I. Prigogine has proposed, and the writings of N. S. Krylov to some extent suggest, a novel and unorthodox solution to foundational problems in statistical mechanics. In particular, the view claims to offer new insight into two interconnected problems: underst and ing the role of probability in physics, and that of reconciling the irreversibility of physical processes with the temporal symmetry (time reversal invariance) of dynamical theories. The approach in question advocates a conception of the state of a system which incorporates features of the quantum mechanical state concept in a context, classical statistical mechanics, where quantum considerations are generally considered to be irrelevant. I examine the plausibility of this new approach by offering an analysis of the various notions of state employed in modern physics. In the first chapter, I analyze the conceptual connections between dynamical laws and the nature of a system's state. I argue that laws and states are correlative. In constructing dynamical theories one does not start with a fixed or pre-determined state concept. Neither is one given the laws of the theory from which the conception of state is derived. Rather, we get the law/state structure as a "package." In light of this general analysis, I next examine the notion of state employed in the quantum theory. Here I consider a variety of conceptions of quantum states and assess their ability to answer the "paradoxes" of quantum theory. I pay particular attention to the role of probability and related restrictions on the realization of certain states. The new approach to statistical mechanics proposes to exploit similar restrictions on states in order to resolve the irreversibility problem. But is this unorthodox approach viable? In the final four chapters, I offer a detailed critique of this approach, examining the plausibility of the radical reworking of the state concept. I argue that while some important progress can be made, certain old puzzles remain, and new and difficult ones arise--ones which raise serious doubts about the ultimate success of this particular approach. I conclude, however, by arguing that such radical proposals are not unmotivated; and that novel and unorthodox proposals concerning the foundations of statistical mechanics must be taken seriously.
I. Prigogine has proposed, and the writings of N. S. Krylov to some extent suggest, a novel and unorthodox solution to foundational problems in statistical mechanics. In particular, the view claims to offer new insight into two interconnected problems: underst and ing the role of probability in physics, and that of reconciling the irreversibility of physical processes with the temporal symmetry (time reversal invariance) of dynamical theories. The approach in question advocates a conception of the state of a system which incorporates features of the quantum mechanical state concept in a context, classical statistical mechanics, where quantum considerations are generally considered to be irrelevant. I examine the plausibility of this new approach by offering an analysis of the various notions of state employed in modern physics. In the first chapter, I analyze the conceptual connections between dynamical laws and the nature of a system's state. I argue that laws and states are correlative. In constructing dynamical theories one does not start with a fixed or pre-determined state concept. Neither is one given the laws of the theory from which the conception of state is derived. Rather, we get the law/state structure as a "package." In light of this general analysis, I next examine the notion of state employed in the quantum theory. Here I consider a variety of conceptions of quantum states and assess their ability to answer the "paradoxes" of quantum theory. I pay particular attention to the role of probability and related restrictions on the realization of certain states. The new approach to statistical mechanics proposes to exploit similar restrictions on states in order to resolve the irreversibility problem. But is this unorthodox approach viable? In the final four chapters, I offer a detailed critique of this approach, examining the plausibility of the radical reworking of the state concept. I argue that while some important progress can be made, certain old puzzles remain, and new and difficult ones arise--ones which raise serious doubts about the ultimate success of this particular approach. I conclude, however, by arguing that such radical proposals are not unmotivated; and that novel and unorthodox proposals concerning the foundations of statistical mechanics must be taken seriously.
Through extended consideration of two wide classes of case studies -- dilute gases and linear systems -- I explore the ways in which assumptions of probability and irreversibility occur in contemporary statistical mechanics, where the latter is understood as primarily concerned with the derivation of quantitative higher-level equations of motion, and only derivatively with underpinning the equilibrium concept in thermodynamics. I argue that at least in this wide class of examples, (i) irreversibility is introduced through a reasonably well-defined initial-state condition which does not precisely map onto those in the extant philosophical literature; (ii) probability is explicitly required both in the foundations and in the predictions of the theory. I then consider the same examples, as well as the more general context, in the light of quantum mechanics, and demonstrate that while the analysis of irreversibility is largely unaffected by quantum considerations, the notion of statistical-mechanical probability is entirely reduced to quantum-mechanical probability.
