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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Philosophical Interpretations of Quantum Physics

Henry Mehlberg, Robert S. Cohen

Published Jan 1, 1980• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-009-8988-7_1

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It is demonstrated that the reason for the diversity of interpretations of quantum mechanics is that they are not connected by continuity relations with classical physics, and also the reason is the impossibility of operationalist definition of the vector of state. The problem lies in the incompatibility of the philosophical foundations of interpretations, which results in the difficulty of building a unified picture of the world. To solve the problem, we identify general philosophical foundation of interpretations of quantum mechanics and built their classification. We also show that in more general theories, the part of which is quantum mechanics, it is possible to integrate (reconcile) the philosophical foundations of interpretations.
Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria selected.
I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical theories—particularly quantum field theories—has led philosophers astray. It has driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physicists, so-called effective field theories, to be unfit for philosophical interpretation. In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpretation. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism in the context of quantum field theory. The article concludes by briefly sketching some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics. 1 Introduction2 The Standard Account of Theory Interpretation2.1 Vices of the standard account3 A More Effective Realism3.1 Approximate truth3.2 Scales and ontology4 Conclusion