Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Cauchy's Logico-Linguistic Slip and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle

Abhishek Majhi

Published Nov 1, 2021• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

If Cauchy would have been more careful about his own language, then he could have written down the ``Heisenberg'' uncertainty principle a century earlier than Heisenberg. Such logico-linguistic self-criticism can provide new insights to physicists in the pursuit of truth and reality.

Related papers

Cauchy’s Logico-Linguistic Slip, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and a Semantic Dilemma Concerning “Quantum Gravity”

Abhishek Majhi

arXiv:2204.00418•International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Mar 1, 2022•5 citations

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Scale Principle

Rodolfo A. Frino

Earlier this year I wrote a paper entitled Scale Factors and the Scale Principle. In this paper I formulated a new law which describes a number of fundamental quantum mechanical laws. This paper shows that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle obeys this new formulation.

•Jul 1, 2014•1 citation

Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg Principle

Vincent Edward Smith

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE I T HE Heisenberg uncertainty principle, like its rival theory of relativity/ has been one of the truly crucial phases in the physics of our day~ It did not, like the discovery of a new element or the Maxwell equations, simply indent the story of classical physics for a new paragraph. It was not only a new chapter but a new book. Detected, in the words of Heisenberg himself, when physics became self-critical, the principle is a statement of what is observable-like its contemporary, the theory of relativity. It was anew advance in method, so revolutionary indeed that physics has virtually lost meaning as content and become synonymous , as logical empiricism amply indicates, with mere rules of procedure. That science is developing into a system of logic, combining the Cartesian stress on clearness with the Kantian regulative idea, actually confirms a contention of traditional philosophy. It reveals that once we deny the colors and sounds, the life, lights, and purpose in our universe-as pure scientific method actually does-we are fated to deny much more than quality. Quality is in the order of form, substance, and being. The moment quality is banished from the real world, by the same 1 That all is not as peaceful and unified in physics as the layman sometimes believes can be seen in the deep cleavage between quantum and relativity mechanics. For the first, the exact specification of space (position) and time (velocity, momentum) has no meaning, while in relativity theory such exact description is the only meaning that can be had. Despite the efforts 'of leading physicists, including Dirac, to unite the two theories, the contradiction is so profound that one of these systems must eventually be abandoned or, more probably, both of them will be superseded. The recent work .of Schroedinger and apparently also of Einstei~ himself are directed to extend the general theory of relativity, making the current theory a special case just as Newtonian physics is a special case of present relativity mechanics. 474 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE 475 decree being itself-because it is an immediate, non-inertial (formal) thing like quality-is driven into its only possible exile, nothingness. It is not surprising then that, after modern physics· has finished its task, the universe should not only be emptied of its lights, its fragrance, its sweetness, and its music but should also be without being and without existence. The uncertainty principle has been much debated in modern thought. Its impact has brought a sad end to the pride of 19th century science since it prevents a complete knowledge of anything at all by shading into the darkness at least one of the two major factors that specify it. Shortly after the principle was born it was hailed by various authors as a proof of free will, of the possibility of religion, and of non-mechanistic concepts in biology. In a more consistent and challenging sense, it has often been taken to refute what the physicist calls causality and what the philosopher calls the order of nature. The fact of the matter is that if the senses alone supply knowledge, truly only one thing at a time can be apprehended. If Hume was right in philosophy, so is Heisenberg. But when sensism yields to an intellectual insight into reality, it is easy to refute the scientist's claim to dethrone the doctrine of nature's order which he could never detect, even in classical physics, by pointerreadings .2 But whatever the fate of the Heisenberg principle in cosmology , it has had a most fruitful career in the field of physics. To Heisenberg himself, the principle was a point of departure for an original development of quantum mechanics based on the " uncertainty " of position and momentum,.: 3 If, for example, measurements are made, under a microscope, of the position of an electron, the photon (light-particle), which impinges on the eye and thus conveys the required knowledge to the physicist, has had to collide with the electron, thus imparting an impact known as the Compton recoil. When • For ·a discussion of the order of nature, cf. J. Marling: The...

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review•Jan 1, 1949•0 citations

The certainty principle (review)

D. A. Arbatsky

The certainty principle (2005) allowed to conceptualize from the more fundamental grounds both the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (1927) and the Mandelshtam-Tamm relation (1945). In this review I give detailed explanation and discussion of the certainty principle, oriented to all physicists, both theorists and experimenters.

arXiv:quant-ph/0608138•Aug 17, 2006•0 citations

The conceptual foundation of quantum mechanics

Sandro Petruccioli

‘Sprache und Wirklichkeit in der modernen Physik’ is the title of a lecture Heisenberg gave in 1960 at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste. The polemics that had accompanied the establishment of quantum mechanics were over by then and the so-called problems of its foundations had lost much of their initial interest. Einstein had been dead for some years. Right up to the end he had expressed his profound dissatisfaction with a theory which, in his opinion, had something unreasonable about it. With the volume dedicated to him by the community of physicists and philosophers, the long debate between Bohr and Einstein had come to an end. It had been a disappointing conclusion, marked by the reaffirmation of the respective viewpoints of two scientists who by now found great difficulty even in defining a common code of communication. As though seeking to narrow the gap between them, Heisenberg took the opportunity to underline the existence of a common feature in their contributions to 20th century physics. Their discoveries had in fact made it possible to recognize that ‘even the fundamental and most elementary concepts of science, such as space, time, place, velocity, have become problematic and must be re-examined’. The conceptual and cognitive implications of relativity and of quantum mechanics were obviously different but Heisenberg maintained that both theories asked the same question: ‘Does the language we use when we speak of experiments correspond to the artificial language of mathematics which, as we know, describes real relationships correctly; or has it become separated from it so that we must be content with imprecise linguistic formulations and only return to the artificial language of mathematics when we are forced to express ourselves with precision?’.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 18, 1993•9 citations

