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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

Endophysics

Published May 1, 1998• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A new science, endophysics, is introduced. Only if one is outside a nontrivial universe is a complete description of the latter possible — when you have it in your computer, for example. The laws that apply when you are an inside part are in general different: Endophysics is different from exophysics. Gödel's proof is the first example, in mathematics. In physics, it is desirable to have explicit observers included in the model world. Brain models are a case in point. Macroscopic brain models, however, are nonexplicit in general. Therefore an explicit microscopic universe is introduced. It is based on a one-dimensional Hamiltonian of the classical type in which "formal brains" can arise as explicit dissipative structures in the sense of Prigogine. The pertinent endophysics is still largely unknown. As a first step, the implications of the fact that the observer contains indistinguishable particles (Gibbs symmetry) are considered. Campbell's postulate — a fast back-and-forth vacillation of the time's axis on the micro level — is obtained as an implication. Nelson's postulate and hence the Schrödinger equation follow as corollaries. Thus, a "nonlocal" interface can be generated by a local theory. Microscopic observer properties "percolate up" to affect the macroscopic spatiotomporal appearance of the world. Physics becomes dependent on brain theory.

DOI
10.1142/9789812817303_0006

Related papers

Endophysics — Physics from Within

An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

Explicit Observers

A new approach to the brain and the world is attempted. A chaotic Hamiltonian universe is set up in one dimension so that an internal observer — an excitable system — becomes amenable to complete understanding. The Gibbs symmetry and the Wigner symmetry, when taken into consideration explicitly, imply that to this observer, the world appears different from what holds good objectively — such as if one is doing a molecular dynamics simulation of the same system, and looking at it from the outside. Specifically, both stochastic mechanics and the quantum nonlocality turn out to be formal implications of the present artificial universe — which thereby qualifies as a local-deterministic hidden-variables approach to quantum mechanics at the same time. Bell's well-known impossibility theorem is circumvented because all quantum effects arising are nonexistent objectively. They are valid only within the "interface" that develops internally between the observer and the rest of the universe. Hence for the first time the Kantian notion that the world is objectively different from the way we perceive it can be demonstrated — not for our own world but for a lower level universe as it presents itself to an artificial observer living inside.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•0 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

A Possible Explanation of Quantum Mechanics

Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•4 citations

The Endo Approach

Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

Endophysics, time, quantum, and the subjective : proceedings of the ZiF Interdisciplinary Research Workshop, 17-22 January 2005, Bielefeld, Germany

time Endophysics, R. Buccheri, Avshalom C. Elitzur +1 more

# Endophysics: # Evolution of Human Knowledge and the Endophysical Perspective (R Buccheri & M Buccheri) # The Entropy of the Future (G Jaroszkiewicz) # Time: # Time, Memory and Consciousness: A View from the Brain (H J Markowitsch) # A Structure of Experienced Time (I M Havel) # Becoming, Events and the Ontology of Physical Theories (M Dorato) # Quantum: # Quantum Measurement Act as a Speech Act (J Schneider) # A Conceptual Introduction to Nelson's Mechanics (G Bacciagaluppi) # On the Subjective Nature of Relative Frequencies: Combining Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics (T Marlow) # The Subjective: # Observing Reality on Different Time Scales (A Alyushin) # The Mind in Physics (J Sanfey) # Time Within: The Perceptual Rivalry Switch as a Neural Clock (J D Pettigrew & J D Tilden) # and other papers

•Jan 1, 2005•1 citation
A new science, endophysics, is introduced. Only if one is outside a nontrivial universe is a complete description of the latter possible — when you have it in your computer, for example. The laws that apply when you are an inside part are in general different: Endophysics is different from exophysics. Gödel's proof is the first example, in mathematics. In physics, it is desirable to have explicit observers included in the model world. Brain models are a case in point. Macroscopic brain models, however, are nonexplicit in general. Therefore an explicit microscopic universe is introduced. It is based on a one-dimensional Hamiltonian of the classical type in which "formal brains" can arise as explicit dissipative structures in the sense of Prigogine. The pertinent endophysics is still largely unknown. As a first step, the implications of the fact that the observer contains indistinguishable particles (Gibbs symmetry) are considered. Campbell's postulate — a fast back-and-forth vacillation of the time's axis on the micro level — is obtained as an implication. Nelson's postulate and hence the Schrödinger equation follow as corollaries. Thus, a "nonlocal" interface can be generated by a local theory. Microscopic observer properties "percolate up" to affect the macroscopic spatiotomporal appearance of the world. Physics becomes dependent on brain theory.
An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.
A new approach to the brain and the world is attempted. A chaotic Hamiltonian universe is set up in one dimension so that an internal observer — an excitable system — becomes amenable to complete understanding. The Gibbs symmetry and the Wigner symmetry, when taken into consideration explicitly, imply that to this observer, the world appears different from what holds good objectively — such as if one is doing a molecular dynamics simulation of the same system, and looking at it from the outside. Specifically, both stochastic mechanics and the quantum nonlocality turn out to be formal implications of the present artificial universe — which thereby qualifies as a local-deterministic hidden-variables approach to quantum mechanics at the same time. Bell's well-known impossibility theorem is circumvented because all quantum effects arising are nonexistent objectively. They are valid only within the "interface" that develops internally between the observer and the rest of the universe. Hence for the first time the Kantian notion that the world is objectively different from the way we perceive it can be demonstrated — not for our own world but for a lower level universe as it presents itself to an artificial observer living inside.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.
Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.
# Endophysics: # Evolution of Human Knowledge and the Endophysical Perspective (R Buccheri & M Buccheri) # The Entropy of the Future (G Jaroszkiewicz) # Time: # Time, Memory and Consciousness: A View from the Brain (H J Markowitsch) # A Structure of Experienced Time (I M Havel) # Becoming, Events and the Ontology of Physical Theories (M Dorato) # Quantum: # Quantum Measurement Act as a Speech Act (J Schneider) # A Conceptual Introduction to Nelson's Mechanics (G Bacciagaluppi) # On the Subjective Nature of Relative Frequencies: Combining Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics (T Marlow) # The Subjective: # Observing Reality on Different Time Scales (A Alyushin) # The Mind in Physics (J Sanfey) # Time Within: The Perceptual Rivalry Switch as a Neural Clock (J D Pettigrew & J D Tilden) # and other papers