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International Journal of Quantum Information

INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO QUANTUM INFORMATION

Christopher A. Fuchs, Marcos Pérez-Suárez, David J. Santos

Published Dec 17, 2004• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Providing quantum theory, and thus quantum information, with some meaning, can only be the result of adopting a well-defined approach to the notion of probability. From a subjectivistic Bayesian approach to the latter, it follows that not only quantum states, but also quantum operations, are structural elements of a subjective nature. Furthermore, we provide a representation of any quantum operation as a stochastic matrix.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749905000803

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Providing quantum theory, and thus quantum information, with some meaning, can only be the result of adopting a well-defined approach to the notion of probability. From a subjectivistic Bayesian approach to the latter, it follows that not only quantum states, but also quantum operations, are structural elements of a subjective nature. Furthermore, we provide a representation of any quantum operation as a stochastic matrix.
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. In this paper, we show that, despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite answers for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally, we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography.
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. Despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite predictions for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography. There are excellent reasons for interpreting quantum states as states of knowledge. A classic
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.