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Philosophy Compass

Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory

Matthias Egg, Juha T. Saatsi

Published Sep 30, 2021• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This paper surveys the status of scientific realism in relation to quantum physics, focusing on the problem of underdetermination.
DOI
10.1111/phc3.12773

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Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense).
Scientific realism holds that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or activities of scientists and those scientific theories are true of that objective world. This is antithetical to the posits of quantum physics, a body of knowledge taken as the seal of the sciences because of its incredible feat, which emphasizes observer created reality, and to that end subjective and probabilistic understanding of realities. Given this background, we contend that, if the thesis of scientific realism were to be taken as sacrosanct, nature would have remained somewhat unfavourable since nobody would have dared to ‘create’ reality other than those originally imposed by nature. And to the quantum physicist, the resort to probabilistic conception of reality is an obvious indication that nature in its dynamism is uncanny and still has billions of tricks for mankind.