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Oxford University Press eBooks

The Pilot-field

Henry Krips

Published Feb 20, 1992• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In the previous chapter we described the core features of the theoretical role which the state-vector has in QT (sections 4 and 5), and said what a state-vector is (sections 1-3). Moreover we located the property of having a state-vector as a real property of an individual system at a time (section 6). And we went some of the way to interpreting the state-vector by locating it within a suite of metaphysical models in terms of which explanations are couched (section 5). In particular we suggested that f(S,t) describes a categorical basis for the propensities displayed by the P(Q, qi, S, t). In this chapter I shall complete the task of interpreting the state-vector. In particular I shall argue that f(S, t) should be taken as a field-function, describing a probability field which is associated with S at t.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198242802.003.0004

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Abstract Already in this book one substantial issue has been discussed under the rubric of’realism’ in connection with QT, viz. the issue of whether the state-vectors and density operators of QT represent ‘real’ properties of q-systems. For the purposes of this chapter I take this particular issue to have been settled in favour of realism. But more generally what does it mean to adopt a ‘realist interpretation’of QT? I shall take it to mean accepting that QT is true, that the objects QT refers to (electrons, protons, etc.) exist, that the properties it refers to are ‘real’, and in particular that the physical quantities it refers to are ‘real’; in short it also means that we can interpret QT ‘literally’ in the sense that we can take all its referential terms as genuinely referring and not just as convenient fictions or metaphors for the real.

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Abstract In the previous chapter we described the core features of the theoretical role which the state-vector has in QT (sections 4 and 5), and said what a state-vector is (sections 1-3). Moreover we located the property of having a state-vector as a real property of an individual system at a time (section 6). And we went some of the way to interpreting the state-vector by locating it within a suite of metaphysical models in terms of which explanations are couched (section 5). In particular we suggested that f(S,t) describes a categorical basis for the propensities displayed by the P(Q, qi, S, t). In this chapter I shall complete the task of interpreting the state-vector. In particular I shall argue that f(S, t) should be taken as a field-function, describing a probability field which is associated with S at t.
Abstract Already in this book one substantial issue has been discussed under the rubric of’realism’ in connection with QT, viz. the issue of whether the state-vectors and density operators of QT represent ‘real’ properties of q-systems. For the purposes of this chapter I take this particular issue to have been settled in favour of realism. But more generally what does it mean to adopt a ‘realist interpretation’of QT? I shall take it to mean accepting that QT is true, that the objects QT refers to (electrons, protons, etc.) exist, that the properties it refers to are ‘real’, and in particular that the physical quantities it refers to are ‘real’; in short it also means that we can interpret QT ‘literally’ in the sense that we can take all its referential terms as genuinely referring and not just as convenient fictions or metaphors for the real.
Abstract I shall start this chapter by summarizing some of the claims of Chapter 2. In QT we represent the states of systems in QT by vectors. In particular with each q-system S is associated a set (or space) ℋ(S) of vectors each one of which represents a possible state of S at t. Each vector in ℋ (S) is represented by a set of N numbers (c 1, c 2, … , c N) The number N is called ‘the dimension of ℋ (S)’, and the various c n for n = 1, 2, … , N are called ‘the vector components’.
The quantum amplitudes are necessary for analyzing an interference experiment, even though it is a probability that embodies the experimentally testable result. The description, called a state vector , permits the same kind of freedom in thinking about quantum states that ordinary velocity and acceleration vectors, provide in thinking about the classical trajectory of a particle in Newtonian mechanics. The state vector provides an abstract description of a quantum state independent of the basis states onto which its projection amplitudes are taken. According to classical wave theory, if light arrives at a given point by way of two or more paths, the total electric field is the vector sum of the fields associated with each contributing wave. The components of a state vector are its projection amplitudes onto a given set of mutually orthogonal basis states. The state vector receives its name from the strong analogy between its properties and those of a geometrical vector of unit length—a unit vector.
As a last step towards general conclusions, I collect and assess the more important results obtained in the previous chapters. In the next and final chapter I then consider the question of whether the modal descriptions of reality meet the demands of being well developed, empirically adequate and metaphysically tenable. Indefinite properties and inexact magnitudes The bi, spectral and atomic modal interpretations do manage to interpret quantum mechanics by providing a description of what reality could be like in terms of systems possessing properties. Moreover, if one accepts the full property ascription (5.12) as developed in Section 5.4, this description of reality satisfies a number of desirable conditions. However, these modal interpretations do not simultaneously ascribe all the possible properties to a system. Instead they select at each instant a specific subset of the properties pertaining to a system and ascribe only these. And the properties which are not selected are taken to be indefinite. This possibility that properties of systems are sometimes not definite is in itself not that problematic for in some cases it is perfectly understandable what this means. Consider again the example of a tossing coin. During the toss the properties ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ can be said to be indefinite and this can be understood as meaning that these two properties are applicable only to coins which lie on surfaces. However, in other cases it is less clear what is going on.
Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last two chapters that nature denies us the easy way out. The clear experimental demonstration of quantum entanglement rules out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. For the time being at least, we are forced to live with the consequences of entanglement, non-locality, and ‘spooky’ action at a distance. This might make some of us uncomfortable, but there is no solace in the Copenhagen interpretation, which does not provide us with any answers and is still regarded by many to be no interpretation at all. And, lest we forget, there remain the problems of interpreting the meaning of quantum probability and the collapse of the wave function. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that these issues raise as they analyse the results from the latest particle-accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.
The highly speculative nature of the pilot-wave theory is obvious and acknowledged even by its keenest supporters. But many physicists, including those who do not believe it is a true description of what exists, may well find it useful when trying to interpret quantum theory. Hidden-variables theories are not the only theories susceptible of being interpreted as faithful descriptions of "what exists" (so-called ontological theories). In particular, several physicists investigated the possibility of building up ontological theories in which the state vector would constitute the complete specification of the physical state of the system. Within such an approach the main difficulty is of course the one linked with the reduction of the wave packet. In any ontologically interpretable theory elements must be added to standard quantum mechanics in order that objective states of individual physical systems can be defined. The models reviewed in this chapter are a sample of what has been proposed in the domain of ontologically interpretable theories.