This chapter previews the contributions to this volume and lays out the broader context and motivations for engaging in the scientific realism debate specifically in relation to quantum physics.
Abstract This stage-setting chapter reviews past developments and previews coming attractions. The review is an opinionated account of the scientific realism debate, one attentive to how attitudes toward the project of interpreting physical theories implicate, and are implicated by, positions in the debate. Two foundations of physics controversies where appeals to Renormalization Group considerations loom large are ongoing. One controversy concerns the role of apparently false assumptions in explaining critical phenomena, such as phase transitions. Another controversy concerns how to interpret, and whether to believe, the interacting quantum field theories making up the Standard Model of particle physics. Close attention to those controversies could afford traction on sweeping questions of scientific realism. This chapter’s preview of coming attractions will sketch the controversies, and try to indicate where the traction comes from, and where it might lead.
Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This book defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. The first part of the book introduces the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism and discusses entity realism, which is the most important precursor of causal realism. It also argues against the view that the very debate on scientific realism is not worth pursuing at all. In the second part, causal realism is developed and the key distinction between two kinds of warrant for scientific claims is clarified. This distinction proves its usefulness in a case study analyzing the discovery of the neutrino. It is also shown to be effective against an influential kind of pessimism, according to which even our best present theories are likely to be replaced some day by radically distinct alternatives. The final part discusses some specific challenges posed to realism by quantum physics, such as non-locality, delayed choice and the absence of particles in relativistic quantum theories.
Scientific realists believe, of successful scientific theories, that they’re at least approximately true. Quantum mechanics (QM) lays credible claim to being the most successful theory in the history of human science. But what does a scientific realist believe when she believes QM? And what can we learn about the scientific realism debate from the fact that that debate, conducted in abstraction, appears incapable of settling what a realist about QM should believe when she believes QM? This contribution explores both questions.