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Lecture notes in computer science

Layering Quantum-Resistance into Classical Digital Signature Algorithms

Teik Guan Tan, Jianying Zhou

Published Jan 1, 2021• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-91356-4_2

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Due to the development of quantum computers and quantum methods and algorithms, in order to ensure the security of information after the development of cryptographically relevant quantum computers, NIST conducted the NIST PQC competition. As a result of conducting three rounds of NIST PQC, NIST selected 4 candidates for standardization and four candidates for the fourth round (key encapsulation mechanisms BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC, and SIKE (which the developers considered unreliable)). Due to the fact that selected algorithms are based on the use of lattices and to add diversity to this list through the use of general-purpose signatures, the process of standardizing additional digital signatures for quantum-resistant cryptography has been initiated. The following types of signatures are considered for the first round of this standardization process: code-based signatures, isogeny signatures, multivariate signatures, symmetric signatures, MPC-in-the-head, and NIST-defined "other" signatures. These "other" digital signatures are mostly based on new and promising post-quantum (quantum-resistant) problems. The purpose of the work is to analyze and compare candidates for quantum-resistant digital signatures, based on new and promising quantum-resistant problems, resistant to classical and quantum attacks and side-channel attacks. The paper provides comparison of four digital signatures classified by NIST as "other", namely: ALTEQ, eMLE-Sig 2.0, KAZ-SIGN, Xifrat1-Sign.I. For this purpose, the paper presents the basic principles of each of these digital signatures, their main parameters and available at the time of consideration attack vectors. The paper also provides unconditional criteria necessary for comparison. Digital signatures were compared according to such unconditional criteria as: possible lengths of the public key, possible lengths of the personal (secret) key, length of the result of cryptographic algorithm; and conclusions are made regarding the completeness of given comparison and the possibility of further research is highlighted.
Post-quantum digital signature algorithms are being developed as an alternative to classical schemes, capable of ensuring cryptographic security even in the presence of quantum computing power. The results of the analysis and research of the FULEECA, WAVE, BISCUIT, and RYDE post-quantum digital signature algorithms, which are based on different cryptographic approaches to ensuring resistance in quantum computing environments — from code and rank schemes to multilateral quadratic constructions — providing multi-level resistance to a wide range of attacks, are presented. The analysis showed that all the algorithms considered have high potential for use in post-quantum systems, meeting key requirements for security, performance, and efficiency. At the same time, each algorithm has its own requirements for resources, key and signature sizes, implementation features, and cryptographic resistance to classical and quantum attacks. The results provide a basis for further comparative analysis, as well as for formulating recommendations for the application of each of the algorithms depending on the specifics of the information system, the level of threats, and the limitations of the implementation environment.