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arXiv:1202.3824 · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology

Physical Layer Security for Two-Way Untrusted Relaying With Friendly Jammers

Rongqing Zhang, Lingyang Song, Zhu Han, Bingli Jiao

Published Jul 23, 2012• 225 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.

DOI
10.1109/tvt.2012.2209692

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In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.
In this paper, we consider a two-way relay network where two sources can communicate only through an unauthenticated intermediate relay node. We investigate secure communications of this two-way relay scenario using physical layer security. Specifically, we treat the relay node as an eavesdropper from whom the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept secret, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first find that a non-zero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way relay network even without external jammers. Further still, with the help of friendly jammers who can transmit jamming signals to distract the malicious relay, a positive gain of the secrecy rate can be realized. In order to obtain the maximum secrecy rate, we define and then analyze an optimization problem. Finally, an optimal solution of jamming power allocation is provided for the system with friendly jammers.
This paper investigates the achievable secrecy regions when employing a friendly jammer in a cooperative scenario employing an untrusted relay. The untrusted relay which helps to forward the source signal towards the destination, could also be regarded as a potential eavesdropper. Our system employs a friendly jammer which sends a known noise signal towards the relay. In this paper, we investigate the effect of jammer and relay locations on the achievable secrecy rate. We consider two scenarios where in the first case we consider no direct transmission between the source and destination, while in the second case we include a source to destination direct link in our communication system.
In this paper, we investigate jamming power allocation to improve physical layer security in a multiuser two-way relay network, where several communication pairs, one untrusted relay and one friendly jammer are involved. The untrusted relay helps these pairs to forward information and tries to eavesdrop simultaneously. In order to deteriorate the eavesdropping link and to improve physical layer security, we introduce a friendly jammer to impose interference on the relay. We formulate the jamming power allocation as an ACA-A game, where the friendly jammer is modeled as the auctioneer and the pairs are regarded as the bidders. The convergence and the cheat-proof property of the proposed auction are analyzed and proved. Finally, we also carry out some numerical results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed ACA-A based power allocation algorithm.
In this paper we investigate a cooperative jamming (CJ) strategy based Stackelberg security game to improve physical layer security over multiuser OFDMA networks. Each source node tries to deliver messages to its intended destination node securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Fortunately, these node pairs can resort to a friendly jammer to enhance their communication. But the jamming service is not free and the friendly jammer charges each pair for some cost. Obviously there is a tradeoff between the friendly jammer and the source-destination pairs. Consequently, a two-level Stackelberg game model is proposed, where the friendly jammer plays the seller and the source-destination pairs are the buyers. We analyze the Stackelberg Equilibrium from two sides respectively and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium. Correspondingly, we also develop a distributed iterative power allocation algorithm to reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium point. Numerical Results demonstrate that the system sum secrecy rate is really improved and the physical layer security performance is effectively meliorated.
Physical layer security is an emerging security area that achieves perfect secrecy data transmission between intended network nodes, while malicious nodes that eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information. The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to the eavesdroppers. We investigate the interaction between the source that transmits the useful data and friendly jammers who assist the source by "masking" the eavesdropper. To obtain distributed solution, we introduce a game theoretic approach. The game is defined such that the source pays the jammers to interfere the eavesdropper, therefore, increasing the secrecy capacity. The friendly jammers charge the source with a certain price for the jamming, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If too low, the profit of the jammers is low; and if too high, the source would not buy the "service" (jamming power) or would buy it from other jammers. To analyze the game outcome, we investigate a Stackelburg type of game and construct a distributed algorithm. Our analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of friendly jamming and the tradeoff for setting the price. The distributed game solution is shown to have similar performances to those of the centralized one.
We consider a source-destination pair that can communicate only through an unauthenticated intermediate relay node. In this two-hop communication scenario, where the cooperation from the relay node is essential, we investigate whether achieving non-zero secrecy rate is possible. Specifically, we treat the relay node as an eavesdropper from whom the source information needs to be kept secret, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is needed. We find that a positive secrecy rate is indeed achievable, with the aid of the destination node or an external node that jams the relay, i.e., by cooperative jamming. We derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate by means of an eavesdropper-relay separation argument. We remark that this upper bound is the first of its kind in Gaussian channels with cooperative jamming. The upper bound is strictly smaller than the channel capacity without secrecy constraints. The achievable secrecy rates are found using stochastic encoding and compress-and-forward at the relay. Numerical results show that the gap between the bound and the achievable rate is small when the relay's power is larger than the power of the jammer and the source. In essence, this paper shows that a cooperative jammer enables secure communication to take place using an untrusted relay which would be otherwise impossible.