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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

Limitology

Published May 1, 1998• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The three oldest limit statements are — perhaps — the "flaming sword" of the Bible, the notion of "Maya's veil" in India and Anaximander's claim that the Whole (One) is unrecognizable from within (only a cut is recognizable). The first modern limit statement also takes the form of an interface statement. Boscovich's (1755) principle of the difference predicts that "the impressions generated" are invariant under certain objective changes of the universe (as when it "breathes" (increases and decreases in size) along with the observer and all forces. A century later, Maxwell (1872) recognized that a being who is part of a Hamiltonian universe cannot violate the second law of thermodynamics by performing micro observations followed by appropriate shepherding actions (like watching a gas of cold uranium atoms and setting barriers or removing them in an educated fashion using advanced modern gadgetry), whereas a being who is outside the same universe — a "demon" — can easily do the same thing. He thereby was able to predict that micro motions will in general be "impalpable" (p. 154 of his Theory of Heat , 1872). After this prediction had come true, half a century later, Bohr (1927) claimed that his own "complementarity principle" marks the limit of what an internal observer of a classical-continuous world can hope to measure. Four years later, Gödel (1931) discovered his discrete limit (an inaccessibility in finitely many steps of certain implications of a formal system from within). Unlike Bohr's intutive principle, Gödel's is a hard theorem. However, Bohr's also is harder in a sense because it asserted a contradiction between the inside and the outside view, while Gödel only found that a separating boundary existed between reachable and unreachable truths. Bohr's limit would be a "distortion" limit, Gödel's an "inaccessibility" limit. Distortion limits were subsequently also found by Ed Moore in 1956 (an analog to uncertainty in certain dissipative automata) and Donald Mackay in 1957 (irrefutability of certain false statements, like the attribution of free will, to deterministic automata). The subsequent limits of Bob Rosen in 1958 (to self-reproduction in category theory), Rolf Landauer in 1961 (to dissipation-free computation) and Ed Lorenz in 1964 (butterfly effect in chaotic dynamics) appear to be inaccessibility limits again. The same holds good for the finite combinatorial inaccessibility (NP-completeness) discovered in the 1970's. The most recent limit of Yukio Gunji (inconsistency of language games) appears to be a distortion limit again. Do these findings justify the introduction of a new discipline? Two points are in favor of the idea. First, new limits become definable in the fold of the new paradigm. For example, "ultraperspective" (which is inaccessible to animals) plays a fundamental role in both mathematical economics and science. The very notion of limits implies the adoption of two perspectives simultaneously. Second, any distortion limit "splits" the single (exo) reality into many different internally valid (endo) realities. Some of the objective features become interface-specific. This allows a new question to be asked: Can the "mirage properties" implicit in a distortion limit always be identified ("tagged") from the inside, even though they of course cannot be removed by definition? If so, relativity may turn out to be a first example in physics. Related observer-objective phenomena should then occur and be identifiable on the micro level (micro relativity). The famous Goldstein–Kerner "no interaction theorem" (which precludes a frame-dependent description of gases) would acquire a deep significance. Two previously incompatible fundamental theories of physics, namely relativity and quantum mechanics, would be unexpectedly unified by limitology. A third point is in favor of limitology: distortion limits always leave a loophole. They exist because an objective picture (which no longer depends on the observer) can only be obtained by making the observer explicit — a feat impossible to accomplish from the inside. Nevertheless the impossible can be achieved — on the modeling level. The "artificial universe approach" to the real world therefore qualifies as a new type of measurement. At the same time the computer acquires an unexpected fundamental role.

DOI
10.1142/9789812817303_0018

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Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

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A new science, endophysics, is introduced. Only if one is outside a nontrivial universe is a complete description of the latter possible — when you have it in your computer, for example. The laws that apply when you are an inside part are in general different: Endophysics is different from exophysics. Gödel's proof is the first example, in mathematics. In physics, it is desirable to have explicit observers included in the model world. Brain models are a case in point. Macroscopic brain models, however, are nonexplicit in general. Therefore an explicit microscopic universe is introduced. It is based on a one-dimensional Hamiltonian of the classical type in which "formal brains" can arise as explicit dissipative structures in the sense of Prigogine. The pertinent endophysics is still largely unknown. As a first step, the implications of the fact that the observer contains indistinguishable particles (Gibbs symmetry) are considered. Campbell's postulate — a fast back-and-forth vacillation of the time's axis on the micro level — is obtained as an implication. Nelson's postulate and hence the Schrödinger equation follow as corollaries. Thus, a "nonlocal" interface can be generated by a local theory. Microscopic observer properties "percolate up" to affect the macroscopic spatiotomporal appearance of the world. Physics becomes dependent on brain theory.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•0 citations

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Physicists very rarely boast about the immense extension of the area of physics which took place in the very short period of about 300 years since the birth of "our" discipline. The macroscopic bodies similarly obey laws, those of classical physics, with a similar accuracy. The German physicist D. Zeh has called attention to the fact that the quantum theoretical energy levels of a reasonably macroscopic body are so close to each other that even a single atom or electron, though spatially well separated from it, will influence it in the quantum theoretical sense. The general theory of relativity is a macroscopic theory. In the case just considered it implies the behavior of many living beings; in the case, it implies the consideration of such properties of a single macroscopic object which are macroscopically definable and observable.

