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What are the alternatives?

Jim Baggott

Published Apr 16, 1992• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last chapter that nature denies us the easy way out. We can rule out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. Yet the Copenhagen interpretation is regarded by some to be no interpretation at all. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that it raises as they analyse the results from the latest particle accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198555766.003.0005

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Abstract So, where do we go from here? It is apparent from the last chapter that nature denies us the easy way out. We can rule out the idea of local hidden variables, one of the simpler solutions to the conceptual problems of quantum theory. Yet the Copenhagen interpretation is regarded by some to be no interpretation at all. Even those who adhere to the Copenhagen view tend to put aside or disregard the conceptual difficulties that it raises as they analyse the results from the latest particle accelerator experiment. This is not a very satisfactory situation.
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Abstract The results of the experiments described in the last chapter all point fairly unambiguously to a reality that is decidedly non-local in nature, at least in the quantum domain. Of course, these are results that come as no surprise to those willing to accept one of the most fundamental principles of the Copenhagen interpretation — that quantum phenomena are describable only in terms of the dual classical physical concepts of waves and particles. The wave properties of quantum entities lend them inherently non-local characteristics, and it is only when we forcibly ‘collapse’ the wave function by making a measurement that we are taken aback by what appears to be contradictory or counter-intuitive behaviour.
As announced in the introductory chapter, one of the core motivations for the therapeutic approach developed here is to investigate whether the doctrine of the Copenhagen interpretation, that quantum theory is fine as it stands and needs neither completion nor revision nor reinterpretation in speculative terms, can be vindicated. Having outlined the essential ingredients of the Rule Perspective in the previous chapters as an account designed to fulfil these therapeutic ambitions, it is natural to ask whether the Rule Perspective may be nothing else than the Copenhagen interpretation in new clothing. Since the Copenhagen interpretation is nowadays widely regarded as a failure, the question amounts to a criticism of the Rule Perspective and, so, deserves to be answered in the part of this work that addresses objections. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative