Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last two chapters that nature denies us the easy way out. The clear experimental demonstration of quantum entanglement rules out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. For the time being at least, we are forced to live with the consequences of entanglement, non-locality, and ‘spooky’ action at a distance. This might make some of us uncomfortable, but there is no solace in the Copenhagen interpretation, which does not provide us with any answers and is still regarded by many to be no interpretation at all. And, lest we forget, there remain the problems of interpreting the meaning of quantum probability and the collapse of the wave function. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that these issues raise as they analyse the results from the latest particle-accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.
Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last two chapters that nature denies us the easy way out. The clear experimental demonstration of quantum entanglement rules out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. For the time being at least, we are forced to live with the consequences of entanglement, non-locality, and ‘spooky’ action at a distance. This might make some of us uncomfortable, but there is no solace in the Copenhagen interpretation, which does not provide us with any answers and is still regarded by many to be no interpretation at all. And, lest we forget, there remain the problems of interpreting the meaning of quantum probability and the collapse of the wave function. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that these issues raise as they analyse the results from the latest particle-accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.
Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last chapter that nature denies us the easy way out. We can rule out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. Yet the Copenhagen interpretation is regarded by some to be no interpretation at all. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that it raises as they analyse the results from the latest particle accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.
Abstract The results of the experiments described in the last chapter all point fairly unambiguously to a reality that is decidedly non-local in nature, at least in the quantum domain. Of course, these are results that come as no surprise to those willing to accept one of the most fundamental principles of the Copenhagen interpretation — that quantum phenomena are describable only in terms of the dual classical physical concepts of waves and particles. The wave properties of quantum entities lend them inherently non-local characteristics, and it is only when we forcibly ‘collapse’ the wave function by making a measurement that we are taken aback by what appears to be contradictory or counter-intuitive behaviour.
Quantum mechanics is an immensely successful theory, occupying a unique position in the history of science. It has solved mysteries ranging from macroscopic superconductivity to the microscopic theory of elementary particles and has provided deep insights into the nature of vacuum on the one hand and the description of the nucleon on the other. Whole new fields such as quantum optics and quantum electronics owe their very existence to this body of knowledge. However, despite the stunning successes of quantum mechanics, there is no general agreement on the conceptual foundations and interpretation of the subject. The theory provides unambiguous information about the outcome of a measurement of a physical object. However, many feel that it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the nature of the “reality” we should attribute to the physical objects between the acts of measurement. The conceptual difficulty comes about because the wave function |ψ〉 is usually given by a coherent superposition of various distinguishable experimental outcomes. If we denote the collection of states that represent the possible outcomes of an experiment by |ψ j 〉, then |ψ〉 = ∑ j c j |ψ j 〉 where c j = 〈ψ j |ψ〉. The probability of the outcome |ψ j 〉 is P j =|c j | 2 . In the process of measurement, the so called collapse of the wave function takes place and a single, definite state |ψ i 〉 of the physical object is chosen. The difficulty comes about in the interpretation of the mechanism by which this definite state is chosen from amongst all the possible outcomes.
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
The preparation procedure, an undefined notion in quantum theory, has not had the relevance that it deserves in the interpretation of quantum mechanical formalism.Here we utilize the concepts of identical and similar preparation procedures to show the conceptual differences between the statistical and the conventional interpretation of quantum formalism.Although the statistical understanding, and its final logical consequence, hidden variables theories (this connexion being explained in the text), have a great intuitive appeal due to its fewer ontological difficulties, both recent experimental results and theoretical developments seem to support an epistemic alternative closer to the conventional one.Nevertheless, we must not rule out the possibility that new theorems or new explanatory principles may modify the reigning supremacy of this interpretation. 1.-Introduction.Although the conventional interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (CIQM), very close to the Copenhagen interpretation, is still dominant (is used in almost all textbooks), there are physical situations that ask for an interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (QMF) in terms of the Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (SIQM) or even for hidden variables theories (HVT).The SIQM and HVT are different research programs, but they are closely related, as we will see further below.To introduce properly the distinctions between the three previous acronyms we will ask an old and apparently simple question.Is the wave function associated to an individual system or to a statistical ensemble?A first tentative answer could be formulated as follows.QMF introduces probabilities, and probabilities are related to statistical ensembles.Otherwise, the same concept of probability would lose its meaning.In QM, if it is said that you would get some concrete result with 0,63 probability it means that if the experiment is carried out 100 times, that concrete result would appear approximately 63 times.Hence, the obvious answer will be that the wave function should be related with statistical ensembles.However, despite its intuitiveness this idea does not capture completely what we want to express.The real problem to analyze could be best introduced with the following example.Imagine that we prepare identically two radioactive atoms with half-life of 30 minutes.By preparation we understand all those theoretical methods and physical procedures necessary to fully characterize the state of the system.It is, thus, a macroscopic reproducible act that lefts the system, without destroying it, in a concrete state after the procedure.In quantum theory, this preparation is represented by a vector state (or a density matrix).Identically in this context will mean identity of procedures, that is that the experimenter has repeated all previous operations, so that there is no difference whatsoever between them.Note, however, that identical preparations are not necessarily followed by identical results, so there is