Routledge eBooks•Jun 18, 2019•0 citations

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An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. 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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

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Limits are essential to the asymptotic Bohrification program. It was recognized at an early stage in the development of quantum mechanics that the limit $$\hbar \rightarrow 0$$ of Planck’s constant going to zero should play a role in the derivation of classical physics from quantum theory, and later on also the thermodynamic limit (which often means “ $$\text {lim}_{{N} {\rightarrow } {\infty }}$$ ”, where N is the number of particles in the system) became a subject of interest in quantum statistical mechanics.

Fundamental theories of physics•Jan 1, 2017•1 citation

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The "many worlds" of Everett's can be reduced to temporal slices which are lined up on the time axis — to a shish kebab of worlds, as it were. This interpretation of quantum mechanics is equivalent to Everett's interpretation, Bell showed. Like in the original Everett theory, there exists a bundle of internally consistent worlds that are each complete with its own past and future. However, in addition a rapid hopping across the bundle occurs — with only one fiber "illuminated" at a time (real at that moment). This bizarre result from quantum mechanics turns out to be in accord with endophysical arguments. The internal observer of an artificial molecular-dynamics-simulated universe sees only the "difference" between his own internal micromotions and the rest. Hence only one out of many possible "interface worlds" is valid for him or her at any given moment. It is governed by a Nelson type diffusion law (so that, objects acquire quantum-mechanical properties). More important, perhaps, is the fact that the interface is time-dependent. It follows that the momentarily valid "eigen state" of a measured object changes rapidly — without this fact being accessible to the internal observer. Every single "eigen world" thus corresponds to a fiber in the Everett bundle. The causal endophysical explanation offers the advantage that more can be said than is possible in the quantum analog. The hopping across fibers is again unavoidable. However, it at the same time depends on a parameter which can be indicated. Any change in the "assignment" of a single elementary particle (of whether it belongs to the observer or to the rest of the universe) is already sufficient to put a different fiber in charge. This means that the operator of the next-upper level of reality (in front of his exo-keyboard) controls an added free parameter when running the show for the internal observer. A slight displacement on the "piano" of assignment lets certain fibers be in charge more frequently. While it will be hard to consistently favor a single fiber, favoring a "thread" of adjacent fibers may be possible. The hopping then becomes restricted to a subbundle. Some such threads of mutually related worlds will be "consistent" in the sense that in the one thread, Schrödinger's cat always emerges unscathed while never in the other. To a human observer sitting in front of a discrete state keyboard and lower level universe, a problem arises in the analogous case: picking a rare thread is most likely an NP-complete or even Gödel-impossible task. To circumvent this problem, a "Laplacian desk-top computer" would be needed. The latter — unlike present day computers — sports an inconspicuous switch labeled "turbo" (boosting the number of digits per word to infinity without any drop in speed). It might then as well possess a little tunable knob in addition, labeled "hue" (allowing the user to adjust the degree of living color or shadow-world-likeness, respectively, of the momentarily picked thread). The least sorrowful and most colorful thread is "paradise thread." On the Laplacian computer, the choice of the paradise option might turn out to be protected by a password. Depending on whether or not it is activated, the icon "FS" (for "flaming sword") or "OR" (for "Orpheus") would appear on-screen. However, even if one reluctantly leaves the seat of the superobserver, the model universe approach remains a challenge. For the single exo world that exists behind the momentary thread can perhaps be "tapped" by the internal observer. "Blindsight experiments" permitting a certain degree of thread selection (and by implication world selection) are conceivable. Eventually, the internal observer may learn, for example, to manipulate his own curved hypersurface in exo space–time (into which his current fiber and thread are embedded) to a sufficient degree to bring it in contact with another thread belonging to another, not necessarily contemporaneous, observer ("greeting with the glove"). The iron bars of the world would then acquire spacings. Due to its enhanced nonlinearity, the momentary micro hypersurface lets time travel and the wish-machine-repair-shop appear somewhat less exotic today than they did at the time they were first, proposed by Kurt Gödel and Gilles Deleuze (and Jonas 1 ), respectively.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•0 citations
