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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

The Golden Thread of Paradise — An Implication of the Causally Interpreted Bell–Everett Theory

Published May 1, 1998• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The "many worlds" of Everett's can be reduced to temporal slices which are lined up on the time axis — to a shish kebab of worlds, as it were. This interpretation of quantum mechanics is equivalent to Everett's interpretation, Bell showed. Like in the original Everett theory, there exists a bundle of internally consistent worlds that are each complete with its own past and future. However, in addition a rapid hopping across the bundle occurs — with only one fiber "illuminated" at a time (real at that moment). This bizarre result from quantum mechanics turns out to be in accord with endophysical arguments. The internal observer of an artificial molecular-dynamics-simulated universe sees only the "difference" between his own internal micromotions and the rest. Hence only one out of many possible "interface worlds" is valid for him or her at any given moment. It is governed by a Nelson type diffusion law (so that, objects acquire quantum-mechanical properties). More important, perhaps, is the fact that the interface is time-dependent. It follows that the momentarily valid "eigen state" of a measured object changes rapidly — without this fact being accessible to the internal observer. Every single "eigen world" thus corresponds to a fiber in the Everett bundle. The causal endophysical explanation offers the advantage that more can be said than is possible in the quantum analog. The hopping across fibers is again unavoidable. However, it at the same time depends on a parameter which can be indicated. Any change in the "assignment" of a single elementary particle (of whether it belongs to the observer or to the rest of the universe) is already sufficient to put a different fiber in charge. This means that the operator of the next-upper level of reality (in front of his exo-keyboard) controls an added free parameter when running the show for the internal observer. A slight displacement on the "piano" of assignment lets certain fibers be in charge more frequently. While it will be hard to consistently favor a single fiber, favoring a "thread" of adjacent fibers may be possible. The hopping then becomes restricted to a subbundle. Some such threads of mutually related worlds will be "consistent" in the sense that in the one thread, Schrödinger's cat always emerges unscathed while never in the other. To a human observer sitting in front of a discrete state keyboard and lower level universe, a problem arises in the analogous case: picking a rare thread is most likely an NP-complete or even Gödel-impossible task. To circumvent this problem, a "Laplacian desk-top computer" would be needed. The latter — unlike present day computers — sports an inconspicuous switch labeled "turbo" (boosting the number of digits per word to infinity without any drop in speed). It might then as well possess a little tunable knob in addition, labeled "hue" (allowing the user to adjust the degree of living color or shadow-world-likeness, respectively, of the momentarily picked thread). The least sorrowful and most colorful thread is "paradise thread." On the Laplacian computer, the choice of the paradise option might turn out to be protected by a password. Depending on whether or not it is activated, the icon "FS" (for "flaming sword") or "OR" (for "Orpheus") would appear on-screen. However, even if one reluctantly leaves the seat of the superobserver, the model universe approach remains a challenge. For the single exo world that exists behind the momentary thread can perhaps be "tapped" by the internal observer. "Blindsight experiments" permitting a certain degree of thread selection (and by implication world selection) are conceivable. Eventually, the internal observer may learn, for example, to manipulate his own curved hypersurface in exo space–time (into which his current fiber and thread are embedded) to a sufficient degree to bring it in contact with another thread belonging to another, not necessarily contemporaneous, observer ("greeting with the glove"). The iron bars of the world would then acquire spacings. Due to its enhanced nonlinearity, the momentary micro hypersurface lets time travel and the wish-machine-repair-shop appear somewhat less exotic today than they did at the time they were first, proposed by Kurt Gödel and Gilles Deleuze (and Jonas 1 ), respectively.

DOI
10.1142/9789812817303_0012

Related papers

Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Simon W. Saunders

Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.

