction of a classical subsystem (two nuclei) from a closed three-body system. Finally, following the well-known Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky experiment and Bell's inequality, we reiterate that the wave function must be interpreted as an actual field of information, in a form as elementary as the usual material particles and electromagnetic fields. In fact, experimental measurements transfer this quantum information field into the classical world, which is directly discernable. In my conclusion, the relation between physical reality and its mathematical formulation is discussed. 2012 Physics Essays Publication. (DOI: 10.4006/0836-1398-25.1.27) R ´
Abstract In this article I examine several related views expressed by Robin Hendry concerning molecular structure, emergence and chemical bonding. There is a long-standing problem in the philosophy of chemistry arising from the fact that molecular structure cannot be strictly derived from quantum mechanics. Two or more compounds which share a molecular formula, but which differ with respect to their structures, have identical Hamiltonian operators within the quantum mechanical formalism. As a consequence, the properties of all such isomers yield precisely the same calculated quantities such as their energies, dipole moments etc. The only means through which the difference between the isomers can be recovered is to build their structures into the quantum mechanical calculations, something that is carried out by the application of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation. Consequently, it has been argued by many authors that molecular structure is written in ‘by hand’ rather than derived. Robin Hendry is one such author, but he goes a great deal further by proposing that this situation implies the existence of emergence and downward causation. In the current article I argue that there are alternative explanations which render emergence and downward causation redundant. Such an alternative lies in the notion of quantum decoherence and the appeal to work in the foundations of physics, which posits that the various isomers exist as a superposition until their wavefunctions are collapsed either by observation or by interacting with their environment. Hendry also alludes to a debate among chemists as to whether chemical bonds are real or not, in the sense of directional connections between two or more nuclei in any given molecule. I reject this view and propose that the structural and energetic views of chemical bonding, that have been discussed by some philosophers of chemistry including Hendry, do not refer to any essential ontological differences. I agree that chemists view bonding in a more realistic fashion and may consider bonds to be in some senses real, while physicists may consider bonding in more abstract energetic terms. However, I do not believe that such differences in scientific practice and attitudes should be considered to offer a window as to the ontological status of bonding or whether bonding is real. Finally, I discuss the kinetic energy school of chemical bonding which would seem to challenge any notion of bonds as directional entities, since bonding is no longer regarded as being primarily due to the build-up of electron density between nuclei.
An attempt is made to refine the classical concept of molecular structure in the light of quantum theory. It is argued that a definite molecular structure can only be associated with quantum states that are intrinsically time-dependent and therefore need not manifest the full symmetry implied by the relativity principle; conversely if a molecule is definitely observed in an eigenstate of its associated molecular Schrödinger equation, a molecular structure description is inappropriate. The theme of the article is illustrated with examples drawn from spectroscopy, dielectric phenomena, electron scattering, stereoisomerism and optical activity.