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Oxford University Press eBooks

Realism

Henry Krips

Published Feb 20, 1992• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Already in this book one substantial issue has been discussed under the rubric of’realism’ in connection with QT, viz. the issue of whether the state-vectors and density operators of QT represent ‘real’ properties of q-systems. For the purposes of this chapter I take this particular issue to have been settled in favour of realism. But more generally what does it mean to adopt a ‘realist interpretation’of QT? I shall take it to mean accepting that QT is true, that the objects QT refers to (electrons, protons, etc.) exist, that the properties it refers to are ‘real’, and in particular that the physical quantities it refers to are ‘real’; in short it also means that we can interpret QT ‘literally’ in the sense that we can take all its referential terms as genuinely referring and not just as convenient fictions or metaphors for the real.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198242802.003.0007

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Abstract Already in this book one substantial issue has been discussed under the rubric of’realism’ in connection with QT, viz. the issue of whether the state-vectors and density operators of QT represent ‘real’ properties of q-systems. For the purposes of this chapter I take this particular issue to have been settled in favour of realism. But more generally what does it mean to adopt a ‘realist interpretation’of QT? I shall take it to mean accepting that QT is true, that the objects QT refers to (electrons, protons, etc.) exist, that the properties it refers to are ‘real’, and in particular that the physical quantities it refers to are ‘real’; in short it also means that we can interpret QT ‘literally’ in the sense that we can take all its referential terms as genuinely referring and not just as convenient fictions or metaphors for the real.
Abstract I shall start this chapter by summarizing some of the claims of Chapter 2. In QT we represent the states of systems in QT by vectors. In particular with each q-system S is associated a set (or space) ℋ(S) of vectors each one of which represents a possible state of S at t. Each vector in ℋ (S) is represented by a set of N numbers (c 1, c 2, … , c N) The number N is called ‘the dimension of ℋ (S)’, and the various c n for n = 1, 2, … , N are called ‘the vector components’.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Abstract In the previous chapter we described the core features of the theoretical role which the state-vector has in QT (sections 4 and 5), and said what a state-vector is (sections 1-3). Moreover we located the property of having a state-vector as a real property of an individual system at a time (section 6). And we went some of the way to interpreting the state-vector by locating it within a suite of metaphysical models in terms of which explanations are couched (section 5). In particular we suggested that f(S,t) describes a categorical basis for the propensities displayed by the P(Q, qi, S, t). In this chapter I shall complete the task of interpreting the state-vector. In particular I shall argue that f(S, t) should be taken as a field-function, describing a probability field which is associated with S at t.
Abstract This chapter attempts to bring the foregoing foundational discussion of QM∞ to bear on issues in the philosophy of science more generally construed. Taking one lesson of the foregoing foundational discussions to be that no single interpretation of QM∞ is adequate to the myriad explanatory and developmental demands faced by theories of QM∞, the chapter draws morals for scientific realism and related issues. One moral is that there might be no single structure or interpretation belief in which is warranted by the many successes of a physical theory. Another is that a physical theory might be best understood, not in terms of a unique set of physically possible worlds specified antecedently to the messy business of applying that theory, but in terms of many different such sets, indexed to contexts of application. A third moral is that semantic indecision of the sort just described could be an empirical virtue, insofar as semantically indecisive theories are more flexibly responsive to diverse sets of empirical demands.
The belief that quantum mechanics (QM) does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory (except for the statistical interpretation) presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism (realism of theoretical entities and realism of theories). If these kinds of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM (SR interpretation). Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation (ESR model) in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided.
Despite its power as the conceptual basis for a huge range of physical phenomena in atomic and subatomic physics, quantum mechanics still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the physical meaning of its fundamental theoretical concepts, such as those of quantum state and of quantum theoretical quantities or variables , dealt with by the known mathematical-theoretical rules. These concepts have generally been considered as not giving a direct description of physical systems, for they do not correspond to what is usually understood by `physical states' or `physical properties', notably characterized by definite numerical values such as those obtained from measurement. The situation has been tentatively expressed in terms of various `interpretations', conceived not only with regard to the physical meanings of mathematical quantities, but also in connection with philosophical statements about `physical reality'. The question of whether or not quantum theoretical quantities describe definite physical systems existing in nature has therefore generally been considered as beyond the possibilities of physics, because of the definitions that are commonly taken for `physical state' and `physical quantity'. We sketch the main ideas on this problem and propose a possible way out of the puzzle, in terms of an extension of the meaning given to the concepts of the physical state and physical quantity of a system, which would allow one, without any theoretical change in quantum mechanics, to speak consistently of real quantum systems as having definite physical properties .