•Jun 24, 2010•362 citations

The Endo Approach

Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

Interference Is Exophysically Absent

Interference is the hardest-to-explain property of our quantum reality. Negative probabilities ("amplitudes") have no classical analog, for averaging can never yield a zero outcome starting from nonzero components. As soon as an endophysical explanation of interference is attempted, on the other hand, the price to pay is that the phenomenon ceases to exist exo-objectively. For it remains valid only in the interface of the observer. On the interface, interference indeed arises when many different successive interface worlds are overlaid in an integrating fashion. Since the particle makes a different motion in each interface world — hitting a counter in the one and taking off from it (hitting it in negative time) in the other the net effect can indeed be destructive: a "canceling-out." Motions that either come or go act like quantum amplitudes. Interference thereby becomes "dual" to state reduction. Whereas interference fuses many successive interface worlds as we saw, state reduction "fixates" a single one in the interface at the expense of all others. World-splitting (state reduction) and world-combining (interference) occur in the interface on the same footing — depending on whether a macroscopic record (which cannot be superposed) is present or not. The prediction that interference is exophysically absent can perhaps be put to a test. The experiment is called the "unbiased quantum coin." In the original quantum coin experiment proposed by Schrödinger in 1935 (illustrated by the fate of an imaginary cat), "heads" and "tails" were defined by two equiprobable quantum events. In the modified version proposed here, "heads" is caused by an event made rarer than 50 percent by destructive interference and "tails" is caused by an event made more frequent than 50 percent by constructive interference. A deterministic "unbiasing" has then to be added — like letting every heads click but only every tenth tails click pass through by means of a computer program. The resulting "coin" is then fully acceptable as the source of a bias-free random binary sequence. The "modified quantum ordeal" obtained can possibly be put to a good use — to improve the world on the exo level. While the coin is perfectly fair endophysically, it is "more than fair" exophysically — with its "heads" events. While endophysically there is no difference to the classic Schrödinger cat experiment, the "bonus" given to the rarer outcome ("heads") becomes a real gain exophysically; for the interference-induced "dip" is exophysically absent but the compensating bonus is not. Hence a lottery based on the new unbiased quantum coin would, while being innocuous endophysically, generate more than its share of millionaires exophysically. Even though the gain would be "shielded" from being perceptible endophysically, some subtle trickle-down effect from this "exo-altruism" (since it is a gift without direct returns) cannot be ruled out. In the positive case, the existence of the exo level would be demonstrable. The proposal is related to David Deutsch's idea of subtly exploiting Everett's theory.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•1 citation

A Possible Explanation of Quantum Mechanics

Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•May 1, 1998•4 citations

Schrödinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes

Rupak Bhattacharya, Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, Upasana Bhattacharya +7 more

Quantum mechanics provides us most fundamental descriptions of our most early universe, but there is a long-standing debate amongst theoretical physicists about what all these mathematics really mean in real world? The present three-dimensional (3D) universe, we humans experience daily since our birth, is probably just one of an enormous numbers of essentially classical worlds, and all quantum phenomena arise from a universal force of repulsions that prevented many universes (Multiverse) from having identical physical configurations like ours. Probabilities arise only because of our human ignorance as to which in our world an observer occupies a position in space time. This picture is all that is needed to explain bizarre quantum effects such as particles that can tunnel through solid barriers and wave behavior in double-slit experiments or in a warm hole. Our many-interacting-universes approach hinges on our assumption that interactions between deterministically evolving worlds cause all quantum effects. Each world is simply the position of particles in three-dimensional space time, and each would evolve according to Newton’s laws, if there were no inter world interactions. A surprising feature of human approach was that the formulation contains nothing that corresponds to the mysterious quantum wave functions, except in the formal mathematical limit in which the number of worlds becomes infinitely large. Conversely, Newtonian mechanics corresponds to the opposite limit of just one world. Thus, our approach should incorporate both classical and quantum theory. As few as two interacting worlds can result in quantum like effects, such as tunneling through a barrier. Many interacting worlds theory (MIW) explains that rather than standing apart, an infinite number of universes in the early time shared the same space and time as ours. They show that the theory can explain quantum mechanical effects while leaving open the choice of theory to explain the universe at large scales. This is a fascinating new variant of multiverse theory that, in a sense, creates not just a doppelganger of everyone but an infinite number of them all overlaying each other in the same space and time. The fine tuning of parameters required to reproduce our present day universe suggests that our universe may simply be a region within an eternally inflating super-region. Many other regions beyond our observable universe might have existed in earlier times with each such universe governed by a different set of physical parameters and laws. Collision between these regions, if they occurred, should have left signatures of anisotropy in the cosmic microwave background (CMB) but have not been seen yet. We assess different mechanisms for this residual emission and conclude that although there is a 30% probability that noise fluctuations may cause foregrounds to fall within 3σ of the excess, there is less than a 0.5% probability that foregrounds can explain all the excess. A plausible explanation is that the collision of our universe with an alternate universe, whose baryon to photon ratio is a factor of ∼ 4500 larger than ours, could produce enhanced Hydrogen Paschen-series emission at the epoch of recombination. Future spectral mapping and deeper observations at 100 and 217 GHz are needed to mitigate systematics arising from unknown galactic foregrounds and to confirm this unusual hypothesis. After careful analysis of the spectrum of the CMB, Chary et al. found a signal that was about 4500x brighter than it should have been, based on the number of protons and electrons. Scientists believe that this existed in the very early universe. Indeed, this particular signal, an emission line that arose from the formation of atoms during the era of recombination is more consistent with a universe whose ratio of matter particles to photons is about 65x greater than our own. There is a 30% chance that this mysterious signal is just noise, and not really, a signal at all; however, it is also possible that it is real, and exists as a parallel universe. Keywords : Quantum mechanics, multiverse, Newtonian mechanics Cite this Article Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, et al . Schrodinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes. Research and Reviews: Journal of Space Science and Technology. 2016; 5(1): 35–52p.

