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On the meaning of EPR’s Reality Criterion

Márton Gömöri, Gábor Hofer‐Szabó

Published Sep 26, 2021• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth.

DOI
10.1007/s11229-021-03382-3

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Abstract This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth.
The article offers a rereading of Bohr’s reply to the argument of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) concerning the incompleteness, or else nonlocality, of quantum mechanics. Bohr shows EPR’s argument to be deficient on their own terms, by virtue of an ambiguity found in their application of the criterion of reality they propose to the phenomena in question. He also offers an alternative interpretation of the EPR experiment itself, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, as part of his overall interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
Ignited by Einstein and Bohr a century ago, the philosophical struggle about Reality is yet unfinished, with no signs of a swift resolution. Despite vast technological progress fueled by the iconic Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen paper (EPR) [1][2][3], the intricate link between ontic and epistemic aspects of Quantum Theory (QT) has greatly hindered our grip on Reality and further progress in physical theory. Fallacies concealed by tortuous logical negations made EPR comprehension much harder than it could have been had Einstein written it himself in German. EPR is plagued with preconceptions about what a physical property is, the 'Uncertainty Principle', and the Principle of Locality. Numerous interpretations of QT vis à vis Reality exist and are keenly disputed [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. This is the first of a series of articles arguing for a novel physical interpretation I call ‘The Ontic Probability Interpretation’ (TOPI). A gradual explanation of TOPI is given intertwined with a meticulous logico-philosophical scrutiny of EPR, with Part I focusing on the meaning of Einstein’s ‘incompleteness’ claim for QT: a conceptual confusion, a preconception about Reality, and a flawed dichotomy are shown to be severe obstacles for the EPR argument to succeed. Part II completes the analysis, proving EPR claim of ‘incompleteness’ for QT is fallacious [12]. Part III further develops TOPI, while scrutinizing the mythical ‘Schrödinger’s Cat’, as well as the ‘Basis’ and ‘Measurement’ pseudo-problems [13]. Part IV introduces QR/TOPI: a new theory that solves the century-old problem of integrating Special Relativity with Quantum Theory [14].
The notion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) "element of reality" is much discussed in the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Recently, it has become particularly relevant due to a proposed criterion of the physical reality of a given quantum mechanical observable [A. L. O. Bilobran and R. M. Angelo, Europhys. Lett. 112, 40005 (2015)]. We examine this proposal and its consequently related measure of non-locality [V. S. Gomez and R. M. Angelo, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012123, (2018)] and argue that the criterion is ill-described as quantifying physical reality without introducing serious inconsistency with the basic notions of realism that under-gird enquiry. We agree that this reality criterion demonstrates, along with the famous GHZ results, that general quantum observable values make for poor elements of reality. However, we also argue that this does not mean no such elements of reality are to be found in quantum theory. By arguing for, and adopting, probability distributions as these elements of reality instead, we demonstrate that the criterion of physical reality is actually one of observable predictability. We then examine the relationship of realism-based non-locality to the Bell form and find that, despite the flawed premise, this measure does indeed codify non-locality that is not captured by Bell inequalities.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.