The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
Over fifty years ago Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published a striking argument that quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality – that is, that some elements of physical reality fail to have a counterpart in quantum-theoretical description. What made this a challenge to the quantum-theoretical Weltanschauung was the very mild character of the sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity on which their argument hinged: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” The argument consists in pointing out that it is possible to construct a quantum-mechanical state ψ with the following properties: The state ψ describes two noninteracting systems (I and II). In almost all discussions the two systems are taken to be two particles, and the absence of relevant interaction is built in by taking ψ to assign negligible probability to finding the particles closer together than some macroscopically large distance. By measuring an observable A of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable P of system II. If, instead, one chooses to measure a different observable B of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable Q of system II. The observables P and Q are represented in quantum theory by noncommuting operators, which means that they cannot both have definite values.
The article considers the implications of the experiment of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR), and of the exchange (concerning this experiment) between EPR and Bohr concerning the incompleteness, or else nonlocality, of quantum mechanics for our understanding of quantum phenomena and quantum probability. The article specifically argues that in the case of quantum phenomena, including those involved in the experiments of the EPR type, the probabilistic considerations are important even when the predictions concerned can be made with certainty, due to the impossibility, in general, to repeat any given quantum experiment with the same outcome. The article argue that this fact, not properly considered or taken into account by EPR, makes it difficult and ultimately impossible to sustain their argument, which it is consistent with Bohr’s counterargument to EPR and with his view of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics.
A critical reconsideration of the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) paper shows that the EPR argument can be developed without using the concept of `element of physical reality', thus eliminating any philosophical element in the logical chains of the paper. Deprived of its philosophical ornament, the EPR argument plainly reduces to require what quantum mechanics can not do: to assign definite values to two incompatible physical quantities. Hidden variables theories built up according to Bell - type theorems are formulated on the basis of the assumption that the locality condition implies the statistical independence between two measurements space - like separated. This assumption is valid only with the additional one that statistical dependence between two measurements requires a causal connection between them. This additional assumption rules out the possibility that statistical dependence may due to an intrinsic property of the physical system under study. Therefore, hidden variables theories are built up with a restriction which leads them to be disproved by experiment. Quantum mechanical non - locality, invoked for describing EPR - type experiments, is strictly connected to the hypothesis (NDV hypothesis) according to which the twin photons of entangled pairs do not have a definite polarization before measurements. Both hypotheses are used only for describing EPR experiments and not for making predictions. Therefore, they can be dropped without reducing the predictive power of quantum mechanics concerning entangled photons pairs. Furthermore, both hypotheses can be experimentally tested by a modification of a standard experimental apparatus designed for studying entangled photons pairs.
The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) argument was originally posed as a challenge to the completeness of quantum mechanics, rather than its empirical adequacy. While subsequent developments—most notably Bell’s theorem and experimental tests of nonlocal correlations— have constrained classes of hidden-variable theories, they have not resolved the underlying on- tological question raised by EPR: whether the quantum state exhausts physical reality. In this paper, we revisit the EPR criterion of completeness from the perspective of a temporally grounded physical framework, the Temporal Inertia Framework (TIF). We argue that the orig- inal EPR dilemma rests on an implicit assumption that physical reality must be specified on spacelike hypersurfaces, an assumption shared by both EPR and Bohr. By relaxing this assump- tion and allowing physical correlations to arise from shared temporal structure rather than local spatial variables or superluminal influence, one may satisfy the EPR realism criterion without violating relativistic causality or Bell-type constraints. Quantum mechanics is thus interpreted as operationally complete but ontologically incomplete, with quantum indeterminacy emerging from dynamical interactions with a proposed underlying temporal structure.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
Abstract The 1935 Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paper, “Can Quantum–Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, stands as a landmark in the foundational debates over quantum mechanics. While the paper has since become one of Einstein’s most cited works, it initially received little attention, and the feature of non-locality, which was central to the argument in the paper, was largely neglected for decades. In this paper, I offer two reasons for this early neglect of non-locality in the immediate aftermath of EPR. First, early responses to the EPR paper defended the completeness of quantum mechanics by reformulating the thought experiment the authors had presented, thereby obscuring the feature of quantum mechanics the authors had wished to highlight. Bohr’s influential reply, for instance, substituted the specific thought experiment presented by EPR with the two-slit experiment, thus suppressing the entanglement between spatially separated systems. A second reason for the marginalization of non-locality was the tendency to see Einstein’s critique of quantum mechanics as proceeding from a commitment to determinism, though this in fact played no role in the EPR paper or in his later writings and correspondence. This paper argues that the failure to recognize non-locality was partly a result of the rhetorical manoeuvring by EPR’s critics, but also to a broader philosophical climate dominated by concerns over determinism, which effectively eclipsed all other conceptual issues, Only with Bell’s theorem in the 1960s did non-locality return as a serious focus of foundational inquiry.