•May 16, 2016•0 citations

Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations
The "many worlds" of Everett's can be reduced to temporal slices which are lined up on the time axis — to a shish kebab of worlds, as it were. This interpretation of quantum mechanics is equivalent to Everett's interpretation, Bell showed. Like in the original Everett theory, there exists a bundle of internally consistent worlds that are each complete with its own past and future. However, in addition a rapid hopping across the bundle occurs — with only one fiber "illuminated" at a time (real at that moment). This bizarre result from quantum mechanics turns out to be in accord with endophysical arguments. The internal observer of an artificial molecular-dynamics-simulated universe sees only the "difference" between his own internal micromotions and the rest. Hence only one out of many possible "interface worlds" is valid for him or her at any given moment. It is governed by a Nelson type diffusion law (so that, objects acquire quantum-mechanical properties). More important, perhaps, is the fact that the interface is time-dependent. It follows that the momentarily valid "eigen state" of a measured object changes rapidly — without this fact being accessible to the internal observer. Every single "eigen world" thus corresponds to a fiber in the Everett bundle. The causal endophysical explanation offers the advantage that more can be said than is possible in the quantum analog. The hopping across fibers is again unavoidable. However, it at the same time depends on a parameter which can be indicated. Any change in the "assignment" of a single elementary particle (of whether it belongs to the observer or to the rest of the universe) is already sufficient to put a different fiber in charge. This means that the operator of the next-upper level of reality (in front of his exo-keyboard) controls an added free parameter when running the show for the internal observer. A slight displacement on the "piano" of assignment lets certain fibers be in charge more frequently. While it will be hard to consistently favor a single fiber, favoring a "thread" of adjacent fibers may be possible. The hopping then becomes restricted to a subbundle. Some such threads of mutually related worlds will be "consistent" in the sense that in the one thread, Schrödinger's cat always emerges unscathed while never in the other. To a human observer sitting in front of a discrete state keyboard and lower level universe, a problem arises in the analogous case: picking a rare thread is most likely an NP-complete or even Gödel-impossible task. To circumvent this problem, a "Laplacian desk-top computer" would be needed. The latter — unlike present day computers — sports an inconspicuous switch labeled "turbo" (boosting the number of digits per word to infinity without any drop in speed). It might then as well possess a little tunable knob in addition, labeled "hue" (allowing the user to adjust the degree of living color or shadow-world-likeness, respectively, of the momentarily picked thread). The least sorrowful and most colorful thread is "paradise thread." On the Laplacian computer, the choice of the paradise option might turn out to be protected by a password. Depending on whether or not it is activated, the icon "FS" (for "flaming sword") or "OR" (for "Orpheus") would appear on-screen. However, even if one reluctantly leaves the seat of the superobserver, the model universe approach remains a challenge. For the single exo world that exists behind the momentary thread can perhaps be "tapped" by the internal observer. "Blindsight experiments" permitting a certain degree of thread selection (and by implication world selection) are conceivable. Eventually, the internal observer may learn, for example, to manipulate his own curved hypersurface in exo space–time (into which his current fiber and thread are embedded) to a sufficient degree to bring it in contact with another thread belonging to another, not necessarily contemporaneous, observer ("greeting with the glove"). The iron bars of the world would then acquire spacings. Due to its enhanced nonlinearity, the momentary micro hypersurface lets time travel and the wish-machine-repair-shop appear somewhat less exotic today than they did at the time they were first, proposed by Kurt Gödel and Gilles Deleuze (and Jonas 1 ), respectively.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.
Interference is the hardest-to-explain property of our quantum reality. Negative probabilities ("amplitudes") have no classical analog, for averaging can never yield a zero outcome starting from nonzero components. As soon as an endophysical explanation of interference is attempted, on the other hand, the price to pay is that the phenomenon ceases to exist exo-objectively. For it remains valid only in the interface of the observer. On the interface, interference indeed arises when many different successive interface worlds are overlaid in an integrating fashion. Since the particle makes a different motion in each interface world — hitting a counter in the one and taking off from it (hitting it in negative time) in the other the net effect can indeed be destructive: a "canceling-out." Motions that either come or go act like quantum amplitudes. Interference thereby becomes "dual" to state reduction. Whereas interference fuses many successive interface worlds as we saw, state reduction "fixates" a single one in the interface at the expense of all others. World-splitting (state reduction) and world-combining (interference) occur in the interface on the same footing — depending on whether a macroscopic record (which cannot be superposed) is present or not. The prediction that interference is exophysically absent can perhaps be put to a test. The experiment is called the "unbiased quantum coin." In the original quantum coin experiment proposed by Schrödinger in 1935 (illustrated by the fate of an imaginary cat), "heads" and "tails" were