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AIP conference proceedings

Bayesian Intersubjectivity and Quantum Theory

Marcos Pérez-Suárez

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Two of the major approaches to probability, namely, frequentism and (subjectivistic) Bayesian theory, are discussed, together with the replacement of frequentist objectivity for Bayesian intersubjectivity. This discussion is then expanded to Quantum Theory, as quantum states and operations can be seen as structural elements of a subjective nature.

DOI
10.1063/1.1874582

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AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2007•2 citations
Two of the major approaches to probability, namely, frequentism and (subjectivistic) Bayesian theory, are discussed, together with the replacement of frequentist objectivity for Bayesian intersubjectivity. This discussion is then expanded to Quantum Theory, as quantum states and operations can be seen as structural elements of a subjective nature.
Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.