Recent studies have shown that Einstein did not write the EPR paper and that he was disappointed with the outcome. He thought, rightly, that his own argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory was badly presented in the paper. We reconstruct the argument of EPR, indicate the reasons Einstein was dissatisfied with it, and discuss Einstein's own argument. We show that many commentators have been misled by the obscurity of EPR into proposing interpretations of its argument that do not accurately represent Einstein's own views. Finally, we evaluate Einstein's own incompleteness argument, concluding that recent experimental findings have likely shown it to be unsound.
Recent studies have shown that Einstein did not write the EPR paper and that he was disappointed with the outcome. He thought, rightly, that his own argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory was badly presented in the paper. We reconstruct the argument of EPR, indicate the reasons Einstein was dissatisfied with it, and discuss Einstein's own argument. We show that many commentators have been misled by the obscurity of EPR into proposing interpretations of its argument that do not accurately represent Einstein's own views. Finally, we evaluate Einstein's own incompleteness argument, concluding that recent experimental findings have likely shown it to be unsound.
This chapter details not only the prehistory of EPR but also examines the structure and logic of the EPR paper – including Einstein’s own preferred version of the argument for incompleteness. We here attempt a seamless interweaving of the excellent extant literature with additional details that have emerged from our work and the recent work of others. Some examples of new aspects in this prehistory of EPR include evidence of a ‘proto’ photon-box thought experiment Einstein had developed in connection with his ill-starred collaboration with Emil Rupp in 1926. We also describe the potential importance to this prehistory of Einstein’s paper with Tolman and Podolsky and of Einstein’s seminar and discussions with Schrödinger in Berlin in the early 1930s.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
More than 70 years after its publication, the article by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [88] is still cited hundreds of times every year in the literature; this is a very exceptional case of longevity for a scientific article! There is some irony in this situation since, for a long time, the majority of physicists did not pay much attention to the EPR reasoning. They considered it as historically interesting, but with no precise relevance to modern quantum mechanics; the argument was even sometimes completely misinterpreted. Astriking example is given in the Einstein-Born correspondence [89] where Born, even in comments that he wrote after Einstein's death, clearly shows that he never completely understood the nature of the objections raised by EPR. Born went on thinking that the point of Einstein was a stubborn rejection of indeterminism (“look, Albert, indeterminism is not so bad!”), while actually the major concern of EPR was locality and/or separability (we come back later to these terms, which are related to the notion of space-time). If giants like Born could be misled in this way, no surprise that, later on, many others made similar mistakes! This is why, in what follows, we will take an approach that may look elementary, but at least has the advantage of putting the emphasis on the logical structure of the arguments and their generality. Doing so, we will closely follow neither the historical development of the ideas nor the formulation of the original article, but rather will emphasize the generality of the EPR reasoning.
Einstein's 1927 argument for incompleteness A huge literature arose out of the famous ‘EPR’ paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935), entitled ‘Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?’. The EPR paper argued, on the basis of (among other things) the absence of action at a distance, that quantum theory must be incomplete. It is less well-known that a much simpler argument, leading to the same conclusion, was presented by Einstein eight years earlier in the general discussion at the fifth Solvay conference (pp. 440ff.). Einstein compares and contrasts two views about the nature of the wave function ψ , for the specific case of a single electron. According to view I, ψ represents an ensemble (or ‘cloud’) of electrons, while according to view II, ψ is a complete description of an individual electron. Einstein argues that view II is incompatible with locality, and that to avoid this, in addition to ψ there should exist a localised particle (along the lines of de Broglie's theory). Thus, according to this reasoning, if one assumes locality, then quantum theory (as normally understood today) is incomplete. The conclusion of Einstein's argument in 1927 is the same as that of EPR in 1935, even if the form of the argument is rather different. Einstein considers electrons striking a screen with a small hole that diffracts the electron wave, which on the far side of the screen spreads out uniformly in all directions and strikes a photographic film in the shape of a hemisphere with large radius (see Einstein's figure, p. 440).
Einstein’s opposition to the quantum theory is well known to physicists, but his reasons for being dissatisfied are not. Einstein regarded the theory as not only incomplete, but as fundamentally inadequate. He believed that the only reasonable interpretation of the quantum formalism was an ‘‘ensemble interpretation,’’ but he also thought that this interpretation and others were incomplete and irremediably inadequate, because they failed to describe the objective, real states of individual systems. He hoped, and expected, that a better theory would be developed—one expressed in terms of individuals having their own real states and from which the quantum theory could be recovered as an approximation.