What is the physical significance of entropy? What is the physical origin of irreversibility? Do entropy and irreversibility exist only for complex and macroscopic systems? The bulk of the physics community accepts and teaches that all these fundamental questions are rationalized within statistical mechanics. Indeed, for everyday laboratory physics, the mathematical formalism of statistical mechanics (canonical and grandcanonica1, Boltzmann, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac distributions) allows a successful description of the thermodynamic equilibrium properties of matter, including entropy values. But an ever growing handful of physicists (Schrodinger among the first) have realized that, even in its explanation of the meaning of entropy, statistical mechanics is impaired by ambiguities and logical inconsistencies. They have started to search for a better theory to eliminate these stumbling blocks while maintaining the mathematical formalism that has been so successful in so many applications. This handful of upstreamers must not be confused with the many schools of physicists that have thrived on the more renowned incompleteness of statistical mechanics, namely, the lack of a quantitative (and the weakness of the qualitative) explanation of the origin of irreversibility. In these studies the thrust is provided by the discovery that the macroscopic dynamics of certain complex systems may be modeled using a few-degrees-of-freedom nonlinear Hamiltonian with singularities that give rise to bifurcations and chaotic behavior. These results have generated successful ways to describe irreversible behavior, but their link to the origin of irreversibility is still only heuristic (what is the connection between the nonlinear model Hamiltonian and the true full Hamiitonian?) and does not provide yet a rigorous resolution of the century-old paradox of the conflict between the irreversibiiity of macroscopic behavior, and the reversibility of the laws of mechanics. To resolve both the problem of the meaning of entropy and that of the origin of irreversibility we have built entropy and irreversibility into the laws of mechanics. The result is a theory that we call quantum thermodynamics that has all the necessary properties to combine mechanics and thermodynamics uniting all the successful results of both theories, eliminating the logical inconsistencies of statistical mechanics and the paradox on irreversibiiity, and providing an entirely new perspective on the microscopic origin of irreversibility, nonlinearity and therefore chaotic behavior. The mathematical formalism of quantum thermodynamics differs from that of statistical mechanics mainly in the equation of motion which is nonlinear but has solutions identical to those of the Schrodinger equation for all the states for which statistical mechanics reduces to quantum mechanics. The physical meaning of the formalism of quantum thermodynamics differs more drastically from that of statistical mechanics. The significance of the state operator of quantum thermodynamics is entirely different from that of the density operator of statistical mechanics, even though the two are mathematically equivalent. Indeed they obey different equations of motion. In particular, quantum thermodynamics is concerned only with those systems for which quantum mechanics would describe the states with vectors in Hilbert space or, equivalently, projection operators. Using a well known jargon, we can say that quantum thermodynamics like quantum mechanics is concerned only with pure quantum states. However, it postulates that the set of pure quantum states of a system is much broader than contemplated by quantum mechanics. Pure quantum states must be described by operators defined by all the features of projection operators except the condition of idempotence. As a result, an operator that within statistical mechanics would describe a mixed quantum state (that is, the average state of a statistical mixture of identical systems in different pure quantum states) in quantum thermodynamics describes a pure quantum state, a state that neither quantum mechanics non statistical mechanics would contemplate. Conceptually, the increased richness of pure quantum states is a new revolutionary postulate of quantum physics. But from the point of view of the statistical mechanics practitioners the new theory is not as traumatic as it seems. Whenever one uses a nonidempotent density operator to describe a thermodynamic equilibrium state one simply has to reinterpret it as one of the new pure quantum states. One even saves the usual ad hoc arguments on thermal baths and reservoirs that are usually required in statistical mechanics to justify the use of a nonidempotent density operator to describe the state of a system. In this paper we discuss the background and formalism of quantum thermodynamics including its nonlinear equation of motion and the main general results. Our objective is to show in a not-too-technical manner that this theory provides indeed a complete and coherent resolution of the century-old dilemma on the meaning of entropy and the origin of irreversibility. As a byproduct, we discuss a long set of criteria that a theory should meet in order to afford the same claim.
