Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Physical Layer Security Game: Interaction between Source, Eavesdropper, and Friendly Jammer

Ninoslav Marina, Are Hjørungnes, Merouane Abdelkader Debbah, Han Zhu

Published Jan 1, 2009• 7 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Physical Layer Security for Combating Jammers and Eavesdroppers

Mahdi M. Chehimi

•Sep 23, 2020•0 citations

Physical Layer Security Game: Interaction between Source, Eavesdropper, and Friendly Jammer

Zhu Han, Ninoslav Marina, Merouane Abdelkader Debbah +1 more

Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.

EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking•Jan 6, 2010•116 citations

Physical layer security game: How to date a girl with her boyfriend on the same table

Han Zhu, Ninoslav Marina, Merouane Abdelkader Debbah +1 more

Physical layer security is an emerging security concept that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between the intended network nodes, while the eavesdropping malicious nodes obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdropping malicious nodes while the interference to the intended destination is limited. In this paper, we investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the desired data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "disguising" the eavesdropper. In order to obtain a distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined in such a way that the source pays the friendly jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, and, therefore, increasing its secrecy capacity. Friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for this "jamming service". There is a tradeoff for the price: If the price is too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if the price is too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we define and investigate a Stackelberg game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The fancy title comes from the fact that it is similar to a scenario where the main fellow character (the source) tries to send a dating message to a lady (the intended destination), whose "poor" boyfriend plays the role of the eavesdropper that may hear the message. Friends of the source, the so-called "friendly jammers," try to distract the boyfriend, so that the dating message can be secretly transmitted. The game is defined in order to derive what is the optimal price that the friends can charge for this "friendly" action.

International Conference on Game Theory for Networks•May 1, 2009•62 citations

Physical layer security techniques for future wireless communication systems against eavesdropping

Haji Muhammad Furqan Ahmed Madni

•Jan 1, 2020•1 citation

Physical Layer Security for Two-Way Untrusted Relaying With Friendly Jammers

Rongqing Zhang, Lingyang Song, Zhu Han +1 more

In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.

arXiv:1202.3824•IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology•Jul 23, 2012•225 citations

An Integration of Source and Jammer for a Decode-and-Forward Two-way Scheme Under Physical Layer Security

Pham Ngoc SON, Hyung Yun Kong

Wireless Personal Communications•Jul 24, 2014•11 citations
Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.
Physical layer security is an emerging security concept that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between the intended network nodes, while the eavesdropping malicious nodes obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdropping malicious nodes while the interference to the intended destination is limited. In this paper, we investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the desired data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "disguising" the eavesdropper. In order to obtain a distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined in such a way that the source pays the friendly jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, and, therefore, increasing its secrecy capacity. Friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for this "jamming service". There is a tradeoff for the price: If the price is too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if the price is too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we define and investigate a Stackelberg game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The fancy title comes from the fact that it is similar to a scenario where the main fellow character (the source) tries to send a dating message to a lady (the intended destination), whose "poor" boyfriend plays the role of the eavesdropper that may hear the message. Friends of the source, the so-called "friendly jammers," try to distract the boyfriend, so that the dating message can be secretly transmitted. The game is defined in order to derive what is the optimal price that the friends can charge for this "friendly" action.
In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.