From this chapter we start our exposition of quantum mechanics. First, we lay down the typical setting of a quantum mechanical problem. The fundamental feature of quantum indeterminism and the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is emphasized. We proceed by constructing, from the single notion of measurement, all the essential conceptual ingredients of quantum mechanics (i.e., the concepts of observable, state and system). Then we formulate the target questions that quantum mechanics aims to solve. Next, we proceed to state the specific laws that constitute the logical premise of the subject. Finally, we demonstrate how the laws, most dominantly, the superposition principle (the fact that quantum probabilities interfere) provides an improved recipe for obtaining the answers to the target questions of quantum mechanics. This also leads to a more refined definition of the quantum state. In order to be able to quickly introduce the basic framework of quantum mechanics, we restrict the discussion to a simple scenario of “instantaneously subsequent measurements” (where there is no time evolution), and where states can be prepared by a single measurement (in the standard jargon, this would be called, “quantum mechanics without degeneracy”; these are descriptions involving CSCOs comprising just one observable).
Quantitative studies of irreversibility in statistical mechanics often involve the consideration of a reverse process, whose definition has been the object of many discussions, in particular for quantum mechanical systems. Here we show that the reverse channel very naturally arises from Bayesian retrodiction, in both classical and quantum theories. Previous paradigmatic results, such as Jarzynski's equality, Crooks' fluctuation theorem, and Tasaki's two-measurement fluctuation theorem for closed driven quantum systems, are all shown to be consistent with retrodictive arguments. Also, various corrections that were introduced to deal with nonequilibrium steady states or open quantum systems are justified on general grounds as remnants of Bayesian retrodiction. More generally, with the reverse process constructed on consistent logical inference, fluctuation relations acquire a much broader form and scope.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state
S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state
S is a subset of a state space
S={Z}, such that
S always contains many elements
Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of
S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements
Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of
S is described in terms of sequential time
n∈N, which is updated according to
n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time
n can be separated from relational time
t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each
n, in which
t represents the knowledge at sequential time
n about the temporal relations between present and past events.
We propose a category-theoretic definition of retrodiction and use it to exhibit a time-reversal symmetry for all quantum channels. We do this by introducing retrodiction families and functors, which capture many intuitive properties that retrodiction should satisfy and are general enough to encompass both classical and quantum theories alike. Classical Bayesian inversion and all rotated and averaged Petz recovery maps define retrodiction families in our sense. However, averaged rotated Petz recovery maps, including the universal recovery map of Junge-Renner-Sutter-Wilde-Winter, do not define retrodiction functors, since they fail to satisfy some compositionality properties. Among all the examples we found of retrodiction families, the original Petz recovery map is the only one that defines a retrodiction functor. In addition, retrodiction functors exhibit an inferential time-reversal symmetry consistent with the standard formulation of quantum theory. The existence of such a retrodiction functor seems to be in stark contrast to the many no-go results on time-reversal symmetry for quantum channels. One of the main reasons is because such works defined time-reversal symmetry on the category of quantum channels alone, whereas we define it on the category of quantum channels and quantum states. This fact further illustrates the importance of a prior in time-reversal symmetry.
Despite scholarly consensus on the empirical facts, ever since its inception in the 1920s there has been deep disagreement about how to interpret quantum theory. “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world would be like, if the theory were true.” All scientific theories require interpretation, since strictly speaking what they describe are our experiences of the world rather than the world itself. Thus, whether we are trying to explain or merely describe the world, we are always engaged in inference. To make inferences we need a context for interpretation. For any given claim this context is provided locally by related theories, more broadly by disciplinary paradigms, and ultimately by worldview claims about the nature of reality. The challenge in interpreting scientific theories is to integrate them into this hierarchy of knowledge. Usually this is not too difficult. New theories often require adjustments to nearby theories, but in doing so we can rely on paradigms to make them cohere. More rarely paradigmatic assumptions are themselves challenged, but in that case scientists can fall back on their worldview to make sense of the needed changes. By implication, the most difficult interpretive problems arise when our worldview is called into question, which leaves us without any frame of reference on which to fall back. Quantum theory poses a worldview problem. Prior to the quantum revolution the classical worldview could not be tested scientifically and so it was essentially metaphysical. Even though it corresponded to our experience of material objects, we lacked proof that it adequately represented the deep structure of reality. By giving us access to that deep structure for the first time, quantum mechanics made it possible to do such a test, or “experimental metaphysics.” Unfortunately, the results seemed to contradict classical assumptions, at least on the sub-atomic level.
This chapter tries to pinpoint the epistemological information that a scientist (or an epistemologist) anxious to keep away from "metaphysical" commitments of any sort may nevertheless derive from quantum physics. But, valuable as it is (mainly as a guide for discriminating the genuinely scientific questions from those of a more "mixed" sort) this standpoint is not to be raised to the status of a universal way of thinking that would be the only admissible one. Within the veiled reality conception Einstemian separability, applies to empirical, not to independent, reality; which means that special relativity theory does not concern independent reality. In his mature years Heisenberg developed a conception of the world in which quite a central role is played by the notion of potentia. He associated wave functions to potentia. In a sense, Heisenberg's approach is ontological, but his ontology is of a subtle kind, for along with actuality it leaves room for potentialities.