The certainty principle II: Proof of the uncertainty principle

D. A. Arbatsky

A more detailed derivation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle from the certainty principle is given.

arXiv:quant-ph/0603155•Mar 17, 2006•1 citation
COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE I T HE Heisenberg uncertainty principle, like its rival theory of relativity/ has been one of the truly crucial phases in the physics of our day~ It did not, like the discovery of a new element or the Maxwell equations, simply indent the story of classical physics for a new paragraph. It was not only a new chapter but a new book. Detected, in the words of Heisenberg himself, when physics became self-critical, the principle is a statement of what is observable-like its contemporary, the theory of relativity. It was anew advance in method, so revolutionary indeed that physics has virtually lost meaning as content and become synonymous , as logical empiricism amply indicates, with mere rules of procedure. That science is developing into a system of logic, combining the Cartesian stress on clearness with the Kantian regulative idea, actually confirms a contention of traditional philosophy. It reveals that once we deny the colors and sounds, the life, lights, and purpose in our universe-as pure scientific method actually does-we are fated to deny much more than quality. Quality is in the order of form, substance, and being. The moment quality is banished from the real world, by the same 1 That all is not as peaceful and unified in physics as the layman sometimes believes can be seen in the deep cleavage between quantum and relativity mechanics. For the first, the exact specification of space (position) and time (velocity, momentum) has no meaning, while in relativity theory such exact description is the only meaning that can be had. Despite the efforts 'of leading physicists, including Dirac, to unite the two theories, the contradiction is so profound that one of these systems must eventually be abandoned or, more probably, both of them will be superseded. The recent work .of Schroedinger and apparently also of Einstei~ himself are directed to extend the general theory of relativity, making the current theory a special case just as Newtonian physics is a special case of present relativity mechanics. 474 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE 475 decree being itself-because it is an immediate, non-inertial (formal) thing like quality-is driven into its only possible exile, nothingness. It is not surprising then that, after modern physics· has finished its task, the universe should not only be emptied of its lights, its fragrance, its sweetness, and its music but should also be without being and without existence. The uncertainty principle has been much debated in modern thought. Its impact has brought a sad end to the pride of 19th century science since it prevents a complete knowledge of anything at all by shading into the darkness at least one of the two major factors that specify it. Shortly after the principle was born it was hailed by various authors as a proof of free will, of the possibility of religion, and of non-mechanistic concepts in biology. In a more consistent and challenging sense, it has often been taken to refute what the physicist calls causality and what the philosopher calls the order of nature. The fact of the matter is that if the senses alone supply knowledge, truly only one thing at a time can be apprehended. If Hume was right in philosophy, so is Heisenberg. But when sensism yields to an intellectual insight into reality, it is easy to refute the scientist's claim to dethrone the doctrine of nature's order which he could never detect, even in classical physics, by pointerreadings .2 But whatever the fate of the Heisenberg principle in cosmology , it has had a most fruitful career in the field of physics. To Heisenberg himself, the principle was a point of departure for an original development of quantum mechanics based on the " uncertainty " of position and momentum,.: 3 If, for example, measurements are made, under a microscope, of the position of an electron, the photon (light-particle), which impinges on the eye and thus conveys the required knowledge to the physicist, has had to collide with the electron, thus imparting an impact known as the Compton recoil. When • For ·a discussion of the order of nature, cf. J. Marling: The...
‘Sprache und Wirklichkeit in der modernen Physik’ is the title of a lecture Heisenberg gave in 1960 at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste. The polemics that had accompanied the establishment of quantum mechanics were over by then and the so-called problems of its foundations had lost much of their initial interest. Einstein had been dead for some years. Right up to the end he had expressed his profound dissatisfaction with a theory which, in his opinion, had something unreasonable about it. With the volume dedicated to him by the community of physicists and philosophers, the long debate between Bohr and Einstein had come to an end. It had been a disappointing conclusion, marked by the reaffirmation of the respective viewpoints of two scientists who by now found great difficulty even in defining a common code of communication. As though seeking to narrow the gap between them, Heisenberg took the opportunity to underline the existence of a common feature in their contributions to 20th century physics. Their discoveries had in fact made it possible to recognize that ‘even the fundamental and most elementary concepts of science, such as space, time, place, velocity, have become problematic and must be re-examined’. The conceptual and cognitive implications of relativity and of quantum mechanics were obviously different but Heisenberg maintained that both theories asked the same question: ‘Does the language we use when we speak of experiments correspond to the artificial language of mathematics which, as we know, describes real relationships correctly; or has it become separated from it so that we must be content with imprecise linguistic formulations and only return to the artificial language of mathematics when we are forced to express ourselves with precision?’.