Statistical classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are developed and well-known theories that represent a basis for modern physics. Statistical classical mechanics enable the derivation of the properties of large bodies by investigating the movements of small atoms and molecules which comprise these bodies using Newton's classical laws. Quantum mechanics defines the laws of movement of small particles at small atomic distances by considering them as probability waves. The laws of quantum mechanics are described by the Schrödinger equation. The laws of such movements are significantly different from the laws of movement of large bodies, such as planets or stones. The two described theories are well known and have been well studied. As these theories contain numerous paradoxes, many scientists doubt their internal consistencies. However, these paradoxes can be resolved within the framework of the existing physics without the introduction of new laws. To clarify the paper for the inexperienced reader, we include certain necessary basic concepts of statistical physics and quantum mechanics in this paper without the use of formulas. Exact formulas and explanations are included in the Appendices. The text is supplemented by illustrations to enhance the understanding of the paper. The paradoxes underlying thermodynamics and quantum mechanics are also discussed. The approaches to the solutions of these paradoxes are suggested. The first approach is dependent on the influence of the external observer (environment), which disrupts the correlations in the system. The second approach is based on the limits of the self-knowledge of the system for the case in which both the external observer and the environment are included in the considered system. The concepts of observable dynamics, ideal dynamics, and unpredictable dynamics are introduced. The phenomenon of complex (living) systems is contemplated from the point of view of these dynamics.
This is Part 1 of a four part paper, intended to redress some of the most fundamental confusions in the subject of physical time directionality, and represent the concepts accurately. There are widespread fallacies in the subject that need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics students and philosophers. Parts 1 and 2 are about quantum mechanics, Part 3 is about fundamental concepts, and Part 4 is about cosmology. We start in Part 1 by analysing the time reversal symmetry of quantum probability laws. Time reversal symmetry is defined as the property of invariance under the time reversal transformation, T: t -> -t. It is shown that quantum mechanics (classical or relativistic) is strongly time asymmetric in its probability laws. This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric or reversible. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large philosophical and scientific conclusions are drawn from it. But it is an error. The fact is that while quantum mechanics is widely claimed to be reversible on the basis of two formal mathematical properties (that it does have), these properties do not represent invariance under the time reversal transformation. A recent experiment (Batalhao at alia, 2015) showing irreversibility of quantum thermodynamics is discussed as an illustration of this result. Most physicists remain unaware of the errors, decades after they were first demonstrated. Orthodox specialists in the philosophy of time who are aware of the error continue to refer to the ‘time symmetry’ or ‘reversibility’ of quantum mechanics anyway – and exploit the ambiguity to claim false implications about physical time reversal symmetry in nature. The excuse for perpetrating the confusion is that, since it is has now become customary to refer to the formal properties of quantum mechanics as ‘reversibility’ or ‘time reversal symmetry’, we should just keep referring to them by this name, even though they are not time reversal symmetry. This causes endless confusion, in attempts to explain the physical irreversibility of our universe, and in philosophical discussions of implications of physics for the nature of time. The failure of time reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics changes the interpretation of modern physics in a deep way. It changes the problem of explaining the real irreversibility found throughout nature.
In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.
One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous approach away from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schrodinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. A well-known explanatory framework due to Ludwig Boltzmann traces the rarity of " abnormal" thermodynamic phenomena to the scarcity of the initial conditions that lead to it. After all, physical laws are no more than algorithms and these are expected to generate different results according to different initial conditions, hence Boltzmann's insight that violations of thermodynamic laws are possible but highly improbable. Yet Boltzmann introduces probabilities into this explanatory scheme, and since the latter is couched in terms of classical mechanics, these probabilities must be interpreted as a result of ignorance of the exact state the system is in. Quantum mechanics has taught us otherwise. Here the attempts to explain why we never observe macroscopic superpositions have led to different interpretations of the formalism and to different solutions to the quantum measurement problem. These solutions introduce additional interpretations to the meaning of probability over and above ignorance of the definite state of the physical system: quantum probabilities may result from pure chance. Notwithstanding the success of the Boltzmannian framework in explaining the thermodynamic arrow in time it leaves us with a foundational puzzle: how can ignorance play a role in scientific explanation of objective reality? In turns out that two opposing solutions to the quantum measurement problem in which probabilities arise from the stochastic character of the underlying dynamics may scratch this explanatory itch. By offering a dynamical justification to the probabilities employed in classical statistical mechanics these two interpretations complete the Boltzmannian explanatory scheme and allow us to exorcize ignorance from scientific explanations of unobserved phenomena. In this thesis I argue that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow in time is closely related to the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, i.e., to the measurement problem. We may solve one by fiat and thus solve the other, but it seems unwise to try solving them independently. I substantiate this claim by presenting two possible interpretations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Differing as they do on the meaning of the probabilities they introduce into the otherwise deterministic dynamics, these interpretations offer alternative explanatory schemes to the standard Boltzmannian statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic approach to equilibrium. I then show how notwithstanding their current empirical equivalence, the two approaches diverge at the continental divide between scientific realism and anti-realism.