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Philosophy of Science

The Use of Philosophical Arguments in Quantum Physics

John P. Losee

Published Jan 1, 1964• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria selected.

DOI
10.1086/287973

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Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria selected.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
Mainly due to the EPR trio having declared quantum mechanics as ‘not complete’ and given the acid criticisms of Schrödinger, including his famous cat paradox , many physicists felt encouraged to introduce new interpretations to confront a vaguely assembled orthodox interpretation . Indeed, there are numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics, so numerous that we have decided not to even enter into the interpretational arena, leaving that to the professionals and citing their encyclopedic works instead. In this regard, we are compelled to quote Dyson: ‘We still have passionate arguments between believers of various interpretations… The reason for these arguments is that various interpreters are trying to describe the quantum world in words… and the language is inappropriate for the purpose.’ Here, a humble approach to this subject is taken whilst opting for pragmatism.
The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr began at the Solvay Council in 1927. The debate was about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also addressed the fundamental question of what the purpose and aim of a physical theory should be. Their conflicting positions were based on two diametrically opposed philosophical approaches to the fundamental problems of physics. The many books popularising quantum mechanics quite rightly place the emphasis on the problem of interpretation: they discuss the opposing positions of Einstein’s “realism” and the “Copenhagen interpretation” of which Bohr is seen as the leading protagonist.
Discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory are at present obstructed by (1) the increasing axiomania in physics and philosophy which replaces fundamental problems by problems of formulation within a certain preconceived calculus, and (2) the decreasing (since 1927) philosophical interest and sophistication both of professional physicists and of professional philosophers which results in the replacement of subtle positions by crude ones and of dialectical arguments by dogmatic ones. More especially, such discussions are obstructed by the ignorance of both opponents, and also defenders of the Copenhagen point of view, as regards the arguments which once were used in its defence. The publication of Bunge's Quantum Theory and Reality and especially of Popper's contribution to it are taken as an occasion for the restatement of Bohr's position and for the refutation of some quite popular, but surprisingly naive and uninformed objections against it. Bohr's position is distinguished both from the position of Heisenberg and from the vulgarized versions which have become part of the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” and whose inarticulateness has been a boon for all those critics who prefer easy victories to a rational debate. Einstein's main counterargument is discussed, and Bohr's refutation restated. The philosophical background and earlier forms of Bohr's views are stated also. Considering that these views are more detailed, better adapted to the facts of the microdomain than any existing alternative it follows that fundamental discussion must first return to them. Their uniqueness is not asserted, however. Here the author still maintains that a hundred shabby flowers are preferable to a single blossom, however exquisite. But a hundred shabby flowers plus an exquisite blossom are more desirable still.
The proliferating discourse surrounding quantum mechanics (QM) increasingly bridges foundational physics, technological speculation, and spiritual or philosophical narratives. Yet, the rhetorical strategies and epistemic warrants used to construct these bridges remain critically unexamined. This study performs a critical discourse analysis to identify and evaluate the narrative frameworks used to connect standard interpretations of QM with extra-scientific domains of meaning, particularly spiritual creation narratives. We employ a structured qualitative content analysis of three corpora: (1) popular science texts explicating QM (e.g., Rovelli, Greene), (2) contemporary quantum technology market reports and roadmaps (2018-2025), and (3) exemplary spiritual creation texts. Using a codebook developed from science communication and sociology of expectation frameworks, we analyze rhetorical devices, appeals to authority, and argumentative structures. Our analysis reveals three dominant rhetorical bridging strategies: (1) the "miraculous analogy," leveraging quantum weirdness to legitimize spiritual wonder; (2) the "teleological projection," wherein quantum computing's potential is presented as an inevitable, purpose-driven evolution; and (3) the "selective complementarity," which isolates specific QM concepts (e.g., observer effect) while ignoring their technical context to create false parallels with philosophical idealism. While interdisciplinary dialogue is valuable, our findings demonstrate that current popular discourse often relies on epistemically problematic analogies that risk misunderstanding both science and spirituality. We propose criteria for more rigorous, conceptually sound transdisciplinary engagement.