© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

Terms Privacy Legal Notice

Physical Review A

Reply to “Comment on ‘Practical quantum key distribution with geometrically uniform states' ”

Konstantin Kravtsov, S. N. Molotkov

Published Aug 3, 2021• 1 citation

Abstract

In reply to the Comment by D. A. Kronberg [Phys. Rev. A 104, 026401 (2021)], we would like to reassure readers that none of the critiques actually apply to our final result of the security analysis, namely, Eq. (30). The major part of the Comment, as well as the conclusions, are derived from the consideration of the multiphoton component, which does not appear in our final result. At the same time, we admit that our original interpretation of multiphoton terms in Eq. (26) as well as the potential extension of Eq. (30) with such terms were not correct. The single-photon component plays an essential role in quantum key distribution and was the only one to appear in the final key rate equation, which is valid against the most general collective attack. The Comment concludes that Eq. (30) ``is incorrect ... and the security proof ... is not complete,'' which, as we show, is not the case.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.104.026402

Related papers

Comment on “Practical quantum key distribution with geometrically uniform states”

Dmitry Anatolevich Kronberg

In a recent paper, Kravtsov and Molotkov [Phys. Rev. A 100, 042329 (2019)] propose a quantum key distribution protocol and claim ``the protocol security is analyzed by an explicit construction of the most optimal unitary attack'' and ``we provide an extensive security analysis of the proposed protocol by considering a general symmetric unitary attack, and give succinct relations for the asymptotic secret key rate in the case of $N=8$.'' We show that these claims are erroneous and propose two attacks which are more effective than the attacks considered in the paper of Kravtsov and Molotkov.

Physical Review A•Aug 3, 2021•3 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Semiquantum-key distribution using less than four quantum states’ ”

Xiangfu Zou, Daowen Qiu

In the preceding Comment [Phys. Rev. A 83, 046301 (2011)], Boyer and Mor pointed out that the first conclusion of Lemma 1 in our paper [X. Zou, D. Qiu, L. Li, L. Wu, and L. Li, Phys. Rev. A 79, 052312 (2009)] is not correct, and therefore, the proof of Theorem 5 based on Lemma 1 is wrong. Furthermore, they gave a direct proof for Theorem 5 and affirmed the conclusions in our original paper. In this Reply, we admit the first conclusion of Lemma 1 is not correct, but we need to point out that the second conclusion of Lemma 1 is correct. Accordingly, all the proofs for Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorems 3--6 are based only on the second conclusion of Lemma 1 and therefore are correct.

arXiv:1010.4233•Physical Review A•Apr 11, 2011•23 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum dense key distribution’ ”

Ivo Pietro Degiovanni, Ivano Ruo Berchera, Stefania Castelletto +4 more

In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the quantum dense key distribution protocol, detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by W\'ojcik in his Comment [W\'ojcik, Phys. Rev. A 71, 016301 (2005)].

arXiv:quant-ph/0410221•Physical Review A•Jan 28, 2005•12 citations

Reply to Comment on "Deterministic six states protocol for quantum communication" [arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] / Phys. Lett. A 374 (2010) 1097]

Jesni Shamsul Shaari, Marco Lucamarini, Asmaʼ Ahmad Bahari

We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.

arXiv:1110.1170•Oct 6, 2011•0 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum key distribution for d -level systems with generalized Bell states’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to $d$-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.

arXiv:quant-ph/0509189•Physical Review A•Dec 20, 2005•2 citations

Reply to Comment on

Jesni Shamsul Shaari, Marco Lucamarini, Asmaʼ Ahmad Bahari

We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.

•Oct 6, 2011•0 citations

In reply to the Comment by D. A. Kronberg [Phys. Rev. A 104, 026401 (2021)], we would like to reassure readers that none of the critiques actually apply to our final result of the security analysis, namely, Eq. (30). The major part of the Comment, as well as the conclusions, are derived from the consideration of the multiphoton component, which does not appear in our final result. At the same time, we admit that our original interpretation of multiphoton terms in Eq. (26) as well as the potential extension of Eq. (30) with such terms were not correct. The single-photon component plays an essential role in quantum key distribution and was the only one to appear in the final key rate equation, which is valid against the most general collective attack. The Comment concludes that Eq. (30) ``is incorrect ... and the security proof ... is not complete,'' which, as we show, is not the case.

In a recent paper, Kravtsov and Molotkov [Phys. Rev. A 100, 042329 (2019)] propose a quantum key distribution protocol and claim ``the protocol security is analyzed by an explicit construction of the most optimal unitary attack'' and ``we provide an extensive security analysis of the proposed protocol by considering a general symmetric unitary attack, and give succinct relations for the asymptotic secret key rate in the case of

N=8

.'' We show that these claims are erroneous and propose two attacks which are more effective than the attacks considered in the paper of Kravtsov and Molotkov.

In the preceding Comment [Phys. Rev. A 83, 046301 (2011)], Boyer and Mor pointed out that the first conclusion of Lemma 1 in our paper [X. Zou, D. Qiu, L. Li, L. Wu, and L. Li, Phys. Rev. A 79, 052312 (2009)] is not correct, and therefore, the proof of Theorem 5 based on Lemma 1 is wrong. Furthermore, they gave a direct proof for Theorem 5 and affirmed the conclusions in our original paper. In this Reply, we admit the first conclusion of Lemma 1 is not correct, but we need to point out that the second conclusion of Lemma 1 is correct. Accordingly, all the proofs for Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorems 3--6 are based only on the second conclusion of Lemma 1 and therefore are correct.

In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to

d

-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.