The Pursuit of Reality

Victor Christianto, Florentín Smarandache

This paper delves into the philosophical implications of modern physics, particularly theoretical physics, and its tendency towards hyperrealism-antirealism. Inspired by Baudrillard's concept of hyperreality, we argue that certain aspects of contemporary physics, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics and the pursuit of theories of everything, exhibit characteristics of a hyperreal state. This hyperreal state is characterized by the detachment from reality, the dominance of simulation over the real, and the loss of a clear distinction between the real and the imaginary. We explore how this trend has led to a departure from a balanced realist perspective, hindering the pursuit of a complete and coherent understanding of the physical world.

Bernard d’Espagnat

Bernard d’Espagnat

Abhishek Majhi

If Cauchy would have been more careful about his own language, then he could have written down the ``Heisenberg'' uncertainty principle a century earlier than Heisenberg. Such logico-linguistic self-criticism can provide new insights to physicists in the pursuit of truth and reality.

Karmela Padavic-Callaghan

Aashna Godha

This work is part of the Constraint-Resolved Reality (CRR) framework. The foundational paper defining CRR can be found here: zenodo.org/records/19873518 The pursuit of a Theory of Everything (ToE) assumes that the total structure of physical reality can, in principle, be fully described by a unified formal model. This paper challenges that assumption within the framework of Constraint-Resolved Reality (CRR) and Mapping Wobble Theory (MWT). We argue that constraint propagation and decoherence redistribute physical information into forms that are irretrievable for bounded observers, resulting in a strict limitation on accessible state space (Ω → Ω_acc). By formalizing the accessibility mapping Φₜ and demonstrating its non-invertibility, we show that any observer-dependent model is necessarily defined over a restricted subset of reality. We prove that a complete model of global state space Ω cannot be constructed by bounded systems. Consequently, a ToE, understood as a closed and complete description of reality, lies outside the class of constructible models. Scientific knowledge is therefore reframed as the construction of stable, constraint-compatible representations rather than complete descriptions of total structure.