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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Scientific Realism Made Effective

Porter Williams

Published Aug 29, 2017• 105 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical theories—particularly quantum field theories—has led philosophers astray. It has driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physicists, so-called effective field theories, to be unfit for philosophical interpretation. In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpretation. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism in the context of quantum field theory. The article concludes by briefly sketching some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics. 1 Introduction2 The Standard Account of Theory Interpretation2.1 Vices of the standard account3 A More Effective Realism3.1 Approximate truth3.2 Scales and ontology4 Conclusion

DOI
10.1093/bjps/axx043

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I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical theories—particularly quantum field theories—has led philosophers astray. It has driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physicists, so-called effective field theories, to be unfit for philosophical interpretation. In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpretation. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism in the context of quantum field theory. The article concludes by briefly sketching some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics. 1 Introduction2 The Standard Account of Theory Interpretation2.1 Vices of the standard account3 A More Effective Realism3.1 Approximate truth3.2 Scales and ontology4 Conclusion
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.
Abstract This chapter attempts to bring the foregoing foundational discussion of QM∞ to bear on issues in the philosophy of science more generally construed. Taking one lesson of the foregoing foundational discussions to be that no single interpretation of QM∞ is adequate to the myriad explanatory and developmental demands faced by theories of QM∞, the chapter draws morals for scientific realism and related issues. One moral is that there might be no single structure or interpretation belief in which is warranted by the many successes of a physical theory. Another is that a physical theory might be best understood, not in terms of a unique set of physically possible worlds specified antecedently to the messy business of applying that theory, but in terms of many different such sets, indexed to contexts of application. A third moral is that semantic indecision of the sort just described could be an empirical virtue, insofar as semantically indecisive theories are more flexibly responsive to diverse sets of empirical demands.
Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.
Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense).
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
The philosophy of physics is now an important branch of academic philosophy. Philosophers of physics, who usually have a background in both disciplines, address the kind of questions that any physicist interested in understanding the conceptual foundations of the subject would deem important. These might include: What is four-dimensional Min-kowski space-time, and how did the advent of relativity affect Newtonian views of absolute space and time? Are the standard distributions in statistical physics a measure of objective chance or a lack of information about physical processes? Is there a measurement problem in quantum theory?