From Objective Amplitudes to Bayesian Probabilities

Ariel Caticha

Published Jan 1, 2006• 8 citations

Abstract

We review the Consistent Amplitude approach to Quantum Theory and argue that quantum probabilities are explicitly Bayesian. In this approach amplitudes are tools for inference. They codify objective information about how complicated experimental setups are put together from simpler ones. Thus, probabilities may be partially subjective but the amplitudes are not. 1

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