defined by two equiprobable quantum events. In the modified version proposed here, "heads" is caused by an event made rarer than 50 percent by destructive interference and "tails" is caused by an event made more frequent than 50 percent by constructive interference. A deterministic "unbiasing" has then to be added — like letting every heads click but only every tenth tails click pass through by means of a computer program. The resulting "coin" is then fully acceptable as the source of a bias-free random binary sequence. The "modified quantum ordeal" obtained can possibly be put to a good use — to improve the world on the exo level. While the coin is perfectly fair endophysically, it is "more than fair" exophysically — with its "heads" events. While endophysically there is no difference to the classic Schrödinger cat experiment, the "bonus" given to the rarer outcome ("heads") becomes a real gain exophysically; for the interference-induced "dip" is exophysically absent but the compensating bonus is not. Hence a lottery based on the new unbiased quantum coin would, while being innocuous endophysically, generate more than its share of millionaires exophysically. Even though the gain would be "shielded" from being perceptible endophysically, some subtle trickle-down effect from this "exo-altruism" (since it is a gift without direct returns) cannot be ruled out. In the positive case, the existence of the exo level would be demonstrable. The proposal is related to David Deutsch's idea of subtly exploiting Everett's theory.
Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.
Quantum mechanics provides us most fundamental descriptions of our most early universe, but there is a long-standing debate amongst theoretical physicists about what all these mathematics really mean in real world? The present three-dimensional (3D) universe, we humans experience daily since our birth, is probably just one of an enormous numbers of essentially classical worlds, and all quantum phenomena arise from a universal force of repulsions that prevented many universes (Multiverse) from having identical physical configurations like ours. Probabilities arise only because of our human ignorance as to which in our world an observer occupies a position in space time. This picture is all that is needed to explain bizarre quantum effects such as particles that can tunnel through solid barriers and wave behavior in double-slit experiments or in a warm hole. Our many-interacting-universes approach hinges on our assumption that interactions between deterministically evolving worlds cause all quantum effects. Each world is simply the position of particles in three-dimensional space time, and each would evolve according to Newton’s laws, if there were no inter world interactions. A surprising feature of human approach was that the formulation contains nothing that corresponds to the mysterious quantum wave functions, except in the formal mathematical limit in which the number of worlds becomes infinitely large. Conversely, Newtonian mechanics corresponds to the opposite limit of just one world. Thus, our approach should incorporate both classical and quantum theory. As few as two interacting worlds can result in quantum like effects, such as tunneling through a barrier. Many interacting worlds theory (MIW) explains that rather than standing apart, an infinite number of universes in the early time shared the same space and time as ours. They show that the theory can explain quantum mechanical effects while leaving open the choice of theory to explain the universe at large scales. This is a fascinating new variant of multiverse theory that, in a sense, creates not just a doppelganger of everyone but an infinite number of them all overlaying each other in the same space and time. The fine tuning of parameters required to reproduce our present day universe suggests that our universe may simply be a region within an eternally inflating super-region. Many other regions beyond our observable universe might have existed in earlier times with each such universe governed by a different set of physical parameters and laws. Collision between these regions, if they occurred, should have left signatures of anisotropy in the cosmic microwave background (CMB) but have not been seen yet. We assess different mechanisms for this residual emission and conclude that although there is a 30% probability that noise fluctuations may cause foregrounds to fall within 3σ of the excess, there is less than a 0.5% probability that foregrounds can explain all the excess. A plausible explanation is that the collision of our universe with an alternate universe, whose baryon to photon ratio is a factor of ∼ 4500 larger than ours, could produce enhanced Hydrogen Paschen-series emission at the epoch of recombination. Future spectral mapping and deeper observations at 100 and 217 GHz are needed to mitigate systematics arising from unknown galactic foregrounds and to confirm this unusual hypothesis. After careful analysis of the spectrum of the CMB, Chary et al. found a signal that was about 4500x brighter than it should have been, based on the number of protons and electrons. Scientists believe that this existed in the very early universe. Indeed, this particular signal, an emission line that arose from the formation of atoms during the era of recombination is more consistent with a universe whose ratio of matter particles to photons is about 65x greater than our own. There is a 30% chance that this mysterious signal is just noise, and not really, a signal at all; however, it is also possible that it is real, and exists as a parallel universe. Keywords : Quantum mechanics, multiverse, Newtonian mechanics Cite this Article Pranab Kumar Bhattacharya, et al . Schrodinger Cat's Experiment's Interpretation and Parallel Universe or Multiple Universes. Research and Reviews: Journal of Space Science and Technology. 2016; 5(1): 35–52p.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.