The three oldest limit statements are — perhaps — the "flaming sword" of the Bible, the notion of "Maya's veil" in India and Anaximander's claim that the Whole (One) is unrecognizable from within (only a cut is recognizable). The first modern limit statement also takes the form of an interface statement. Boscovich's (1755) principle of the difference predicts that "the impressions generated" are invariant under certain objective changes of the universe (as when it "breathes" (increases and decreases in size) along with the observer and all forces. A century later, Maxwell (1872) recognized that a being who is part of a Hamiltonian universe cannot violate the second law of thermodynamics by performing micro observations followed by appropriate shepherding actions (like watching a gas of cold uranium atoms and setting barriers or removing them in an educated fashion using advanced modern gadgetry), whereas a being who is outside the same universe — a "demon" — can easily do the same thing. He thereby was able to predict that micro motions will in general be "impalpable" (p. 154 of his Theory of Heat , 1872). After this prediction had come true, half a century later, Bohr (1927) claimed that his own "complementarity principle" marks the limit of what an internal observer of a classical-continuous world can hope to measure. Four years later, Gödel (1931) discovered his discrete limit (an inaccessibility in finitely many steps of certain implications of a formal system from within). Unlike Bohr's intutive principle, Gödel's is a hard theorem. However, Bohr's also is harder in a sense because it asserted a contradiction between the inside and the outside view, while Gödel only found that a separating boundary existed between reachable and unreachable truths. Bohr's limit would be a "distortion" limit, Gödel's an "inaccessibility" limit. Distortion limits were subsequently also found by Ed Moore in 1956 (an analog to uncertainty in certain dissipative automata) and Donald Mackay in 1957 (irrefutability of certain false statements, like the attribution of free will, to deterministic automata). The subsequent limits of Bob Rosen in 1958 (to self-reproduction in category theory), Rolf Landauer in 1961 (to dissipation-free computation) and Ed Lorenz in 1964 (butterfly effect in chaotic dynamics) appear to be inaccessibility limits again. The same holds good for the finite combinatorial inaccessibility (NP-completeness) discovered in the 1970's. The most recent limit of Yukio Gunji (inconsistency of language games) appears to be a distortion limit again. Do these findings justify the introduction of a new discipline? Two points are in favor of the idea. First, new limits become definable in the fold of the new paradigm. For example, "ultraperspective" (which is inaccessible to animals) plays a fundamental role in both mathematical economics and science. The very notion of limits implies the adoption of two perspectives simultaneously. Second, any distortion limit "splits" the single (exo) reality into many different internally valid (endo) realities. Some of the objective features become interface-specific. This allows a new question to be asked: Can the "mirage properties" implicit in a distortion limit always be identified ("tagged") from the inside, even though they of course cannot be removed by definition? If so, relativity may turn out to be a first example in physics. Related observer-objective phenomena should then occur and be identifiable on the micro level (micro relativity). The famous Goldstein–Kerner "no interaction theorem" (which precludes a frame-dependent description of gases) would acquire a deep significance. Two previously incompatible fundamental theories of physics, namely relativity and quantum mechanics, would be unexpectedly unified by limitology. A third point is in favor of limitology: distortion limits always leave a loophole. They exist because an objective picture (which no longer depends on the observer) can only be obtained by making the observer explicit — a feat impossible to accomplish from the inside. Nevertheless the impossible can be achieved — on the modeling level. The "artificial universe approach" to the real world therefore qualifies as a new type of measurement. At the same time the computer acquires an unexpected fundamental role.
Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.
A new science, endophysics, is introduced. Only if one is outside a nontrivial universe is a complete description of the latter possible — when you have it in your computer, for example. The laws that apply when you are an inside part are in general different: Endophysics is different from exophysics. Gödel's proof is the first example, in mathematics. In physics, it is desirable to have explicit observers included in the model world. Brain models are a case in point. Macroscopic brain models, however, are nonexplicit in general. Therefore an explicit microscopic universe is introduced. It is based on a one-dimensional Hamiltonian of the classical type in which "formal brains" can arise as explicit dissipative structures in the sense of Prigogine. The pertinent endophysics is still largely unknown. As a first step, the implications of the fact that the observer contains indistinguishable particles (Gibbs symmetry) are considered. Campbell's postulate — a fast back-and-forth vacillation of the time's axis on the micro level — is obtained as an implication. Nelson's postulate and hence the Schrödinger equation follow as corollaries. Thus, a "nonlocal" interface can be generated by a local theory. Microscopic observer properties "percolate up" to affect the macroscopic spatiotomporal appearance of the world. Physics becomes dependent on brain theory.
Physicists very rarely boast about the immense extension of the area of physics which took place in the very short period of about 300 years since the birth of "our" discipline. The macroscopic bodies similarly obey laws, those of classical physics, with a similar accuracy. The German physicist D. Zeh has called attention to the fact that the quantum theoretical energy levels of a reasonably macroscopic body are so close to each other that even a single atom or electron, though spatially well separated from it, will influence it in the quantum theoretical sense. The general theory of relativity is a macroscopic theory. In the case just considered it implies the behavior of many living beings; in the case, it implies the consideration of such properties of a single macroscopic object which are macroscopically definable and observable.
An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.
Limits are essential to the asymptotic Bohrification program. It was recognized at an early stage in the development of quantum mechanics that the limit ℏ→0\hbar \rightarrow 0ℏ→0 of Planck’s constant going to zero should play a role in the derivation of classical physics from quantum theory, and later on also the thermodynamic limit (which often means “ limN→∞\text {lim}_{{N} {\rightarrow } {\infty }}limN→∞​ ”, where N is the number of particles in the system) became a subject of interest in quantum statistical mechanics.
The "many worlds" of Everett's can be reduced to temporal slices which are lined up on the time axis — to a shish kebab of worlds, as it were. This interpretation of quantum mechanics is equivalent to Everett's interpretation, Bell showed. Like in the original Everett theory, there exists a bundle of internally consistent worlds that are each complete with its own past and future. However, in addition a rapid hopping across the bundle occurs — with only one fiber "illuminated" at a time (real at that moment). This bizarre result from quantum mechanics turns out to be in accord with endophysical arguments. The internal observer of an artificial molecular-dynamics-simulated universe sees only the "difference" between his own internal micromotions and the rest. Hence only one out of many possible "interface worlds" is valid for him or her at any given moment. It is governed by a Nelson type diffusion law (so that, objects acquire quantum-mechanical properties). More important, perhaps, is the fact that the interface is time-dependent. It follows that the momentarily valid "eigen state" of a measured object changes rapidly — without this fact being accessible to the internal observer. Every single "eigen world" thus corresponds to a fiber in the Everett bundle. The causal endophysical explanation offers the advantage that more can be said than is possible in the quantum analog. The hopping across fibers is again unavoidable. However, it at the same time depends on a parameter which can be indicated. Any change in the "assignment" of a single elementary particle (of whether it belongs to the observer or to the rest of the universe) is already sufficient to put a different fiber in charge. This means that the operator of the next-upper level of reality (in front of his exo-keyboard) controls an added free parameter when running the show for the internal observer. A slight displacement on the "piano" of assignment lets certain fibers be in charge more frequently. While it will be hard to consistently favor a single fiber, favoring a "thread" of adjacent fibers may be possible. The hopping then becomes restricted to a subbundle. Some such threads of mutually related worlds will be "consistent" in the sense that in the one thread, Schrödinger's cat always emerges unscathed while never in the other. To a human observer sitting in front of a discrete state keyboard and lower level universe, a problem arises in the analogous case: picking a rare thread is most likely an NP-complete or even Gödel-impossible task. To circumvent this problem, a "Laplacian desk-top computer" would be needed. The latter — unlike present day computers — sports an inconspicuous switch labeled "turbo" (boosting the number of digits per word to infinity without any drop in speed). It might then as well possess a little tunable knob in addition, labeled "hue" (allowing the user to adjust the degree of living color or shadow-world-likeness, respectively, of the momentarily picked thread). The least sorrowful and most colorful thread is "paradise thread." On the Laplacian computer, the choice of the paradise option might turn out to be protected by a password. Depending on whether or not it is activated, the icon "FS" (for "flaming sword") or "OR" (for "Orpheus") would appear on-screen. However, even if one reluctantly leaves the seat of the superobserver, the model universe approach remains a challenge. For the single exo world that exists behind the momentary thread can perhaps be "tapped" by the internal observer. "Blindsight experiments" permitting a certain degree of thread selection (and by implication world selection) are conceivable. Eventually, the internal observer may learn, for example, to manipulate his own curved hypersurface in exo space–time (into which his current fiber and thread are embedded) to a sufficient degree to bring it in contact with another thread belonging to another, not necessarily contemporaneous, observer ("greeting with the glove"). The iron bars of the world would then acquire spacings. Due to its enhanced nonlinearity, the momentary micro hypersurface lets time travel and the wish-machine-repair-shop appear somewhat less exotic today than they did at the time they were first, proposed by Kurt Gödel and Gilles Deleuze (and Jonas 1 ), respectively.